Knowledge as justified true belief
A good approach to tackling the idea of “justified true belief” would be by starting with the introduction of the Theory of knowledge, a philosophic discipline from the dialogues of Plato in his endeavour to insist on assert his knowledge. Plato was intrigued by the concept of proving or expressing certainty of really knowing something, and he therefore made the attempt to authenticate the diverse forms of knowledge, namely science, mathematics and philosophy. From this, Plato deduced that “knowledge must be certain knowledge, and certain knowledge must be believable, true and justified.”
According to the deductions made by Plato, the first aspect involves acknowledging a statement put forward as correct. Secondly, the acknowledgement is based on believe, which has to be true, which leads to the third aspect that the belief then has to be justified. Various philosophers have been said to raise concerns regarding the theory that has existed for about 2,500 years, but the one that provided a variety of views of The Justified True Belief thesis was Gettier, in the 1960’s, by using two examples.
Edmund Gettier observed a scenario whereby an individual is justified in believing something that is actually true, though not based on the rationale put forward by the individual. This makes the path to arriving at the belief wrong, which makes the individual right by guessing. Guese work is meant to be eliminated by justification, and the information, therefore put forward by the individual is not considered to be knowledge.
Brain-in-a-vat (or matrix) scenario
This argument is observed to be a modern version of an earlier argument that observed the likelihood of the human life been based on deception. The current argument looks at the chance of our minds at the present time being in a way linked to computer programs that enable us to replicate events in the actual world. The argument becomes more interesting when the people are asked to look at the possibility of being unsure of their existence in a vat system, which brings in the possibility of their beliefs of the outside world appearing as phony.
One of the sceptical philosophers to this theory was Putnam. His definition of metaphysical realism revolved around the idea that the world comprised of “rigid entirety of mind-independent objects.” This implies that the position of the world, in terms of what it is can only be defined in one accurate and correct manner, where the definition of the term correct looks at association between “words and sets of things.”
The argument is further complicated by the opinion put forward by Thomas Nagel, who looked at the likelihood of the “inability of our beliefs to portray the world as it really is, irrespective of the justification.” Without being skeptical of the Brain in a Vat scenario, it would imply that the beliefs that people have regarding the world would be phoney, disregarding the efforts made in justifying them.
Huemer’s argument against the idea that some of our knowledge is foundational.
According to Huemer, some of our knowledge is not foundational by virtue of the fact that an individual cannot be on familiar terms with anything regarding the outside world. The less radical form of skepticism provides room for individuals to be aware of the existence of an objective world to the exterior of their minds, though they would be in a dilemma of its likeness or constituents. The challenges therefore facing a skeptical mind revolve around beliefs that are not true, not knowledge and not justified. In conclusion, Huemer suggested that the radical skeptic is “focused on an internalist sense of justification, which is concerned with an individual’s own point of view.”