The theodicy means the justification of God and opposition of evil to the divine power of God. In Hinduism, there is no a problem of evil because human souls are created by God himself. in terms of sociological theory, the free will defense: evils are due completely to bad free choices made by people and perhaps by other created beings that have free will. Hinduism explains that a wholly good and omnipotent god give to human beings, and as well, perhaps, to divine power, the freedom which they have misused. In society, the issues arc understood as either that such divine power is itself a higher, third-order, good which outweighs the evils which are either constituted or brought about by its misuse–or, at the very least, which, when the divine power is conferred, outweighed whatever risk of these is even divinely foreseeable, or else that such liberty is logically necessary for some other third-order goods which do the outweighing. Since these evil and wrong choices are freely made by a believer or by fallen (believers, neither they nor their effects can be ascribed to God. Sect and cult promote the issue of theodicy and support the divine power of God and its revelation.
All that can be or needs to be ascribed to him is the formation of beings with the liberty to make morally significant choices. For instance, in the Bharat story Menaka left his son Shakuntala in order to continue his meditations (Three Histories of Reincarnation 2009). What the parables plausibly say is that a father may rejoice more over the return of a prodigal son than over another’s merely constant good behavior, and that a frugal housewife may be more pleased about recovering a coin she had thought she had lost than about simply not losing several of equal value. But it does not follow that the father prefers on the whole to have a prodigal child who ultimately returns than to have a constantly well-behaved one, or that the housewife would be better pleased on the whole to have lost the coin and found it again than never to have lost it. In Hinduism, karma is understood as the possibility to redeem one’s fault and evil deeds of a person. Perhaps these, odd though they are, would be comprehensible human reactions; even so, it would be hard to transfer them to a supposedly omniscient god, or to endorse the sober evaluation that sin plus repentance is, as an organic whole, better than sinlessness.
It must, in addition, be held that the existence and functioning of such beings either are higher-order structures, or are a rationally necessary presupposition of higher-order structures, which outweigh (the risk of) such bad choices and their consequences, so that a god might reasonably choose to create such beings and leave them free (Three Histories of Reincarnation 2009). It is plain that this is the only solution of the problem of evil that has any chance of succeeding. This situation alone allows the theist to confess that there arc some real and unabsorbed evils, some items which the world would, from however broad and eventual a perspective, be better without, and yet at the same time to detach their occurrence from God, to show them as not having been chosen by God, who none the less seems to have been given a reason, compatible with his complete goodness and omnipotence, and perhaps with his omniscience too, for bringing about the state of affairs from which they arise and for allowing them to occur (Theodicy: answering the Problem of Evil 2009).
The main function of the Christian Orthodox theodicy is that it promotes the revelation of God. In effect God is being called good, while at the same time he is being described as bad, that is, as having purposes and acting upon motives which in all ordinary circumstances we would recognize as bad; he is depicted as behaving in some respects like a malevolent demon, in others like a petulant tyrant, and in others again like a mischievous and thoughtless child. Christian Orthodox rejects the Internet and sees it as an evil, but accepts the idea that it helps to connect people and popularize religious value sand ideas of the church. Now certainly if such motives as these are ascribed to God, there will be no difficulty in reconciling his omnipotence with the occurrence of what would ordinarily be called evils.
But to argue in this way is merely to defend a shadow, while abandoning the substance, of the traditional claim that God is wholly good. in society, charismatic leader is seen as seen as an ideal person able to overcome sins and evils in order to maintain positive relations and culture. In this case, religion and church suppose these ideas and help the charismatic leader to establish peace. The mere fact, then, that faith often rests upon a tragic sense of the evil in the world does not do away with the need for a theodicy. It means, no doubt, that some of the firmest believers feel no need for a theodicy; but one is still needed if their position, and that of theism generally, is to be made rationally defensible. Two suggestions need to be distinguished here. The notion that God uses evils as a means to such higher goods is, as we have seen, incompatible with the doctrine that he is omnipotent, and therefore does not need to use deplorable means to achieve his ends. It is, of course, understandable that an all too human deity might decide to make his creatures miserable so that they would be more abject in their devotion.
The main difference between theodicy explained in the Three Histories of Reincarnation and the Christian Orthodox theodicy is that the latter promotes the revelation of God and his power while in Hinduism theodicy implies the justification of God only. The demand for a world free from all evils is one that seems to be implicit in the set of dogmas that make up orthodox theism-though. Such theism also stresses and trades upon the issue that the world is not free from evil. It could not, like God, be noticeably perfect; but nothing has been said to show that real, terrible, unabsorbed evils, such as theists themselves constantly censure, are logically necessary in an earthly world. Though, this was a mistake. Obviously, a god might have both first- and second-order power, so long as he did not exercise his second-order power in such a way as to limit his first-order power. Also, it has been argued that the phrase ‘things which an supreme being cannot control’ is self-contradictory, so that to make such things is rationally impossible, and therefore that God cannot make such things, but that this is no defect in power of any order, since it has been agreed all along that authority does not include the power to do what is logically
Works Cited
Theodicy: answering the Problem of Evil. 2009. Web.
Theodicy. 2009. Web.
Three Histories of Reincarnation. 2009. Web.