Problem Identification and Background
For a long time, the global capitalistic society has enjoyed a long period of stability. However, in the early 2000s, economic stability in western nations threatened this stability (Li, 2012, p. 1). Since this period, America has experienced several economic and political changes.
For example, the US has experienced several internal and external fiscal imbalances (characterized by debt-financing, consumption-led expansions, and a growing current account deficit) (Li, 2012, p. 1). Within this time, China has emerged as the dominant player in the global capitalist economy by sustaining most of the world’s economic growth (both in China and around the world).
America has been unable to counter this growth. The endless wars that the US has fought in the Middle East have also added to the country’s failure to counter-check China’s growing dominance in global politics. Instead, such wars only threaten America’s position as the main center of global political power.
Consequently, the rising dominance of China in the global political space has created tension in Sino-American relations. Now, the future of international relations between China and the United States (U.S) is unpredictable.
Several researchers have explained the outcome of the relationship between China and the US by suggesting two outcomes – war, or peace. Deeper analyses of the Sino-American relations highlight a shifting power balance in favor of China. For example, Buono & Lara (2007, p. 324) say with the periodic economic problems faced by the US, an opportunity for creating multiple centers of power in global politics has emerged.
Evidence of this claim exists from the expansion of international relations between the EU, Russia, and China (among other emerging global powers). Buono & Lara (2007, p. 324) believe some of these great world powers (including France) recognize the need to have a multi-polar reconstruction of world power to replace the single-power strategy (unipolar strategy) perfected by the US.
Predominantly, China plays a central role in the realization of this multi-power strategy. For example, China has threatened America’s position as the ultimate global power. For instance, it has replaced America as the ultimate power in the Organization of Pacific Asian Cooperation (APEC) (Buono & Lara, 2007, p. 324).
China is also the greatest commercial partner in South America, after displacing America in most commercial partnership contracts within the continent.
For example, the Asian giant has signed different trade agreements with the main economic powers in South America, including Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Cuba (Buono & Lara, 2007, p. 324). Some of these countries (for example, Venezuela) have accorded China unlimited access to their vast energy reserves.
The dominance of China in the global economic space has challenged America’s political and economic dominance in global politics. To support this view, Buono & Lara (2007) say, “The commercial and investment agreements between Venezuela, Brazil, and Columbia, and the central strategic role played by Cuba in inviting China to these trade agreements, was a setback for Washington” (p. 324).
A similar global dominance of China has occurred in Asia. For example, in 2005, China and India signed several trade agreements to influence global politics (Buono & Lara, 2007, p. 324).
Both emerging global powers intended to do so by using their combined populations, which amount to more than a third of the global population, to influence the global market. These developments show that the US is slowly losing its grip in global politics, as it is becoming unlikely that it could impose its will on global issues, in the future.
The shifting global power of world politics from the US to China raises anxiety that America may resort to war with China to maintain its position as the center of global power (according to the neo-realism view). Proponents of the neo-realism view have advanced several reasons to explain why this likelihood is possible.
For example, they say, “a generalized existing broadening of international conflicts may lead to a Sino-American war, if it is fuelled by the same market that has generated armed conflicts in the past” (p. 324).
This paper investigates the possibility that great states (like America and China) would go to war to maintain their power. Central to this analysis are the roles of the neo-realism and the power transition theories in predicting such an outcome.
Research Questions and Hypothesis
Research Question
- To what extent does competition among great powers lead them to war?
Hypothesis
- The probability of a new world war between China and the US is low, even if the intentions of great powers to wage wars are high.
Detailed Topic Description
Offensive realism is an ideology that strives to explain the aggressive nature of international relations. Mearsheimer (2007, p. 18) developed this theory during the Second World War by asserting the probability of conflict in international relations. This theory outlines the importance of the structural capabilities of nation-states to engage in war, when they want to maintain their dominance as centers of global power.
Drawing from the principles of the neo-liberalism theory, King (2008, p. 12) says that national security dominates the priority of nation-states.
Proponents of this theory highlight the difficulty of controlling international relations as a recipe for war (they believe there is no regulatory institution for regulating international relations). They also believe that power-preventing misbehavior is the most effective framework for deterring nations from going to war (King, 2008, p. 12).
The offensive realism theory is also pessimistic about the prospects of long-term relations among nation-states because of the competitive nature of these actors. Referring to this view, Mearsheimer (2007) says, “States favor self-help measures and relative short-term gains above cooperation and absolute long-term gains” (p. 18).
Furthermore, King (2008, p. 12) says the relationships between nation-states are anarchical and untrustworthy. Often, this mistrust leads to misunderstandings and misinterpretations of state actions, thereby leading to war.
The offensive realism theory premises its ideologies on five principles. The first principle outlines that the world’s most powerful nations are the main players in international politics. Within this principle, the theory also underscores the importance of looking at international politics as anarchical (Wirtz & Fortmann, 2004, p. 52).
The offensive realism theory also stipulates that these powerful states possess some level of offensive military capability. Through the possession of these military capabilities, nation-states are often wary of the intentions of other states on their welfare (and particularly the implications of these intentions on their national security).
This background highlights the fourth principle of the offensive realism theory, which underscores the importance of survival, as the main preoccupation of nation-states in international politics (King, 2008, p. 12). Lastly, the offensive realism theory suggests that nation-states are rational entities and therefore make rational decisions that ensure their survival in international politics.
Like the offensive realism theory, the power transition theory suggests the existence of war during power transitions in global politics. This theory paints a grim picture of international politics because it suggests nation-states buy military arsenal to attack other states that threaten their power, or dominance, in international politics.
Mearsheimer (2007, p. 19) has been the greatest supporter of the offensive realism and power transition theories. His main ideological departure from proponents of defensive realism is the level of military arsenal needed to safeguard national security.
While proponents of defensive realism theories say nation-states, need only “adequate” military arsenal to keep their countries safe, Mearsheimer (2007, p. 18) believes that nation-states need a lot of military power to protect national security.
Furthermore, unlike the proponents of defensive realism, who believe that nation-states use their military arsenal to preserve the status – quo, the political transition theory suggests that most nations are power-hungry entities, which do not hesitate to attack other countries to increase their global influence (Wunderlich, 2007, p. 18).
The political transition theory therefore says that the international political system harbors the greatest motives for nation-states to “fight” because there is no central authority that would prevent them from doing so.
Since this situation creates anarchy within the international system, proponents of the political transition theory believe that nation-states would eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the intention of other states on their national security by adopting aggressive military strategies to maintain their power (Wunderlich, 2007, p. 18).
Such states would also increase their military capabilities and use them at the expense of other states. To explain this view, Mearsheimer (2007) said,
“Great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemonic power in the system because it thought that it already had sufficient power to survive” (p. 35).
One theory that undermines the principles of the offensive realism theory and the power transition theory is the liberalism theory. This theory suggests that the accumulation of military arsenal is irrelevant in a world where states share mutual interests (Jackson & Sørensen, 2012, p. 126).
Moreover, the theory posits that the existence of broad interests among states have made it difficult for countries to define national interests (SPKN, 2013, p. 1). Therefore, the protection of national interests (security), as proposed by proponents of the neo-realism theory, is irrelevant.
The advancement of the liberalism theory in the 1970s prompted many researchers to say the neo-realist theory is outdated (Jackson & Sørensen, 2012, p. 126). Researchers who argue this view claim proponents of the neo-realist theory do not appreciate the complexity of international politics today (SPKN, 2013, p. 1).
For example, they say advancements in globalization, telecommunication, and global commerce have complicated international relations to the extent that simple power politics cannot explain international relations today (Jackson & Sørensen, 2012, p. 126).
After acknowledging the complexities of international relations, the liberalism theory advances four key principles. The first principle highlights the harsh environment of international relations, but warns against the use of military power to wade through this harsh environment (because the benefits of diplomacy often outweigh the benefits of military interventions) (SPKN, 2013, p. 3).
The second principle acknowledges the existence of other forms of power (besides military power), as influential tools of solving international conflicts (Jackson & Sørensen, 2012, p. 126). For example, the liberalism theory says countries can use economic and social power to solve international conflicts. Concisely, recent years have shown the effectiveness of economic power (over military force) to influence state actions.
The third principle of the liberalism theory recognizes the existence of different interests among countries. Therefore, the assumption that security and political interests surpass all other national interests (as proposed by realists) is flawed (Jackson & Sørensen, 2012, p. 126).
The last principle of the liberalism theory is the acknowledgement that the existence of international rules and regulations foster international harmony through cooperation and trust (SPKN, 2013, p. 3). A classic example of the working of the liberalism theory is the existence of mutual relations between the US and other major western powers.
Certainly, although the US is an influential global power, it is unimaginable to conceive the idea that it would attack other western powers because of political or economic disagreements.
Indeed, America often disagrees with major western powers (and some Eastern powers) about trade rules and policies, but because of the existence of the spirit of cooperation, America would not easily attack any of these countries. To this extent, the liberalism theory explains most international relations today.
Besides the realism and liberalism theories, another theory that explains the nature of international relation is the idealism theory. The concept of idealism premises on the need for morality in international relations. The concept says foreign policies should pursue a moral goal and abstain from trickery and dishonesty (SPKN, 2013, p. 4).
The same theory also condemns violence as a way of solving international conflicts (Crawford, 2013, p. 1). This view shows that the principles of idealism also differ with the principles of the neo-realism theory because the latter advocates for the use of violence to solve international conflicts.
A practical understanding of idealism arises from the use of idealistic principles to explain the workings of the Democratic Party in the US (SPKN, 2013, p. 4). Politicians also used the same concept to end the First World War (particularly after Woodrow Wilson vowed to promote democracy and national self-determination as a strategy for promoting global peace) (SPKN, 2013, p. 4).
The existence of the same principle in explaining how countries relate with one another informs the creation of the League of Nations, which was supposed to prevent the occurrence of global conflicts. Some scholars have used the promotion of idealism during the First World War as a pillar for understanding how democracy started (Crawford, 2013, p. 1).
Outcome Analysis and Results
Some researchers have expressed reservations regarding the principles of the neo-realism theory to explain military aggression between China and the US. One issue that emerges as an anomaly of the theory is the existence of global and regional institutions that regulate international relations (Steiner, 2012, p. 52).
This criticism emerges from the assumption (by offensive realists) that there are no regulatory frameworks to govern international relations. Steiner (2012, p. 52) argues that many regional and international institutions govern international relations.
He gives the example of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Union (EU) (among other regional bodies), as regional bodies that regulate international relations (Steiner, 2012, p. 52).
He further refers to the institutionalization of security cooperation, through global security bodies, such as the North Atlantic treaty organization (NATO), as an example of a long-term security organization that prevents nation-states from fighting (Steiner, 2012, p. 52).
The creation of the international criminal court (ICC) is another example of the existence of an international legal and justice body that would deter attempts by nations to engage in “needless” wars.
Kruse & Tuck (2012, p. 93) believe the existence of such global institutions explain why the 21st century marks the most peaceful period in the world’s history. Indeed, violence does not dominate global politics today as it did a few years back.
Historical excerpts in England show that today’s global citizen has one-fifteenth the likelihood of dying in a global war, as opposed to people who lived more than 800 years ago (Kruse & Tuck, 2012, p. 93). A central argument that advances this view is the human advancement in the legal and justice systems.
Certainly, today, it is difficult for any nation to engage in an open war without legal consequences (Steiner, 2012, p. 52). Through this view, Steiner (2012, p. 52) disputes the fact that nation-states would easily go to war because there are no regulatory institutions to mediate conflict.
In fact, contrary to the principles of the neo-liberalism theory, the existence of security and economic cooperation has continued after the end of the cold war.
Another criticism of the offensive realism theory is the peaceful transition of power from a multi-polar system to a unipolar system, during the cold war. This transition stems from the dominance of the US in the global political system (unipolar system) after the end of the communist era.
The neo-liberalism theory suggests the existence of conflict between America and other global powers, such as Russia during this transition, but this did not happen. Furthermore, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism, China gained economic and political power to become a global power, without any war.
Researchers who criticize the neo-realism theory through the absence of major wars in the past few decades also say great political powers have realized their mistakes, and would not repeat the same political errors that contributed to the First World War and the Second World War (King, 2008, p. 12).
The existence of alternative strategies for solving international power transitions decrease the likelihood that America would engage in a military war with other nations. The absence of war during the Cuban military crisis explains the difficulty for America to pursue a military strategy, even when other countries provoke it.
Historians say the Cuban missile crisis was the closest point where the cold war almost turned out to be an armed conflict (Roberts, 2012, p. 156). On one side, Russia and Cuba joined hands to position missiles in Cuba, ready for an attack on the US. One the other hand, the US government positioned nuclear missiles in Turkey, ready to attack Moscow, Russia.
However, before any of the protagonists started the war, the US proposed a blockade to stop the transportation of Russian missiles in Cuba (Roberts, 2012, p. 156). This move was an attempt by the Kennedy administration to pursue alternative strategies for solving the crisis (besides using military force). This strategy almost failed because Russia was determined to attack the US.
Consequently, in an attempt to stop the blockade, the Russian army shot down a US plane. Historians say, ideally, this action would have easily stopped all the negotiations and started the war, but it did not (Roberts, 2012, p. 156).
Instead, the Kennedy administration continued with the negotiations, until both parties agreed that they would stop all hostilities. In the agreement, the US declared that it would never attack Cuba. It also committed itself to destroy all nuclear weapons positioned in Turkey, if Russia did the same in Cuba (Stern, 2012, p. 160). Eventually, the conflict ended.
The Cuban missile crisis is a good example that shows how world powers can be rational and avoid military confrontation, even when they are provoked. Indeed, although all indications suggested Russia and the US would attack each other, the rationality of both countries to negotiate prevented this eventuality from happening.
This example undermines the validity of the neo-realism theory in predicting how countries solve international conflicts today. A key issue that emerges in this analysis is the advanced nature of military arsenal that has restrained many countries from attacking one another. The containment of nuclear arsenal particularly comes to mind here because nuclear weapons are deadly and may cause widespread human deaths.
Countries therefore restrain themselves from using such weapons, although they have them. This analysis shows the widespread use of the deterrence theory in explaining the absence of conflict during the cold war. Particularly, this theory shows that military intimidation and coercion are effective strategies for solving conflicts, as opposed to engaging in physical military conflicts.
Therefore, the capacity that warring states have to destroy other states (through nuclear technology) is a deterrent for states to refrain from provoking one another.
Therefore, according to scholars, powerful states, like Russia and America, stock nuclear weapons to intimidate one another, but not really to attack one another (Roberts, 2012, p. 156). Since military capabilities are muted, powerful nations use alternative strategies to “fight” one another. Such strategies include proxy wars.
A proxy war is an indirect confrontation between nation-states. Such types of wars involve the use of third parties to “fight” major wars. Such third parties may be allied countries, mercenaries, or non-state actors. Ideally, countries pursue this strategy when they do not want to engage in a full-blown conflict. Many countries have used this strategy, successfully.
For example, this strategy characterized the cold war period when both Russia and the US could not engage each other directly in a full-blown war. Because America and Russia cannot engage in an open war, both countries have fought proxy wars on different fronts.
The earliest proxy war was the Greek civil war where Russia and America aligned their troops on different sides. On one hand, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria supported Russia in its quest to cement communist rule in Greece (Carabott & Sfikas, 2004, p. 51).
On the other hand, America and other western allies opposed this quest. The latter managed to win the war by repelling communist rebels away from Greece (Carabott & Sfikas, 2004, p. 51). Both sides fought the communist war by funding and arming rebels to advance their ideological views. The same strategy emerged when Russia invaded Afghanistan.
The US and other western allies supported the Mujahedeen regime of Afghanistan to repel Russian invasion by providing it with sophisticated weapons and financial support (Danforth & Boeschoten, 2012, p. 56). The Lebanese civil war also demonstrated the same alignment of East and west political powers.
Syria, Russia, and Palestine supported one wing of the rebels (Lebanese National Movement) and Israel and America supported the other protagonist, Lebanese Front, by providing it with military arsenal and financial support.
Lastly, the Vietnam War is another example of how Russia and the US engaged each other in a proxy war. On one side, the US and its western allies wanted to stop the communist aggression of a Vietnamese dictator on South Vietnam, while on the other side, China and Russia helped the Vietnamese dictator to repel American aggression (Lawrence, 2010, p. 170).
Russia and China supplied Vietnam with military weapons that could repel air strikes and intimidate American forces. They also supported Vietnamese ground troops with weapons and financial support to wage war against America. The US and some of its western allies supported South Vietnam with the same financial and military strength. However, the US sent its ground troops to help South Vietnam stop communist aggression.
Broadly, the war was a bold attempt by America and other anti-communist regimes to stop the spread of communism in South Vietnam. The war also aimed to cement the American dominance in global politics. However, the communist regime managed to win the war after French and American forces pulled out (Lawrence, 2010, p. 40).
Consequently, the North Vietnamese government annexed South Vietnam and established it as part of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Such kinds of proxy wars have provided an avenue for America and other dominant world powers (notably, China and Russia) to flex their military muscles without attacking each other directly.
Overall, since this paper establishes that the US cannot engage in open wars with its enemies, economic warfare has emerged as the practical strategy for the US to control its hegemonic power in global politics. Indeed, the growing importance of commercial interests in the global political arena highlights the low likelihood that any serious global war would occur.
This fact stems from the negative relationship that wars share with commerce. The rise and prominence of commercial interests in the global business arena mean that the commercial gains of countries working together override the need to plunder, steal, and destroy. China and the US share deep commercial interests with each other.
Some of the commercial interests shared by both countries are vital to the sustenance of their economies. Therefore, it would be unlikely that both countries would engage in a war that would override these commercial interests. Globalization therefore explains the difference between the likelihood of countries to engage in war during early years, and today’s low likelihood of countries to participate in similar wars.
Nonetheless, the control of oil flow to China is one economic strategy that the US has used to protect its position as the global hegemonic power. The fact that China needs oil to support its economic growth informs this strategy. This is because China’s economic growth largely supports its political power (Li, 2012, p. 5).
This strategy has seen the participation of the US in several Middle East wars, such as the gulf war and the Iraq war, to protect its oil supply. Through these wars, the US has tried to ensure it controls the oil trade by ensuring a free oil flow to the US (Li, 2012, p. 5).
The same objective informs its involvement in the Libyan revolution because it sought to control oil flow to China and other anti-western countries by creating a regime change. Through these examples, the politics surrounding the oil trade largely inform America’s attempts to control China’s global influence, by controlling the flow of oil to the Asian giant.
However, statistics show that this strategy is failing to safeguard American interests because China has already surpassed the US as the largest crude oil importer from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Spegele, 2013, p. 2). China also leads the US as the main crude oil buyer in the Middle East.
The sudden emergence of China as the largest crude oil importer in the world has created tensions in the Sino-American relations. Nonetheless, the use of alternative strategies for solving power politics eliminates the idea that America would indulge in a full-blown war with its enemies.
Conclusion
Although this paper recognizes the importance of the offensive realism view and the power transition theory in understanding international relations, it is highly pessimistic about the possibility of the US attacking China, or any other emerging power, to maintain its dominance in global politics. The offensive realism theory maintains that the US would attack China to maintain its hegemonic power.
However, based on the peace that has existed during (and after) the cold war, the validity of the offensive realism theory is questionable. Indeed, evidence shows that during this time, there was a peaceful transition of power in the world, without any war. In its place, the liberalism theory portrays a perfect picture of the current state of international relations because evidence shows that international relation is a complex issue.
However, the realism theory portrays a simplistic idea of such relations. This paper also shows that the complex relationships between American and Chinese commercial interests surpass the need for America to maintain its power through military means.
Moreover, unlike the principles of the offensive realism theory, the existence of international institutions in international politics undermines the possibility of military wars. Certainly, international bodies, such as the WTO and NATO, not only ensure the economic coordination of different countries, but also their coordination in security issues.
Since there is little chance that America could attack China to maintain its hegemonic power, proxy wars are the main methods that America uses to maintain its dominant position in international politics. The Vietnam War, Afghanistan war, and the civil war in Greece are only a few examples that show how America has struggled to maintain its hegemonic power in global politics.
The existence of proxy wars therefore show that military strategies are not the only effective strategies for maintaining power. The existence of alternative strategies for maintaining power therefore appears to be the only effective strategies that America could use to maintain its hegemonic power.
Indeed, its attempts to control the flow of oil resources to China define how the US intends to stop Chinese dominance. Furthermore, wars are expensive and it would take a lot of money (and other resources) to sustain a war, especially with an equally powerful country, such as China. Overall, this paper shows that the probability of a new world war between China and the US may never happen.
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