The exclusionary rule that informs the suppression of evidence in a trial traces its origin in the fourth amendment. Here, the law clearly stipulates that, “…where evidence has been obtained in violation of the search and seizure protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the illegally obtained evidence cannot be used at the trial of the defendant.” Black’s Law Dictionary 564, (6th edition 1990) (Szymanski, 2007, p. 1085).
Consequently, a lot of controversy arises regarding the moral or ethical effect of applying this rule. To try and settle the matter, the “good faith” exception came into play in the late nineties, specifically after the case of Arizona v Evans 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995), rev’g 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1994). This case established a standard that would limit the possibility of a defendant winning in a motion to suppress evidence, especially where the arresting officers were not at fault. The exclusionary rule is meant to act as a deterrent to unethical police conduct or any other misconduct (LaFave, 1996, p. 34).
In a hypothetical case where say the defendant was arrested for speeding and the arresting officer while frisking the defendant spots a cigarette roll that reeks of marijuana. Subsequently, he searches the rest of the car where he discovers more contraband in the dashboard. This defendant shall probably bring a motion to suppress the evidence of drugs before the trial begins to determine which evidence shall appear before the jury and the court generally during the hearing.
Part of the defense’s argument, may include the fact that the defendant’s rights were violated and that the rule applies to all American states because of the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment. On the other hand, the prosecution can raise any or all of a variety of reasons why the rule should not apply. This could include but would not be limited to the fact that the defendant’s rights were not violated during the search (Dripps, 2002, p. 7). There is also the possibility that the arresting officers who conducted the illegal search were acting in good faith, or on an objectively reasonable belief that they had the backing of a warrant, statute, or a court order that was later determined to be erroneous (Dripps, 2002, p. 14).
It is also possible for the prosecution to prove that the discovery of the illegally obtained evidence was inevitable even if there had been no illegality to warrant a search at the time it was conducted. Finally, if the defendant decides to take the stand during the trial, the illegally obtained evidence can be used to impeach his testimony (Dripps, 2002, p. 19). It is apparent that the limitations to the exclusionary rule are on the rise and soon there may be limitation to admitting illegally obtained evidence in a trial. As a judge in this hypothetical case, one of the priorities would be the protection of this rule. The spirit behind the fourth amendment clause that provides for this exclusionary rule is to prevent police misconduct. With this in mind, it is inconsequential whose fault it is that police records may be outdated, leading to a faulty arrest.
It does not matter whether the mistake was made by a court official, a judge, or a police officer. Secondly, if the policeman had reasonable cause to suspect that the defendant was in possession of contraband, he should have applied the acceptable protocol. Consequently, my decision would be to grant the motion to suppress. This is because the more the courts attempt to allow loopholes in the system through which errant officers c a maneuver illegally obtained evidence, the more quality of justice continues to dwindle. Moreover, if one stops to consider the injustice of these searches especially on innocent victims then it is easier to appreciate the significance of the exclusionary rule.
References
Dripps, D. (2002). Exclusionary Rule. Web.
LaFave, R.. (1996). Search and Seizure, 3rd edition. St. Paul, Minn: West Publishing Company.
Szymanski, S. (2007). Exclusionary Rule: Good-Faith Exception- New Limitations on the Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence Arizona v Evans 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995), rev’g 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1994). Marquette Law Review , Vol 79:1083, 1083-1100.