One of the reasons why many people experience a hard time while trying to ensure that the verbal/written messages that they convey to others are being properly understood is that it is in the very essence of language, as a communicational medium, to alter the semiotics of informational transactions.
In its turn, this can be discussed as the direct result of the fact that there are two semantic aspects (sense and reference/denotation) to just about any linguistic unit (sign), which denotes a particular emanation of the surrounding reality – hence, the sheer ease with which some individuals tend to misinterpret the referential ‘identity’ of verbal/written sentences. Apparently, the mentioned aspects are not easily identifiable.
However, for those who are aware of the discursive significance of the issue at stake, this should not prove too challenging – the idea that Gottlob Frege used to promote. In this paper, I will explain the meaning of Frege’s idea, in this respect, and provide a critical evaluation of the proposed solution, on his part.
The conceptual essence of Frege’s line of argumentation, in regards to what accounts for the ‘problem of identity’, can be outlined as follows. When we come up with an object-denoting sentence, there is a certain chance for the concerned message to end up misread. The reason for this is that the object of denotation does not always correlate with the denotation’s semantic significance.
The validity of this suggestion can be illustrated, in regards to the referential sentences “the country that is being the most committed to promoting the cause of democracy in the world”, on one hand, and “the country that dropped a nuclear bomb on the innocent civilians in Hiroshima”, on the other. As it can be well seen, in both cases, the referential point appears to be the U.S.
At the same time, however, there are only a few doubts that the mentioned sentences convey messages that can hardly be considered semiotically compatible. Why would this be the case, given the fact that both sentences denote exactly the same? The reason for this is that both of them represent the denoted object in a specific contextual light, which Frege used to refer to as the ‘mode of representation’:
“A difference can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of that which is designated” (24). Apparently, the denoted object’s ‘mode of representation’ accounts for the actual sense of the sentence’s semantic connotation.
In its turn, this implies that one of the ways towards solving the ‘puzzle of identity’, is concerned with ensuring that there is a semiotic unity between three qualitatively different aspects of the actual manner of how a particular object is being referred to – ‘sign’ (name), ‘reference’ (denotation) and ‘sense’ (idea).
Nevertheless, there can also be cases when, despite not denoting a particular object of reference, some sentences make a semantically legitimate sense, such as the following: “I would like to meet the smartest person on Earth”. As it can be well seen, this sentence does not refer to any concrete person, who is being deemed the world-smartest’, but rather implies his possible existence.
We can discuss long and hard whether it is being discursively appropriate to assume that there is indeed such a possibility, however, it cannot be denied that semantically and syntactically speaking, the above-provided sentence is thoroughly plausible. The reason for this is that the suggestion that the smartest person on Earth can indeed be identified, correlates well with the people’s unconsciously defined cognitive predispositions.
After all, while reacting to the socially induced external stimuli, throughout the course of our lives, we inevitably learn that people do in fact differ, in terms of what happened to be the measure of their intellectual brightness. In its turn, this naturally brings us to conclude that there must a person out there, who can be considered the world-smartest.
Consequently, this means that: a) The point of the complex sentence’s denotation is the actual ‘sense’, which it supposedly carries. b) The measure of the concerned sense’s actuality positively relates to its ability to appeal to people emotionally. As Frege noted: “We are… driven into accepting the true value of a sentence as constituting its reference. By the truth value of a sentence, I understand the circumstance that it is true or false” (29).
The suggestion B further implies that, even though one’s perception of the surrounding reality is utterly subjective, there are nevertheless several ‘senses’, the discursive soundness of which is being recognized by just about anyone – this is exactly what makes communication between people possible, in the first place.
What it means is that to be able to denote an ‘identity’ that will not be misinterpreted, the sentences’ ‘sense’ should represent the value of a ‘thing in itself.’ That is, it should remain fully consistent with what happened the manner, in which a human cognitive psyche works.
Nevertheless, there are several apparent drawbacks to Frege’s conceptualization of the ‘semantic triangle,’ concerned with the author’s vision on what accounts for the significance of the ‘sign,’ ‘reference’ and ‘sense,’ as informational mediums. The foremost of them can be formulated as follows: Frege promotes the idea that semantic ‘senses’ are fully objective.
This idea, however, cannot be considered fully plausible – especially in light of the recent breakthroughs in the field of neurology. The reason for this is that, contrary to Frege’s assumption that, while indulging in the communicational activities, people exercise rational control over the process of building sentences/phrases; this is far from being the actual case.
The situation, in this respect, could not possibly be more different, because there is a genetically predetermined ‘innate’ factor to one’s tendency to reflect upon the surrounding environment in one way or another, and to consequently make subjective judgments about it.
For example, whereas, Westerners would be likely to classify the words hammer, nails and saw, as such that convey the sense/idea of ‘instruments,’ it would never occur to the intellectually underdeveloped peasants in Africa to do the same. For them, the earlier mentioned wordily sequence would connote the idea of ‘usefulness’ and nothing else since these people are simply not accustomed to operating with abstract terms.
What it means is that, contrary to how Frede saw it, for as long as a particular sentence continues to denote ‘sense,’ its ability to succeed, in this respect, will be the least reflective of how grammatically/stylistically sound it appears to be.
Frede’s solution to the ‘puzzle of identity’ can also be criticized on the account of being utterly mechanistic, in the sense that it presupposes that it is indeed possible to grasp the significance of a systemic phenomenon (such as language), by the mean of making an inquiry into the qualitative essence of the phenomenon’s elementary components.
After all, as today’s scientists are aware, the overall quality of how a system function is not solely defined by the de facto quality of the system’s integral parts, but also by the particulars of their interrelation with each other.
In a light of this suggestion, the fact that Frede strives to deconstruct the workings of people’s consciousness, as the mean of gaining an insight into what accounts for the innermost aspects of how one should go about ensuring the semantic integrity of his or her verbally expressed thoughts, does not make much of a sense.
The validity of the above-stated can be well shown, in regards to the fact that language is nothing by the product of one’s endowment with consciousness, which in turn is nothing but the by-product of the ongoing biochemical reactions between neurons inside of the concerned person’s brain.
What it means is that Frede’s idea that people are in the position to exercise rational control over their linguistic leanings is far from being considered undisputed. Just as one will not be able to lift itself off the ground by the mean of pulling upwards on its hair, a person will not be able to alter the nature of its cognitive tendencies, by the mean of becoming aware of where they come from.
I believe that the provided explanation, as to what accounts for Frede’s solution of the ‘puzzle of identity,’ and the contained critical remarks (concerning the provided solution), are fully consistent with the paper’s initial thesis.
Works Cited
Frege, Gottlob. “On Sense and Reference.” Meaning and Reference. Ed. David Moore. Oxford: OUP Oxford, 1993. 23-42. Print.