There are many different views on God’s existence and the questions of belief nowadays. Many scientists, philosophers, and researchers, regardless of what position they support, build many theories and suggestions related to religion. One of such theories is reformed epistemology, which started its development in the middle of the 20th century and was fully articulated in the 1990s. This paper examines reformed epistemology and its weaknesses as it relates to the apologetical task of demonstrating God’s existence. For the purposes of this paper, it analyzes the concepts and theories suggested by one of the pioneers of reformed epistemology, a philosopher named Alvin Plantinga. As a theological theory, reformed epistemology appears to have many weaknesses as it only denies the necessity for a rational explanation of God’s existence instead of demonstrating it.
First, it is essential to discuss what epistemology is and the role reformed epistemology plays in the modern understanding of religion. Epistemology is the theory of knowledge that investigates whether a particular judgment or statement should be identified as a justified belief or just someone’s opinion. Thereby, religious epistemology aims to determine whether people’s specific positions on God’s existence relate to one or the other category. One of this theory’s components is reformed epistemology, which has a particular core thesis. This thesis suggests that religious beliefs “can be rational without being based on propositional evidence or argument” (Baldwin and McNabb 3). Reformed epistemology examines three crucial components of the belief in God: rationality, reasonability, and intellectual propriety of the corresponding statements. The theory was defended by an American philosopher Alvin Plantinga in his work God and Other Minds (Baldwin and McNabb 3). That particular work and the whole theory of reformed epistemology attempt to prove that the belief in God is rational, reasonable, and intellectually appropriate.
The first significant argument in favor of God’s existence that reformed epistemology suggests is related to some fundamental beliefs. For example, the philosophical idea of solipsism suggests that there are no other minds but one’s own since the opposing arguments fail to establish a solid conclusion (Baldwin and McNabb 4). Nonetheless, people mostly find it foolish or irrational to believe that other minds do not exist, making the existence of multiple minds natural and thereby rational. The same is true for many beliefs: the belief in the existence of one’s self, the external world, the present, and the past. Reformed epistemology suggests that the belief in God, in many respects, resembles those beliefs as most people find them rational even without solid evidence of their existence (Baldwin and McNabb 5). In other words, the supporters of the theory of reformed epistemology propose that God’s existence does not need solid arguments to be rational.
However, the described viewpoint seems more like a weakness of the theory than its strong side since it does not present an actual argument or at least a reasonable or valuable suggestion. Reformed epistemology, in this sense, explains the existence of God based on the concept of parity of reasoning: some points do not require any argument, and God’s presence is one of them (Baldwin and McNabb 5). It does not appear as a valid point since such a suggestion relies on other beliefs that are not related to the subject. That argument can prove why some people believe in God without rational reasoning: they do not need it as their faith is strong enough. Such a position is entirely acceptable in justifying one’s beliefs, but it is unacceptable in demonstrating God’s existence. A theistic person can use that point to explain their beliefs to themselves, but they would not be able to persuade someone who is not a believer with that argument.
Following the thought of believers, there is another notable point in the theory of reformed epistemology suggesting that believers’ confidence does not come from rational arguments. Plantinga, for example, argues that “because scripture proceeds from God as the starting point, believers are within their epistemic rights to take belief in God as the starting point” (qtd. in Baldwin and McNabb 4). It is a fundamental truth: people in the modern world respect each other’s beliefs, and there is little chance a person would be insulted or disrespected just because they believe in God’s existence. However, that argument deconstructs the whole point of building a theological theory such as reformed epistemology to try and prove the rationality of believing in God. That argument succeeds in explaining one’s belief in God, but it fails to demonstrate God’s existence to other people.
Most theological theories’ main goal is to explain the essence of God to other people so they can accept it and understand why God exists and what rational reasons can prove it. That goal is the primary reason for multiple discussions and arguments in modern theology. There is a critical contradiction in the case of Plantinga’s views on reformed epistemology. As mentioned in the previous sections of the paper, some of the reformed epistemology’s main components are rationality and reasonability. However, the theory argues that believers do not “need arguments or propositional evidence for their belief in God to have rational justification” (Baldwin and McNabb 4). If one accepts that position, a question will arise on the purpose of a theological theory. Reformed epistemology, in many senses, explains why believers have the right to believe, but nobody tries to take that right from them, meaning that there is no need for the whole theory. The theory is needed to demonstrate God’s existence to people who cannot or do not want to accept it, and the described argument fails to achieve that goal.
Furthermore, there is another critical contradiction in reformed epistemology that cannot be ignored, and it relates to the theory’s views on other sacramental beliefs. Some opponents of reformed epistemology provide a counterargument that has received the name of the “Son of Great Pumpkin objection” (Baldwin and McNabb 10). The essence of the objection is the following: the absence of the necessity to provide a rational explanation for God’s existence can make various communities legitimately claim that their beliefs are rational. For example, Voodoo believers can claim that they follow their ways based on the concept of rationality, as Christians do (Baldwin and McNabb 10). There may be communities based on irrational or even dangerous beliefs, such as the proponents of the flat-earth idea or devil worshipers. If God’s existence did not need a rational explanation, then other beliefs would not need it, as well, which could potentially lead to negative consequences.
Nevertheless, the mentioned contradiction is not as much related to the objection itself as to the reformed epistemology’s response. The theory under discussion, replying to the Son of Great Pumpkin objection, suggests the following. If humanity’s “cognitive design plan is not set up to form belief in the deities of voodoo or the Great Pumpkin, then belief in such things would be mistaken” (Baldwin and McNabb 10). In other words, people’s minds have always been established to believe in God, which frees that belief from rationality, but people’s cognition does not suggest believing in Voodoo, making that belief irrational. There is an evident contradiction in this statement related to the fact that there is no evidence that God’s existence is a fundamental element of humanity’s cognition. In many senses, the described response to the objection means that people should believe in God since they are supposed to believe in God on a cognitive level. As the previous points of the reformed epistemology, this one does not present an argument and makes belief in God look natural, neither demonstrating God’s existence nor proving it.
Overall, reformed epistemology appears as a weak theological theory as it does not provide arguments in favor of God’s existence, claiming that belief in God is fundamental and does not require a rational explanation. The whole point of the theory is correlated with rationality and reasonability, as stated in reformed epistemology’s core thesis. However, the proponents of the theory contradict that thesis in their position, suggesting that believing in God is a concept that can exist without rational evidence. Reformed epistemology suggests that people do not need to argue for their beliefs, and their faith in God does not need to be rational. It is a solid and respectable viewpoint that cannot and should not be argued, but it does not prove God’s existence to those who believe in it. People do not need a religious theory to believe in God, meaning that reformed epistemology may need reconsideration in terms of its goals.
Work Cited
Baldwin, Erik, and Tyler Dalton McNabb. Plantingian Religious Epistemology and World Religions: Prospects and Problems. Lexington Books, 2018.