An interest group is characterized as a collective of people with common concerns who strive to promote the interests of its members in the government. Examples of such groups include labor unions, professional associations, and the representatives of the business community. It is a widely known fact that the interests of non-governmental members have a significant influence on American politics. The current paper reckons that interest group politics should be regulated and describes some reasons for this opinion.
Thinking about the consequences of unregulated factions politics, the first idea that comes to mind is that the weaker groups will always be outsiders that are unable to promote their interests. According to Cigler et al., pressure groups naturally evolve in democratic regimes, and it is expected that individuals unite for the sake of the promotion of their interests (2). Still, political equality is one of the principles of a democratic regime. This principle implies the impossibility of disparity among the citizens. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the absence of regulation in interest group politics leads to the discrimination of the minority. Wealthy organized interests possess more resources that could be used to lobby their concerns in the government. Therefore, the minority groups become deprived of a chance to be treated in the same manner as bigger ones. This point of view could be proven by Cigler et al., who claim that the control over organized interests helps to elaborate on the system of checks and balances (4). Consequently, this reduces the power of a single strong group.
It is essential to note that in American politics, there already exist some regulations on factions’ activities. For instance, the state government proscribes such actions as gifting lawmakers and receiving compensations for voting in a manner that a group wants. These regulations signify that the government realizes the value of limitations of interest groups in the process of taking policy decisions. Regulations are aimed at the promotion of transparency in lobbying activity. From my point of view, it is necessary to be sure that the promotion of the interests of some faction is honest and happens behind locked doors. This, in turn, helps to increase the responsiveness of politicians to the public and minimizes the possibility of corruption. At the same time, one could claim that regulations violate the freedom of interest organizations’ actions. Nevertheless, I assume that these limitations are an imprescriptible part of an efficient policymaking process.
Finally, I do believe that the government should make decisions thinking, foremost, of the interests of the citizens, not any interest group. This assumption drives the contradiction because these groups are comprised of individuals, concerns of which the government should take into consideration. However, politics could not be entirely based on the attempt to please only a particular union. I suppose that policymakers should make decisions depending on the outcomes of the whole community.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that interest group politics should be restricted. The major reasons for governmental regulation lie in the government’s obligation not to be corrupted and to be concerned with the interests of all unions and citizens in the same manner. The existing regulations are non-violent and leave significant space for factions to influence politics. In addition, rules and restrictions are essential because they discipline and equate the competing interest groups.
Work Cited
Cigler, Allan, et al. Interest group politics. 9th ed., CQ Press, 2015.