Introduction
The focus of the US in the Persian Gulf was predominantly on Saudi Arabia. Over time, smaller Emirate States have bolstered their strategic importance by taking measures that have attracted the interest of the US. Currently, the US has bilateral relationships with most of the Emirate States. The small Emirate States include Qatar, Bahrain, Sultanate of Oman, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (Abdulla, 1999, 6).
These small Emirate States are characterized by low populations but are richly endowed with oil and natural gas resources. Security scare especially from terrorism and terrorist activities is a major problem facing these states. Due to their small populations, the states cannot provide sufficient internal security against infiltration of terrorists so they rely on external security systems. The US has been instrumental in provision of security to these small Emirate States (Marschall 2003, 154).
This paper analyses the diplomatic relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US. The focus of the analysis is on how the US is now shifting its tactics of maneuver of the Persian Gulf from Saudi Arabia to Qatar and the other GCC nations. It is the position of this paper that the shift is occasioned by changed US economic and security interests.
The changes having been occasioned by the wave of terrorism that culminated into September 11 attacks and the economic potential of the GCC nations. However, most crucially, the shift is occasioned by shifts in the foreign policy in the Emirate nations. Although the US interests in all the GCC nations, at the moment, Qatar seems the favorable point of control for the US from the infrastructural and policy changes it has implemented.
Diplomatic relationships between the US and Saudi Arabia begun immediately after the Second World War; concessions on the political, economic and military issues were established between the US and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ( Saikal 2003, 46 ).
The governments began relating significantly in 1933 after the award of the oil exploration concession to the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) (Little 2003, 47). A more formal international relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia started in 1945 when President F. D. Roosevelt and King Abd Al Aziz met aboard the U.S.S Quincy (Little 2003, 73).
The interaction between the two leaders saw the US government sign a series of agreements with the government of Saudi Arabia for developmental cooperation. Schanzer, Jonathan and Ross (2005, 102) indicate that construction of the Dhahran military air base, provision of the military training assistance and development of a financial and infrastructure systems were some of the projects the US government implemented in Saudi Arabia as a result of the bilateral relation.
The California Arabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) succeeded in oil exploration and by 1938, the company had started mining oil. During the Second World War the US government endeavored to protect the oil wells against attacks. This support offered to Saudi Arabia by the US during the war played a major role in deepening the bilateral relations (Zahlan 1998, 93). The US gradually worked on replacing the United Kingdom as the major political controllers or influencers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The US has since then continued to pursue a bilateral relation with Saudi Arabia. Using the relationship with Saudi Arabia, it has gradually managed to perpetuate its influence in the entire Persian Gulf despite recurring problems arising from regional issues. The Arab-Israel war break outs in 1948, 1967 and 1973 and the difference in opinion on how to respond to the situation posed a severe test on bilateral relations between the US and Saudi Arabia (Little 2003, 67).
The 1973 war dealt the most severe blow to bilateral relations because of the support that the US offered to Israel during the war. Saudi Arabia joined other Persian Gulf nations to slap an oil embargo on the US causing severe shortage of the commodity in the US (Al-Rasheed 2002, 136). The Israel-Palestinian peace break down in September 2000 was another significant test on the bilateral relationship that had developed again after the 1973 oil embargo (Schanzer & Ross. 2005, 212).
In the wake of the shortage, the two governments started working on reviving the relationship to ensure continued flow of oil from the Persian region to the US markets. Difference in opinion on how to handle the Arab-Israel war has continued to be the point of disagreement and a thorny issue to their bilateral relations.
Tanter (1999, 72) indicates that after cold war, the Bush administration wanted to extend Reagan’s’ policy of creating a balance between Iraq and Iran. Iraq’s attack on Kuwait however shifted the presidents’ mindset ordering the deployment of American military to Saudi Arabia.
Clinton’s administration was opposed to the power balance policy as being ineffective and fashioned out the “Dual Containment” which aimed at supporting both Iraq and Iran. A partial support of the policy by some US personnel’s based in Saudi Arabia led to the death of 24 of them and injuries to hundreds of others in two separate bombings in Riyadh and Dhahran in 1995 and 1996 respectively (Tanter 1999, 74)
The 11th September, 2001 terrorist attack on the US heightened the tension in the relationship between the two governments. The Al-Qaeda network leader Osama Bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia though the country revoked his citizenship in 1994 (Griffin 2005, 73). There is a general feeling in the US that Saudi Arabian policies support terrorism and religious extremism posing a threat to the peace of the citizens of the US as well as other countries of the world.
The Al-Qaeda network members led by Osama Bin Laden have come out openly to criticizing the US citing its anti-Islamic policies in the Persian Gulf. According to Griffin (2005, 62) there were some suspicions that Saudi Arabia was responsible for the funding of the 9/11 attack on the US. The report cites sources indicating that the funding of this particular attack was solicited from Saudi Arabian businessmen, charities and elements of government sponsorship.
The Saudi Arabian government on the other hand has come out strongly denying the allegations leveled against it by the US government. Officials of Saudi Arabian government officials instead argue that the Saudi Arabia has worked closely with the US government in combating the group who target both the US and the Saudi Arabian government itself. Griffin (2005. 65) concludes that there is evidence the government of Saudi Arabian indeed funded the September 11 attack on the US.
The US government did at some point praise Saudi Arabia for steps in countering terrorism but maintains than the country still has more miles to cover. From 2003, Saudi Arabia did establish laws dealing with terrorism financing according to US stipulated standards. US officials however maintain that Saudi Arabia is the source of terrorist money has to up its efforts in dealing with financing of terrorist activities (Library Information and Research Service 2002, 61).
Some senate members have come out strongly criticizing the US assistance to Saudi Arabia, saying the huge Saudi Arabian oil revenue made the US foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia unnecessary. The more revenue that the US adds to Saudi Arabia in terms of foreign aid is thought to be part of the money that is diverted into financing of terrorism activities
The US has interests in the Persian Gulf because of the huge oil resources and security concerns associated with Islamic extremists. It has continued to perpetuate these interests among the GCC nations, however, after tensions with Saudi Arabia, a need a rose for the US to establish a stable point of control in the Persian Gulf. As a result the US has spread its alliance in the Persian Gulf to all the Emirate countries.
Although, the US has interests in most Emirate countries, Qatar stands out; it has stronger ties with the US than the others. Pauly & Lansford (2005, 97 ), indicate that at the time when Saudi Arabia was reluctant to allow the US use its military airbases, Qatar built new runways and other military facilities that would be used by the US military.
From late 1990s, the country focused on developing independent foreign policies that differentiated it from the larger influence of the neighboring countries and promoted its international profile (Rabi U. 2009).
Qatar is a country whose population largely lives in luxury. It has the highest per capital income compared to the rest of the Middle East. This is occasioned by the fact that it holds “the third largest natural gas resource in the world” (Willis 2004, 5). Like the rest of the Persian Gulf countries, Qatar is under the rule of a monarch.
The current leader of the country Emir Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa took over the government from his father in 1995 through a peaceful coup. The Emir developed policies that have seen the country gain a lot in terms of economic and political development. Key among these include; the establishment of the Aljazeera, a first all Arab-nations news television network and the passing of a new constitution in 2003 that allowed women to vote and run for political positions (Canfield 2002, 127).
Qatar has developed ties with several US companies especially in those dealing in oil and natural gas such as Mobil and Conoco Philips (Zahlan 1998, 49). Qatar government has developed a unique foreign policy among the Gulf Cooperation Councils, which has attracted sharp criticism to Qatar from the other GCC nations (Rabi 2009, 1). The Al jazeera for example has been sampled out as a tool Qatar uses to undermine other GCC nations by centering much on broadcasting the negative news about the GCC.
Its alignment with Israel has also been viewed by the neighboring countries as a betrayal. Since the 1991 Gulf war, Qatar embarked on developing good international relations with Israel and the US. Doha is the host to Israel’s trade representation office and the US embassy, which has elicited sharp criticism from the Gulf Cooperation Council nations (Rabi 2009, 67).
Qatar has ignored the criticisms from the neighboring countries and gone ahead to sign agreements between Israel and the US in business, military and other development programs. Close cooperation between Qatar and the US in military affairs began in 1992 after the signing of the defense cooperation agreement (Abdullah1999, 9).
The US government has offered unrelenting support to Emir Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa’s government since he assumed the leadership of the country in 1995. The US has invested heavily in the expansion and upgrading of the Al-UIde airbase to enable it hold the US aircrafts, equipment as well as personnel (Sharp 2004, 9). The main support offered by the US government has been on the implementation of key reforms in the political, economic and educational sectors (Abdullah 1999, 12).
Trade between the two nations has been on the path of acceleration since the take-over of Emir Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa. Sharp (2004, 8) indicates that the US exports to Qatar in 2001 amounted to $ 320 millions consisting mainly of machinery and transport equipment, its imports mainly textiles and fertilizer amounted to $ 510 millions. Trade between the two nations is mainly based on textiles, fertilizer, machinery and transport equipment and not oil (Uzi, 2009, 85).
The two governments recently held talks to explore trade between them in the energy sector. Defense and security are some other areas of cooperation that the two governments have forged significantly. In 1992 after the Gulf war, Qatar and the US signed a bilateral and defense cooperation which provided for US to access Qatar airbases, the US invested in upgrading of the military base and other military equipments for Qatar (Sharp, 2004, 9).
The US also provides counterterrorism aid to Qatar to support of its domestic security system (Abdullah 1999, 23). Due to its small population, Qatar has a small security force and therefore relies much on external co-operation to strengthen its force (Uzi 2009, 83). Since the 1992 Gulf war, Qatar embarked on intensive ways of modernizing its security force to fit for provision of good internal security and especially against terrorism. The military modernization Qatar has implemented is both in facility and equipment.
The construction of the Al-Udeid airbase is one of the most significant military investments at a cost of $1 Billion. The airbase is also used by the US as a basing hub for its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Wills 2004, 66). Allowing the US to access Qatar’s airbase is one of the incentives for a deeper bilateral relationship between the two governments. The formalization was done in 2000 and in April 2003 the US combat army shifted from Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia to Al Udeid in Qatar.
The US state department has also characterized Qatar’s laws and efforts to counter terrorism since the September 11 2001 incidence as quite significant. The laws provide a definition of terrorism and a terrorist.
Mechanisms have been established identifying much broader ways of detecting and dealing with terrorist (Wills 2004, 62). A body called “The Qatar Authority for Charitable Activities (QACA)” was established in 2004. The QACA was given powers to monitor and evaluate the activities of all charity organizations; both local and international (Willis 2004, 12).
This came about in a wake of investigations that linked some charitable organizations to terrorism and the Al-Qaeda network. Qatar’s central bank has put in place “a Financial Intelligence Unit” that closely inspects and watches the banking system. To beef its operations, this intelligence unit works closely with counterparts in the US (Rubin 2009, 72). All these efforts directed at sealing avenues that can bring in money for terrorist activities.
The Qatar-Israel relation has been viewed as being fronted by the US. Although Qatar and Israel lack a formal bilateral relationship, Qatar took a lead in fronting for the Arab-Israel talks to revamp economic links between Israel and the Arab countries (Rubin 2009, 9).
Some of the efforts taken by Qatar in initiating the Arab-Israel talks include the hosting of the multilateral talks of the Arab-Israel working groups and a visit to the country by the Israel Prime Minister Shimon Peres in April 1996 (Davis 1995, 71). Qatar also hosted the fourth Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference (MENA), the conference brought together the political and leaders from Arab and Israel and discussed the regional economic cooperation (Rubin 2009, 6).
Qatar has for sometime now played an active role in the initiation of talks to revive the Palestinian- Israel peace talks. Qatar’s involvement in the peace process has been seen as an encouragement by the US to Qatar to take an active involvement in the Palestinian-Israel peace negation process (Little 2003. 12).
This interpretation is drawn from the Emirs’ visit to Washington to meet President Bush and immediately after the meeting between the two leaders, Qatar and Israel’s foreign ministers met to discuss ways of reviving the Palestinian – Israel peace process in May 2003 (Wills 2004, 60).
The Israel – Qatar relationship is seen as a US effort to use Qatar as a bridge to foster dialogue between Israel and the Arab countries (Saikal 2003, 9). The other Arab nations look at the relationship between Qatar and Israel as one way that Qatar is using to undermine the unity of the Arab nations (Uzi 2009, 4).
It is not just Qatar that has placed itself strategically to benefit from the US maneuvers in the Persian Gulf. There is US presence in most of the Emirate Countries. The US has military presence in Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, and Oman. Kuwait for example has a long bilateral relationship with the US which begun in 1961 after gaining full independence from Iraq.
Kuwait has suffered three invasions by Iraq, in 1961, 1973, and 1990 (Panaspornparist 2005, 1). The country’s small population and weak military was not enough to wade off these attacks, as a result, Kuwait relied much on external military forces; US formed a bulk of the military aid of Kuwait during the invasion by Iraq (Panaspornparist 2005, 2).
The US army took a lead in expelling the Iraq military from Kuwait. Kuwait has since then been relying on the external forces to maintain its sovereignty and internal security. Bahrain and UAE have also been working on strengthening their ties with the US. The naval ships of the US have their base in Bahrain, which acts as their control centre (Panaspornparist 2005, 15).
The US has been keen on developing stronger ties with Emirate states since when tensions in bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia surfaced. The Strategy of the Emirate states in attracting US interest has been the establishment of friendly foreign policy. Qatar seemed to be ahead of others in securing US interests. Its position on various regional issues has been looked at by other Persian countries as controversial.
It tries to take a reconciliatory position contrary to the positions held by the other countries in the region (Saikal 2003, 12). Other Emirate countries seemed to be following suit or towing the line. For example, on the Issue of Palestine and Israel, although there is opposition to US involvement, the Emirate countries have not come out condemning the US. They have rather supported dialogue initiatives between Israel and Palestine.
The relationship between the Emirate States and US has led to mutual benefit between the nations. The US has been able to import and export goods from the Emirate Nations and vice versa (Little 2003. 12).
The US combat force uses bases in the Emirate nations to provide defense to and security in the region. The countries have also been pivotal as control points for US forces combating terrorist cells. Emirate Countries like Kuwait, on the other hand, have been able to benefit in terms of external security, upgrading of military facilities and equipment.
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