Even though the principle of compensation that is followed in the criminal justice system of the United States is usually discussed as fair, just, and effective to address the needs of citizens who became the victims and need repayment, the problem is in the fact that there is a category of victims for whom it is almost impossible to determine the size of compensation. It is important to focus on the problem of false imprisonment as a result of weaknesses that are observed in the U.S. criminal justice system. In their book Picking Cotton: Our Memoir of Injustice and Redemption, Jennifer Thompson-Cannino, Ronald Cotton, and Erin Torneo told a story of false imprisonment from a perspective that no compensation can be discussed as adequate for being wrongly convicted because the life of a wrongly imprisoned person changes significantly (Thompson-Cannino, Cotton, and Torneo 8). In addition, according to the ideas presented by Professor Deborah Mostaghel in the article “Wrongfully Incarcerated, Randomly Compensated – How to Fund Wrongful-Conviction Compensation Statutes” that was published in Indiana Law Review in 2011, wrongly imprisoned persons “may have lost years of their lives, their families, the opportunity to go to school, or the chance to gain or keep employment” (Mostaghel 509). From this point, false imprisonment can be considered as a case of injustice because it is impossible to measure all the damages associated with the period of incarceration, and it is impossible to state the set adequate repayment for experienced losses. Thus, the tort of false imprisonment should be discussed as the infringement of individuals’ civil liberties and rights, and there is not enough compensation to pay damages and losses faced by wrongly imprisoned persons.
False imprisonment is a violation of persons’ civil liberties because wrongly imprisoned people become almost deprived of the opportunity to state their innocence, and compensation provided with references to the size and character of losses cannot satisfy their needs. The problem is in the fact that it is almost impossible to measure damages associated with false incarceration and the procedures that can prove the innocence of wrongly convicted persons became actively used only two decades ago. Thus, some time ago, victims of weaknesses in the criminal justice system received the opportunity to be exonerated with the help of tests and procedures like DNA testing. Ronald Cotton, the author of Picking Cotton, became one of the first post-conviction DNA exonerees in the United States who had to prove his right to return to the free social life (Thompson-Cannino, Cotton, and Torneo 283). In spite of the fact that Cotton received the significant compensation in about $109,150 for eleven years of false imprisonment, he did not receive any compensation for the personal things that he lost while being incarcerated (Thompson-Cannino, Cotton, and Torneo 284). Prof. Mostaghel states that “convicted persons whose innocence is established may be able to walk out of prison, but is not so easy to walk back into society” (Mostaghel 509). In their turn, Professors Evan Mandery, Amy Shlosberg, Valerie West, and Bennett Callaghan, an expert in Criminal Justice, published the article “Compensation Statutes and Post-Exoneration Offending” in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, in which they stated that “the compensation is inadequate in every sense. It is too little in comparison to the harm suffered by the exoneree, and inadequate to help the exoneree land on his feet following release” (Mandery et al. 560). From this point, the consequences of injustice are faced by all wrongly imprisoned persons when they receive the opportunity to prove their innocence because they need time and resources to adapt to the social life after receiving different kinds of traumas. In this case, the provided compensation cannot be discussed as appropriate in order to cover losses associated with being imprisoned and becoming a victim of injustice in a situation when justice should be promoted by the criminal system.
However, compensation can be discussed as extremely helpful and necessary when the case of false imprisonment is observed because the absence of any compensation is a more serious problem. In addition, it is necessary to state that the absence of compensation in many cases of false incarceration is the other issue that is typical for the U.S. criminal justice system. There are thousands of persons who have no opportunity to prove their innocence because of drawbacks of the criminal justice system; as a result, it is even impossible to speak about the expected compensation. In their article “Framing Innocents: The Wrongly Convicted as Victims of State Harm” that was published in 2010, Saundra Westervelt and Kimberly Cook, specialists in Criminology, note that exonerees “must request that the courts expunge their records and/or grant compensation for their wrongful convictions (if available in their state)” (Westervelt and Cook 263). It is important to pay attention to the fact that the authors of the article note that the discussed services are often unavailable. Furthermore, the associated procedures are usually costly, time consuming, and even ineffective (Westervelt and Cook 263). Thus, the first barrier is the fact that in many states of the country, there is no compensation practice that is directly associated with false imprisonment. The other barrier experienced by wrongly imprisoned persons on their path to receiving the compensation and assistance is that they face the necessity to state the need for DNA testing or other procedures of that kind. Therefore, exonerees need to win the other case in order to prove the fact of false imprisonment (Westervelt and Cook 264). As a result, the wrongly imprisoned person should overcome the long path toward proving innocence, and there is no guarantee that these efforts will help to succeed. The presence of compensation is considered as the necessary condition in this situation. From this point, the provision of any compensation should be discussed as an important response to the problem of false imprisonment in the country, and the main problem is that states in the USA vary in regulations and principles regarding the process of compensating the months or years spent in prison for wrongly accused persons.
On the one hand, the idea that any compensation is better than the absence of compensation is relevant to be declared in the context of controversial situations when wrongly convicted persons have no opportunities to prove their right to receive compensation for false imprisonment. Furthermore, in many cases, these persons cannot receive compensation because of particular features of criminal justice system in different states. In this context, the focus on the necessity to provide compensation in all states of the country seems to be reasonable (Cabraser 2209; Mandery et al. 562). On the other hand, it is important to promote the idea that any set compensation cannot be discussed as adequate in case of false imprisonment because of the involvement of not only legal but also moral and ethical questions. From this point, the necessity of compensation and its size are the questions that need to be discussed in order to address the issue effectively, but the losses generally mentioned by wrongly imprisoned people cannot be compensated with references to material resources. Mandery, Shlosberg, West, and Callaghan state that it is significant to pay attention to the “inadequacy of money to redress the physical, psychological, and financial issues that confront exonerees upon their reentry to society” (Mandery et al. 562). A combination of the financial, psychological, and social assistance is an important way to resolving the problem, but even this holistic approach to compensation cannot be discussed as completely appropriate, as it is noted by Elizabeth Cabraser in the article published in Vanderbilt Law Review in 2004 (Cabraser 2209). In spite of the attempts of governments to develop the procedures for providing compensations for wrongly accused persons, these services will be often considered as incomplete, if it is possible to see them from the point of exonerees. Furthermore, even if the size of compensation is different when persons were wrongly incarcerated during a month or a year, it is inappropriate to state that the provided compensation could cover all the experienced losses.
False imprisonment can be discussed as a situation when a wrongly convicted person loses freedom, property, social connections, job, psychological and physical health, reputation, and often family. Even if this person is provided with the compensation in spite of the fact that in many states of the country there are no associated norms and principles, this compensation cannot be discussed as adequate to address the issue and cover all the mentioned losses. Mandery, Shlosberg, West, and Callaghan say the following to discuss this controversial problem: “Wrongfully convicted individuals are victims in the truest sense. They have done nothing to bring about the harm they have suffered. In a retributive sense, they deserve compensation, inadequate though it may be” (Mandery et al. 563). As a result, the released persons need to adapt to the life in the world that has changed dramatically in a general sense and personally for the wrongly imprisoned people, and there is no compensation that can be assessed as enough to help these persons to start their life again (Mostaghel 508). From this perspective, the inadequateness of the provided compensation is one of the most important problems that need to be discussed in the context of violating the citizens’ rights because even the compassionate assistance provided as the compensation cannot serve to address the experienced traumas. There is an observed need for the fair and reliable assistance provided to exonerees, but it is almost impossible to speak about this assistance in terms of ‘compensation’ for being wrongly imprisoned. Even if it is relevant to speak about the necessity of the compensation for wrongly incarcerated persons, there is no single opinion regarding the size of compensation that needs to be provided for the man due to the absence of adequate measures that can be used to assess the damage in the concrete situation.
Works Cited
Cabraser, Elizabeth. “Human Rights Violations as Mass Torts: Compensation as a Proxy for Justice in the United States Civil Litigation System”. Vanderbilt Law Review 57.6 (2004): 2209-2238. ProQuest. Web.
Mandery, Evan, Amy Shlosberg, Valerie West, and Bennett Callaghan. “Compensation Statutes and Post-Exoneration Offending”. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 103.2 (2013): 553-583. ProQuest. Web.
Mostaghel, Deborah. “Wrongfully Incarcerated, Randomly Compensated – How to Fund Wrongful-Conviction Compensation Statutes”. Indiana Law Review 44.2 (2011): 503-544. MckinneyLaw. Web.
Thompson-Cannino, Jennifer, Ronald Cotton, and Erin Torneo. Picking Cotton: Our Memoir of Injustice and Redemption. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2010. Print.
Westervelt, Saundra, and Kimberly Cook. “Framing Innocents: The Wrongly Convicted as Victims of State Harm”. Crime, Law and Social Change 53.3 (2010): 259-275. ProQuest. Web.