Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates: Case Analysis Report (Assessment)

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Brief Facts

In 1993, the UAE launched the competition for development of a design for an embassy and chancery which were to be built in Washington, DC. Elena Sturdza, an architect, entered a competition to provide the architectural design. Sturdza had license from Texas and Maryland, but she was not licensed by the District of Columbia. The architect was chosen by the jury of the competition which was constituted by civil engineers and architects.

The architect and the UAE entered negotiations on the contract. During two years they were negotiating on the contract and Sturdza was working on her design. The architect changed the initial design to make it meet certain technical issues. Clearly, she submitted certain drafts. She also agreed to get payment after execution of the contract. In 1996, the UAE sent the final draft which incorporated all the necessary changes and Sturdza agreed to sign the contract. However, the UAE stopped communication with the architect without any explanations. The UAE did not sign the contract.

In 1997, the architect discovered that the UAE started contractual negotiations with the National Capital Planning Commission. The new architect working on the embassy design was Angelos Demetriou who also participated in the competition in 1993. It is noteworthy that Demetriou’s design was significantly different from the one of Sturdza. However, Sturdza learnt that the design of Demetriou which was accepted had major features of her own design. The UAE signed the contract with Angelos Demetriou. In 1998, Sturdza brought a suit against the UAE. She noted that she completed a considerable amount of work on the design and she accused the UAE of breaching the contract and she sought quantum meruit recovery for the work she had done. Sturdza appealed to the US District Court for the District of Columbia.

Thus, she claimed that the UAE breached the contract by giving the contract of the design to another architect though considerable amount of work had already been completed. Sturdza also claimed that the UAE had to compensate the work that had been done. The court decided that Sturdza was barred from getting compensation as she was not properly licensed to complete the work or execute the contract.

Sturdza filed an appeal against the decision. The DC Circuit agreed that the laws of the District precluded the architect’s cause of action. The court noted that Sturdza did not have the right to enter negotiations and provide services before obtaining the appropriate license. It was also noted that the license was essential for entering the practice of architecture. At the same time, the court agreed that specific licensing laws of the District of Columbia could create uncertainty in some cases. There were also some cases which created precedents and, hence, there were some limitations to the law. A number of cases were mentioned but the court decided that it would be most effective to certify the case to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

It is necessary to note that the UAE and Sturdza never executed the contract as the UAE did not sign it. Even though the contract was not signed, the architect provided certain services and worked on the design. It is also noteworthy that according to DC Code §2-261 (b) unlicensed and unskilled people could not be engaged in the practice of architecture. However, Sturdza was also a skilled professional and had license (though it was not provided by the District of Columbia which has quite specific regulations). Sturdza filed the case against the UAE and asked for compensation as the UAE did not sign the contract they had been negotiating on and for work which had already been done by the architect.

Under certain circumstances, she could claim quantum meruit recovery as some amount of work was completed and negotiations on the contract had been taking place. Nonetheless, Sturdza was not licensed by the District Columbia which had certain status when it comes to architecture. According to the Architect’s Registration Act, architects who engage themselves in the practice of architecture have to be licensed by the district. Importantly, ‘the practice of architecture’ includes such activities as provision of designs as well as negotiations on construction contracts. Thus, the District’s General License Law sets a number of requirements for those engaged into practice of architecture.

These requirements are aimed at improving the quality of services provided as well as well-being of people living in the community. Therefore, Sturdza did not have the right to complete any work prior to obtaining the necessary certification from the District of Columbia. Therefore, she could not obtain compensation due to failure to comply with the district’s laws.

It is noteworthy that Sturdza noted that international laws had certain priority and an architect operating in different parts of the world did not have to comply with all local regulations that could limit their creative activity. The architect noted that compliance with international laws and having license from the country gives the right to work in the country. She also stressed that the regulations of the District of Columbia were rather strict and they could negatively impact the development of the community.

The court did not take into account this argument as it was rather inconsistent. The architect also argued that there is certain limitation to the licensing requirement under the International Center Act and the Foreign Missions Act of 1982 (that dwells upon federal jurisdiction over international activities). Sturdza tried to prove that these acts preempted local regulations. Nevertheless, the Foreign Missions Act does not preempt any municipal law regarding a variety of issues including involvement into the practice of architecture. The International Center Act also requires international activities to comply with local laws and regulations.

The architect referred to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Thus, the court had to decide whether Sturdza could claim quantum meruit recovery and compensation for the contract that was given to another architect.

Decision or Ruling of the Court under Jurisdiction of the Case

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that Sturdza was barred from recovery in quantum meruit as well as on the contract on embassy design as she had had to obtain the license form the district before starting her work on the design.

The court agreed that license laws in the District of Columbia were quite harsh and might be different from the international laws or regulations of other states. Nonetheless, the court also stressed that the law was well-established and it had proved to be affective in addressing people’s needs and high-standards of services provided. The court also agreed with the DC Circuit that there can be certain exception to the law. For instance, it was allowed to enter negotiations on architectural contracts if an architect obtained the necessary license before completing actual work. Thus, architects could start contractual negotiations but they had to obtain the license prior to rendering any services.

This poses certain inconveniences to parties but it ensures well-being of the people living in the state. Hence, if an architect started completing certain work on a contract without license, they could avail themselves of the exception mentioned above. It is necessary to add that Sturdza claimed she was going to obtain the license before rendering the services. However, the DC Circuit expressed uncertainty on the matter and it was stressed that the license was not obtained and, hence, recovery was impossible. More so, the architect provided certain drafts as well as changes to initial design without applying for the license, which led to violation of numerous regulations existing in the district.

A number of cases were referred to. For instance, Truitt V. Miller was mentioned. In that case, it was decided that the contract did not comply with the licensing statute. Therefore, the case supported the decision of the DC Circuit. Another case referred to was Cevern, Inc. V. Ferbish. In that case, the court decided that quantum meruit recovery was impossible due to the failure to comply with the necessary regulations. Again, that was a case similar to the case in question and the decision of the DC Circuit was supported. Another case mentioned was But cf. Remsen Partners, Ltd. V. Stephen A. Goldberg Co.

In that case, it was decided that a party that completed some work and received certain fees under an illegal contract had to disgorge money obtained. Nonetheless, the DC Circuit decided that that case was not applicable as Sturdza had not received any money from the UAE. More so, it was also added that even though the decision in that case could have been made, it did not spread automatically towards all other cases and it was essential to apply all policies involved. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed with this decision as well. It is noteworthy that the case of Dunn v. Finlayson was mentioned to stress that even a licensed architect could not claim quantum meruit recovery if his/her license had lapsed.

Furthermore, it was noted that according to DC Code §2-262(6), an architect having a license from another district could claim recovery if he/she agreed to perform certain tasks but the architect did not start the work before obtaining the license from the District.

Admittedly, Sturdza failed to comply with this regulation and, hence, was barred from the recovery. It is possible to note that the court referred to several cases which supported the decision made. There are a number of acts and regulations that clearly demand obtaining license before rendering any services. Therefore, the decision made by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was well-grounded.

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IvyPanda. "Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates: Case Analysis." April 9, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/sturdza-v-united-arab-emirates-case-analysis/.

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