The Constitutional Validity of the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010, Its Possible Effect on the Meals for Kids and the Principle of Separation of Powers
The provisions of the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 are legally valid. The Commonwealth or Federal parliament of Australia is the organ that has the mandate to come up with new laws for the Australian people (Stein 1999, p.23). This is spelled out in the constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (Jackson & Tushnet 2006, p.79). This is not an exclusive case that is uniquely applied in Australia. Most countries make use of the Acts of Parliament as a source of new laws. The Commonwealth parliament which is made up of the Queen, the Senate, and the House of Representatives comes up with new legislation through, among other ways, Acts of Parliament (Souter 1989, p 34). Once they have taken effect, Acts of Parliament are enforceable by the law enforcement agencies of Australia and are considered legitimate law as much as the Australian constitution is (Monahan & Hispley 2007, p.37-41). Legal challenge to such laws is not a tenable move. What does this reality mean to the Free Meals for Kids Corporation question on whether the provisions of the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 are valid and whether it would apply to the corporation and the directors who are in charge of its affairs?
Based on the above background, my legal advice to the directors of Free Meals for Kids would be that the constitutional validity of the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 is not in doubt whatsoever. This is because the Australian Constitution allows for the creation of new laws by the Commonwealth Parliament through Acts of Parliament, and the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 is in that category (Amar & Tushnet 2008,p.101-102). It is therefore not only binding but also legally enforceable.
The utilization of Acts of Parliament as a source of law in Australia is not a new legal field. The Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 will be a member of a long line of Acts of Parliament that have been produced by the Australian legislative Assembly at different times to serve different purposes. Examples of past Acts include the Aquaculture Act of 2001, which was enacted by the Australian parliament to act as a guideline in the handling of issues related to aquatic life, the Adoption Act of 1988 that was enacted to guide the process of adoption, and the Aerodrome Act of 1998 whose function was to act as a guide on the establishment and usage of aerodromes in the Commonwealth of Australia (Elkins, Tinsburg & Melton 2009, p.58). All these Acts of Parliament have been enforced with satisfactory success with little or no question or legal challenge. However, legal queries can be raised in cases where the Acts are implemented in a manner that is beyond the powers given to them through their provisions. This is a legal provision that is equally supported by the Constitution of Australia.
The Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 and its effect on the Free Meals for Kids Corporation and its Directors
Leaving the above aside, on the subject of how the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 will affect the Free Meals for Kids and its Directors, the documents must establish the corporation get examined to determine what they declare the purpose of its establishment to be. What the directors may be doing is not as important as what the legal documents of the corporation said it is meant to do. It is very clearly stated in the Memoranda and Articles of Association of this corporation that the primary aim of Free Meals for Kids is to provide free meals to needy children and encourage other members of the community to provide assistance to such children. The other aspect that is crucial in the process of giving legal advice to the directors is to carefully look at the organizations or entities that will be the targets of the newly enacted law. The Act clearly points out that trading and financial corporations or companies are the ones that will be required to fulfill the requirements that are referred to by the provisions of the Act of the new law. Having looked at both sides; the law and the corporation, the next step is to look for areas of conflict between the two. Looking at the aim of the corporation reveals that it does not fall into any of the two categories of organizations (financial or trading) and I will point this out as I advise the directors of the corporation. This, therefore, means that the Free Meals for Kids Corporation does not conflict with any of the provisions that make up the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010. This is due to the fact that it is not a trading corporation and neither is it a financial corporation (Glenn 2007, p.128).
Due to the above scenario, the Free Meals for Kids Corporation will not be required to have at least three of its motor vehicles meeting the hybrid status requirement under the new law. It will also not be required to make reports concerning the usage of its motor vehicles. Any move by the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010, through the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission to ask the Free Meals For Kids Corporation to meet any of these obligations that are raised by the new law will be legally untenable and can be challenged successfully in a court of law. The clause or section of the Act that allows the commission to use its mandate to see how best to implement the law is only legally acceptable to the extent that the commission’s actions are consistent with the Australian constitution. The same actions should also be consistent with the provisions of the new law. Failure to follow either the Australian constitutional provisions or the guidelines of the newly enacted act in its provisions will make the commission’s actions illegal and therefore open to challenge.
Based on the above, I will promptly advise the directors of Free Meals for Kids that their corporation is not covered or touched in the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 and therefore will not affect them as directors nor will it affect the Free Meals for Kids as a Corporation. I will further inform them that in the event that they are asked by the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 through the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission to meet any of the requirements as raised in the new law, they have the right to seek legal redress over the matter.
Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission
On the constitutional validity of the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission, I will inform the directors that due to the fact that the validity of the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 is beyond question as far as legal grounds are concerned, the validity of the establishment of the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission is not something that can be challenged in a court of law. It is therefore a valid body formed under the Act to dutifully enforce the provisions of the Act (Jeffrey 2007, p.63). I will make it clear to them that the Australian Constitution mandates and empowers all these entities. How about the appointment of Justice Brown as president of the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission?
On The Appointment of Justice Brown as President of the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission and the Principle of Separation of Powers
The separation of powers can be analyzed in two ways. The general way is the distinction between the three arms of government. The executive, the legislature, and the judiciary are supposed to have a clearly defined area of jurisdiction without any arm interfering with the functioning of the other. In the event that the executive arm of government decides to influence the actions of the courts, the legal question of separation of powers can be raised. The same can be done if the judiciary tries to influence the executive or the legislature tries to influence the executive or the judiciary. Under this kind of setting, the issue of Justice’s Brown’s appointment as President of the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission does not get affected since he will be an agent of the judicial arm of the government and there is no evident sign that he will be meddling in the affairs of either the executive or the legislature. This is shown by the extent of his powers as they are spelled out by the provisions of the Act.
The second way in which the legal query of the principle of separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature can be raised is through overlap whereby someone who has an interest in one of the arms of government is given a chance to execute some functions another. To illustrate this case, think about a person employed to execute functions in the executive arm of government and working for the courts too or vice versa or someone working for the legislature having something to do with the executive or the judiciary too. Holding the two offices will provide room for peddling influence from one arm to the other. This will also be liable for legal challenge on the grounds of separation of powers. This too does not apply to Justice Brown because he does not hold any other position in either the executive of the legislature at the time of his appointment as President of the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission
Under the principle of separation of judicial powers, there is no legal room for the questioning of the appointment of Justice Brown to the position of president of the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission. His position is constitutional given that the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission is a constitutionally constituted organ. He also meets all the requirements that are considered necessary for anyone to be president of the commission. The accusation of conflict of interest can be raised but with little legal success. Section 6(a) of the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 regarding the functioning of the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission is very categorical that the commission will have to abide by the legal provisions of the Act in the process of discharging their duties. Section 6 (b) of the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 also makes it very clear that any penalty that the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission will be imposing on any corporation must be done according to law.
Therefore the above legal scenario leaves no legal room for raising the concern for conflict with the principle of separation of judicial powers. He does not hold any other position that can create an open-source conflict of interest and has litigated on behalf of environmental bodies before his appointment does not mean that he is going to use his rules to make decisions. He will be making decisions based on the provisions of the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010. The other issues can only be raised on political grounds which are not recognized by the law. The appointment of Justice Brown does not legally avail a maneuverable ground for abuse of power separation and I will make this clear to the directors of Free Meals for Kids Corporation.
In conclusion, my legal advice to the directors of Free Meals For Kids Corporation will be that the provisions of the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act of 2010 are legally valid since they are founded on the Australian Constitutional mandate (Carney 2006, p.19). This, therefore, means that the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission is also valid and its functions as spelled out in the provisions of the Act are legal. I will also inform them that since the Free Meals for kids is not a trading or a financial corporation, the Corporate Motor Vehicle Usage Act 2010 does not apply to them and there will not be legally required to comply with any of the requirements that the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission may require trading or financial corporations to meet. I will further inform them that as directors, since the Act does not cover their corporation, it does not cover them too, since the Act of parliament cannot stretch to the officials when it does not have the mandate to deal with the organization itself.
Regarding the constitutionality of the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Commission, I will inform them that it is constitutionally valid since it is based on an Act of Parliament. The Australian constitution provides for Acts of Parliament as a source of law for the country and this is not the first time this is being done (Bellomo 1995, p.87). It is something that has been done for a long time and the Aquaculture Act of 2001is an example. I will also make it clear to them that the constitutionality of the appointment of Justice Brown is not something that can be challenged on legal grounds since he meets all the requirements. Judicial power separation does not arise since he does not hold any other position that may create a conflict of interest in terms of powers. Having litigated on behalf of environmental bodies before his appointment does not mean he is going to apply his law and convictions to decide. He has legal provisions that he will abide by as he makes decisions on behalf of the Commonwealth Motor Vehicle Judicial Commission.
References
Amar, V & Tushnet, M. 2008, Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law (Global Perspectives Series).Oxford University Press, New York.
Bellomo, M & Cochrane, L.1995, The Common Legal Past of Europe: 1000-1800.The Catholic University Press of America, New York.
Carney, G.2006, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and Territories. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Elkins, Z, Tinsburg, T &Melton, J.2009, The Endurance of National Constitutions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Glenn, P.H.2007.Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law. Oxford University Press, New York.
Jackson, V. & Tushnet, M. 2006, Comparative Constitutional Law, 2nd Ed.Foundation Press, London.
Jeffrey.G.2007. Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study. Oxford University Press, New York.
Monahan, G & Hipsley, D.2010, Essential Professional Conduct: Legal Ethics.2nd ed.Routledge-Cavendish Press, Annandale.
Souter, G. 1989, Acts Of Parliament: A Narrative History Of The Senate And House of Representatives, Commonwealth Of Australia. Melbourne University Press, Melbourne.
Stein, P.1999, Roman Law in European History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.