What are the distinguishing features of the Theory of Recollection we find in the Meno? What problem is the Theory of Recollection trying to solve?
The foremost theoretical premise, upon which the Theory of Recollection is based, is the assumption that the physical destruction of one’s body does not affect his or her eternal ‘soul’.
In its turn, this implies a possibility for one’s ‘soul’ to be unconsciously aware of the true significance of the surrounding reality’s emanations, “As the soul is immortal – as it has been reborn, time and again, and has seen both the things of this world and those of the underworld, and all matters – there is nothing it has not learned” (Plato, trans. 2002, p. 85).
What it means is that the process of a particular individual striving to find out more about a specific phenomenon in question, cannot be referred to in terms of actual ‘learning’. Instead, this process is best discussed in terms of ‘recollecting’.
That is, there is nothing incidental about the fact that, as they go through life, people grow ever more knowledgeable – it is namely their souls’ deep-seated understanding of the true implications of the surrounding reality, which predetermines such a state of affairs. This also implies that that the manner, in which people address cognitive tasks, simply reflects their cognition-related inclinations, defined by the innermost workings of these people’s ‘psyche’ (soul).
Thus, the Theory of Recollection effectively addresses the paradox of people’s epistemological pursuits appearing to make no logical sense, whatsoever. This paradox has been outlined by the character of Meno, “He (a person) cannot search for what he knows since he knows it; there isn’t any need to look for what’s not lost. Nor can he search for what he does not know; for then he does not know what to look for” (p. 72).
Apparently, even though that there is indeed a formal rationale to think that knowledge-seeking people do not know what they actually look for, this is far from being the actual case. The reason for this is simple – while striving to educate themselves in a particular field, people do nothing else but trying to regain their souls’ long-lost knowledge of the inquired subject matter.
Therefore, once assessed within the conceptual framework of the Theory of Recollection, Meno’s argument appears as such that does not hold much water, because according to this theory’s provisions, people do in fact remain thoroughly aware of the actual purpose of their cognitive pursuits – even though such their awareness happened to be largely unconscious.
How can the Theory of Recollection be said to fit into the metaphysics and epistemology of the Theory of Forms?
According to the Theory of Forms, visually observable manifestations of the surrounding reality provide us with only a partial insight into what this Greek philosopher used to refer to as ‘things in themselves’ – the true metaphysical essences of physical/phenomenological entities in this world.
That is, while being exposed to a particular physical object, we can only attain preliminary/incomplete understanding, as to what should be considered this object’s ‘idea’. This ‘idea’ exists in the realm of metaphysics, inaccessible to our sense-based perceptions. Plato’s ‘allegory of the cave’ is being particularly illustrative of the earlier suggestion.
This allegory refers to prisoners, who have been kept in the cave ever since they were born, and who could only make judgments about the outside world by the mean of observing shadows on the wall (there is assumed to have been a flaming torch, behind prisoners’ backs). Apparently, prisoners’ understanding of the world outside of their cave would be severely distorted.
The same could be said about people’s understanding of the surrounding reality – since they can only perceive ‘physically’, they cannot possibly grasp the true significance of the perceived things’ metaphysical (ideal) essence (Plato, trans. 2004). This, of course, points out to the fact that it is not only that the Theory of Recollection is being consistent with the Theory of Forms, but that they actually derive out of each other.
Just as it is being the case with the Theory of Recollection, the latter one implies that there is a higher truth, which even though cannot be physically experienced, nevertheless defines the physical reality’s actual meaning. This is exactly the reason why it is specifically the extent of one’s commitment towards broadening its intellectual horizons, which reflects the measure of the concerned individual’s virtuousness.
The reason for this is apparent – according to Plato, while gaining more and more knowledge about the world’s actual workings, we become increasingly aware of these workings’ ‘purposefulness’, which in turn makes us more comfortable with the idea of God. In other words, it is specifically by indulging in intellectual pursuits (and not by believing in God blindly) that people are able to live up to their preordained destiny of divine and essentially immortal entities.
It is needless to mention, of course, that in light of recent discoveries in the fields of physics, genetics and psychology, the provisions of both theories can be best referred to as being rather naïve. After all, it has now been well proven that, in order to appear purposeful, the reality’s observable manifestations do not have to be as such per se (Dawkins, 1976).
Nevertheless, even today these theories continue to represent an undermined humanistic value, consistent with the discursive aspects of today’s living, because they do promote the idea that it is namely the concept of science (and not morality or religion), which is being synonymous with the notion of ‘virtuousness’.
References
Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Plato (2002). Five dialogues (2nd ed.). trans. G. M. A. Grube. New York: Hackett Publishing Company.
Plato (2004). Republic. trans. C.D.C. Reeve. New York: Hackett Publishing Company.