This report analyses organizational failure. The issue has never been looked into critically. The police departments in many jurisdictions have been faced with lots of scandals, corruption topping the list. Banking institutions are expected to be wise investors. There are many cases where banks have invested unwisely, thereby affecting the shareholders’ confidence. Schools fail to fulfill their core mandate of educating. Bad bets are equally made. However, the surprising thing is that the failure does not lead to automatic extinction of those organizations. This means that there are many institutions that keep failing.
Studies have shown that in as much as institutions may fail in their official goals, they may not necessarily fail in their unofficial ones. Social sciences do not clearly state the sources of organizational plans. Many organizations provide plans on how they may respond to potential failure, but the big question is where they draw the basis of those plans.
Theory of Organizational Failure
This theory clearly shows that many plans to mitigate failure are mere symbolism. To support this notion, a case of Shoreham Nuclear Power Station in Long Island is given. Due to pressure from regulatory agencies, Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) came up with an entirely convincing plan on how it could evacuate the Island in case of a nuclear mishap. These contingency measures were in the process of being approved.
From the analysis, it can be seen that organizations tend to believe what they represent. It is due to this that such plans are referred to as “fantasy documents.” What is interesting is the fact that such plans are never totally believed or disbelieved. Only on rare occasions do they test the plans against reality. The only reason behind this could be that these plans are usually based on unlikely events. Good case scenarios can be drawn on Three Mile Island and Chernobyl disasters, among others.
Most of the plans are usually copy-pasted from other model organizations. The planners often assume that everything will work out well the first time. Also, many wrongly assume that they know every contingency measure and are well prepared for it. In most cases, the reverse has always been true.
The Shoreman Nuclear Power Station
Building The Shoreman Nuclear Power Station on Long Island had been met with opposition at the beginning. Many thought that it was utterly ridiculous to put a nuclear plant on Long Island in the first place. Many opposed the plant on the basis that carrying out an evacuation could not be possible in the first place. They did not think of the meltdown or radiation released by the plant. What many dwelt on was just evacuation logistics.
In its plan, LILCO promised the public that it was able to evacuate ten-mile radius. But, there was no promise that this could be possible. Hence, It led to the failure of Shoreham. LILCO consultants claimed that research showed that trained emergency staff always do what they are supposed to do when faced with an emergency. This is wrong as contrary studies have shown that what most emergency workers think of first when an emergency occurs is their families.
Evacuation Exercise
To fill the credibility issue, LILCO came up with several measures. Computer simulations were used for convincing the public. The simulations showed that in case of a disaster, the company was able to evacuate people within a record four hours and fifty five minutes. All this, as claimed, could be possible only under normal weather and traffic guides. This record time was averagely the same as that of other plants. However, these simulations were too technical for the public to understand. As such, the credibility problems remained. So, LILCO had to conduct a real-time procedure. But, critical areas of the evacuation were never tested. Sirens could not be used as radio stations could not insist that there was a real disaster. Since the plant was not online, it could not be scrammed. Local government response could not be included since they were from the outset, opposed to the plant. All in all, the Federal Emergency Management Agent (FEMA) approved everything, saying the plant had shown demonstrable ability to handle the emergency.
Problems
Providing organizational breakdown in relation to natural and technological disasters may not be useful. This is because most organizations do lose their mandates. Personnel may also sabotage laid down procedures due to internal issues that include politics, pressures, etc. Many planners fail to factor in the impact of external failure. They also hardly consider worst-case scenarios. Most organizations do not notice that fantasy plans are all costly. LILCO spent lots of cash training its staff. It paid consultants large sums of money. Also, the time resource that FEMA and other agencies took was a lot.
Communication failed terribly. Scripted messages for the public were too long. The issue of two trucks clearly communicates that problem. The messages should have been conveyed from below the hierarchy. But this did not happen.
In as much the exercise had been given a clean bill of health by FEMA and other agencies, the courts felt that the emergency disaster preparedness, as claimed, was in doubt. If LILCO could not follow its plan, how did it expect the public to follow it?
Questions
- How can emergency plans be made more realistic?
- Should organizations be made to develop their emergency plans?