Heated discussions on whether the public should know about a key illness involve numerous individuals. Undoubtedly, proponents of the CEO’s privacy, along with its opponents, present compelling arguments. Even though the former have more powerful ones, everything depends on numerous circumstances. It is crucial to understand that the issue is particularly complex and depends on ethical and legal aspects.
On the one hand, key executives are often strongly linked to companies, and their private matters can influence stock prices or businesses’ images. Stockholders may state that CEOs are obliged to share their health information, as it can affect stock prices. Moreover, customers and employees may feel that individuals who represent companies need to disclose their problems as most celebrities do. These positions have the right to exist, as key executives are trusted individuals with many responsibilities, including the ones outside of work settings.
On the other hand, most legal and ethical arguments support companies not disclosing key executives’ private personal matters. First, “there is no Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule that expressly requires any disclosure regarding executive health” (Horwich, 2018, p. 6). Second, everyone must respect individual privacy and let people choose on their own whether to share their health information or not. Without any doubt, a company should not lie about the health condition of its executives. Still, it has legal rights, as well as the ethical ones, not to disclose any information unless the issue is raised. It is vital to understand that key executives are ordinary people who deserve privacy and respect. Therefore, in most cases, it is unreasonable to require a company to release its CEO’s personal information. However, it is evident that key executives should reveal their health problems to prevent their companies from facing different issues.
Reference
Horwich, A. (2018). The securities law disclosure rules of the road regarding executive illness. Securities Regulation Law Journal, 46(1), 5-18.