Introduction
Term limits for officeholders are an essential principle in a significant part of democratic governments. It means that parliamentarians, presidents, or other incumbents are legally restricted from staying in power more than it is officially stated. In other scenarios, incumbents have opportunities to run for office numerous times. Although it is widely recognized that well-functioning democracy cannot survive without term limits, some still see benefits in unconstrained opportunities to be elected.
Discussion
The striking argument for term limits is that during a long period of staying in a ruling position, a president may usurp power by co-opting elites and continuously enforcing personal rule. It is especially seen in post-Soviet countries, where weak constitutionalism and populist rhetoric of presidents resulted in the abolishment of term limits and the strengthening of dictatorship (Dixon and Landau 371). These countries include Russia under Putin, Belarus under Lukashenka, Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev, and many others. Another benefit of term limits is that they reduce corruption and contribute to the circulation of new meanings and ideas (Benito et al. 19). As for drawbacks, some may argue that term limits violate the true will of the population. In addition, some people uninformed by political history may judge that unconstrained term limits may significantly eradicate dirty political bargainings behind the scenes. The reason is that reduced uncertainties about party nominations may create more stable relations.
Conclusion
In general, I strongly support the necessity of term limits. It is evident that the absence of limitations increases the chances of a democracy crackdown. In modern times, the rise of far-right populist movements adds another important case for term limits. Nevertheless, in stable democracies, parliamentarians may not be restrained by term limits because their share of responsibility is not as high as in the case of a president.
Works Cited
Benito, Bernardino, et al. “Can Salaries and Re-Election Prevent Political Corruption? An Empirical Evidence.” Revista de contabilidad, vol. 21, no. 1, 2018, pp. 19-27, Web.
Dixon, Rosalind, and David Landau. “Constitutional End Games: Making Presidential Term Limits Stick.” Hastings Law Journal, vol. 71, 2019, pp. 359-418, Web.