Overview
Today, space exploration stands to be the most remarkable accomplishment by man. In the year 1957, the Soviet Union became the first nation to send a manufactured object into space (Grack 12). In response to the Soviet’s accomplishments, the US found a space exploration program, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the year 1958. Later, NASA launched the first American satellite into space. It was not until the year 1961, that the Soviet astronaut Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space. Realizing the Soviet ’executions,’ President John F. Kennedy mandated a mission to challenge the Soviets’ space race. Based on his opinions, NASA planned to take a lead and send the first man on the moon. On July 20, 1969, astronaut Neil Armstrong became the first man to set foot on the moon. Despite the successful explorations, space travel is still in its infancy.
Problems
The origin of the shuttle space programs dates to the discussions preceding the Apollo project. After the dramatic trip to the moon, NASA scheduled to design larger earth-orbiting shuttles. Out of this project, NASA planned to build a 12-person station before the year 1975 (Gehman 21). From the year 1976 onwards, NASA built subsequent larger space stations to accommodate more individuals. Thereafter, NASA developed skills and equipment for the crewed exploration of Mars (Gehman 21). It was amid these projects, that the concept of building a space shuttle that could be flown back and forth the earth’s orbit arose. To reduce the infrastructure cost, NASA had to design a reusable space vehicle. Although, the space shuttle was designed to reduce its operation cost, its design complexities and raised its development cost. Thus, NASA had to petition the government and other willing private investors to fund their development into a fully reusable space vehicle (Gehman 21).
Costs
During the year 1970, NASA leaders secured the government’s support in funding their development of reusable space vehicles. To improve on these vehicles, NASA and the military conducted a variety of missions aimed at reducing the cost of the space vehicles to be developed (Gehman 25). These vehicles were to become the first space vehicles to have wings, and the first reusable thermal protection system. Moreover, the shuttle was to be the first reusable space vehicle to use high-pressure hydrogen-oxygen engines. Despite its complexity, NASA was forced to keep its space shuttle development and operation at a low cost. In the year 1971, NASA was to utilize a maximum of $5 billion over five years in their development of the space shuttle. With this budget, NASA was forced to drop its hope of building a fully reusable space shuttle for another alternative. In the year 1972, NASA officials assured the white house leaders that with $ 5.15 billion they could develop a reusable space shuttle that could meet all the performance requirements. Eventually, in 1972, in favor of the shuttle program, President Nixon promised to help NASA transform their space frontier into unknown territories (Gehman 27).
Schedule
As illustrated in the article, the project has never been on schedule as it was expected. However, the space shuttle Colombia became the major one developed by NASA. The construction of this spaceship began in the year 1975, and it became the first American shuttle to orbit around the earth. Before its first flight in the year 1979, its launch was delayed due to defaults in its SSME components. Before its destruction, the shuttle had completed 27 missions. On February 1, 2003, the seven astronauts aboard the space shuttle radioed the mission control in Texas saying that the shuttle was ready for reentry. During the reentry process, the space shuttle disintegrated over Texas killing its seven crew members (Behrens 34).
Technical performance
To meet the technical performance requirements, the space shuttle was designed with tiles to act as the main thermal protection system (Cabbage & William 67). As compared with the previous space shuttles, Colombia was the first one to be designed with its surface covered with temperature resistant reusable surface.
Risk
Since the inception of the project, management has been blamed as the main cause of failure. As portrayed in the article, the program managers were resistant to the latest information and only majored in management problems, disregarding the vital engineering issues. Doing so, NASA’s management risked the lives of their astronauts (Starbuck & Moshe 78).
Systems engineering
System engineers perform numerous tasks developing space shuttle. Both the design and the operation of the space shuttle are mandated by system engineers (Cabbage & Harwood 176). Similarly, with the help of the system engineers, space shuttle instrumentation is designed and installed as per their specifications.
Lessons learned
There are a lot of lessons learned from the Colombia disaster. The first lesson learned from this tragedy is that we should depend not only on the latest information but also on the previous data (Starbuck & Moshe 43). As illustrated from the report, the shuttle’s front insulation broke away during the previous trips causing no harm. However, the damage had not been rectified, which later acted as the chief cause of the disaster. Another valuable lesson learned is the dangers of selective perception. As reflected in the disaster reports, the shuttle’s supervision shifted their attention from engineering to managerial concerns. Due to their policies, management problems dominated the program schedules, and budgets eventually compromised the program’s mandate (Starbuck & Moshe 43).
Work cited
Behrens, Carl E..The International Space Station and the Space Shuttle. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009. Print.
Cabbage, Michael, and William Harwood.Comm check: the final flight of Shuttle Columbia. New York: Free Press, 2004. Print.
Gehman, Harold W..Columbia Accident Investigation Board: report. Arlington, Va.: Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003. Print.
Grack, Rachel A.The Space Shuttle Columbia disaster. Edina, Minn.: ABDO Daughters, 2004. Print.
Starbuck, William H., and Moshe Farjoun.Organization at the limit: lessons from the Columbia disaster. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005. Print.