The present paper deals with a fictitious scenario on the issue of probation revocation and decision-making related to this procedure. The paper attempts to identify the theory underlying the decision to revoke probation, make valid assumptions concerning the rationality of such a decision, and establish the limit of rationality.
Studies of probation law and offense in various states have shown that probation officers, not the judges, have a critical role in the offenders’ condition status (Franklin, 2010). In this particular case, the probation officer is tasked with providing a rational ground for his decision to revoke probation for his supervisee.
The theory underlying Nichols’ decision can be that of the simple logic of treatment. According to this theory, revocation is due on every occasion the probation conditions are violated (Stojkovic, Kalinich & Klofas, 2016). The factor consistent with this theory and contributing to the severity of potential punishment is that Jim (the offender) was repeatedly involved in an offense he was originally charged with. In other words, the initial offense and the one that followed his probation are of the same nature: being implicated in illegal drug trafficking, he was later found to be under the effect of drugs. Making his decision, Nichols would potentially consider rehabilitation as the fundamental goal of probation (Boone & Herzog-Evans, 2013). Correction of behavior would also be a goal to aim at.
To arrive at a rational decision, the officer would need to know whether Jim had to undergo a drug treatment program, whether or not he adhered to the treatment, and what his progress was. Besides, the probation conditions were specific, including Jim’s obligation to perform social work, stay within the town’s limits. Consequently, the officer would have to ascertain whether any other violations were registered (e.g., loitering, leaving the premises of residence without permission, etc.).
Rational decision-making in situations concerning probation has to take multiple factors into account and rely firmly on logic dictated by the guidelines. Extralegal criteria can appear relevant to the actors responsible but they should not have any substantial influence on the decisions. To arrive at a rational decision, it is imperative that Nichols is capable of defining the problem, reviewing all alternatives, and singling out the best one. The alternative selection should be based on valid decision criteria enabling him to weigh the costs and benefits of each option (Stojkovic et al., 2016). In other words, his decision should be based on the guidelines of:
- Equity (that the offender be treated in a manner similar to the treatment of other offenders under similar circumstances);
- Accuracy (the fact of guilt should be established);
- Consistency with theory;
- Consistency with resources;
- Positive effects of the present decision on the subsequent ones (Stojkovic et al., 2016).
The latter factor can be problematic because the officer (or any other actor involved) has no knowledge of what Jim’s future conduct might be. However, if the officer can articulate his decision based on the model described above, his decision will be rational and commensurate with the offense.
Considering the circumstances of the second offense, it is possible to say the offender has inclinations to criminal actions of sexual nature. The limit of rationality here would be to mandate sex offense consultations, without a priori stigmatizing Jim as a committed sex offender.
References
Boone, M., & Herzog-Evans, M. (2013). Decision-Making and Offender Supervision. In F. McNeill, K. Beyens (Eds.), Offender Supervision in Europe (pp. 51-96). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Franklin, T. W. (2010). The intersection of defendants’ race, gender, and age in prosecutorial decision making. Journal of Criminal Justice, 38(2), 185-192.
Stojkovic, S., Kalinich, D., & Klofas, J. (2016). Criminal Justice Organizations: Administration and Management (6th ed.). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning.