Criminal evidence is very delicate because it often determines whether a person gets to keep or lose his or her liberty, and sometimes life. Consequently, it is critical that all the parties involved in the processes of investigation, processing and storage of criminal evidence do so with utmost caution. One of the more critical matters in criminal evidence is confessions. Usually, when a crime has been committed, detectives go about carrying out a full-fledged investigation into what may have occurred. They try to recreate the circumstances surrounding the commission of to recreate the moment of commission if possible. If their efforts are productive, apprehending the perpetrator becomes much easier because when such a person is confronted with the truth, he or she will usually confess. Of course, there are those that deny to the bitter end and if they happen to have overzealous defense attorneys they may even manage to walk off, but in the presence of such irrefutable evidence, most juries often pass a guilty verdict. However, despite this seemingly airtight process of administering justice, certain exceptional circumstances pop up every now and then and if not handled properly, these few rotten apples will spoil the entire basket that is the justice system. This paper discusses one such loophole and bases its arguments on the case of David Vasquez, an innocent man who spent five years in the penitentiary simply because some people chose to ignore some crucial rules of evidence regarding confessions. In evidence, confessions are, “admissions by word or conduct or by a combination of both from which an inference can reasonably be drawn that the maker has committed an offence” (Garland, 2009, p. 78). The common law position regarding the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence as per Justice Crompton in R v Leatham is, “it matters not how you get it, if you steal it even, it would still be admissible as evidence.” (Garland, 2009, p. 99)The only sound exception to this rule covers confessions. If obtained by inducement, oppression, or deception, these should not be admissible even if the content is relevant to the facts of the case. Of course at this point one experiences two equally significant but warring concepts; on the one hand, it seems alright to admit all relevant evidence regardless of how it is obtained, so long as it puts away the guilty. However, there is the risk that if this is so, it will encourage impropriety among the law enforcement officers; why go through the proper legal channels if they can get it illegally? The justice system seems to lack a stand in this matter, but it draws the line on confessions. Confessions obtained through inducement, coercion, oppression or deceptions are generally inadmissible with certain exceptions arising from extenuating circumstances. The inducement ought to be by a person in authority and this is a subjective test. The prisoner or the accused ought to believe that this person is capable of influencing the prosecutor. In the case of Vasquez, the detectives interrogating him were definitely people of authority because they were working hand in hand with the prosecutor, Henry E. Hudson. Secondly, the standard of proof regarding such undue influence in obtaining a confession is to a balance of probabilities, so that if it ‘appears’ to the court that an accused person’s confession was involuntary, the magistrate should apply himself or herself into further investigating the matter. This did not happen in the Vasquez case despite his having two state-appointed counsel representing him. Thirdly, the threat or inducement should be temporal and not spiritual in nature and should relate to the charge. Moreover, it must be sufficient to make the accused either hope for some advantage or fear some prejudice. In Vasquez, the victim entered a plea bargain and gave a guilty plea in return for 30 years in the penitentiary instead of the electric chair which Hudson was aiming at. Finally, the court must consider other actors such as the age, experience, mental status of the accused, and the time lapse between the inducement and the confession. The latter is to ascertain whether the ‘impression’ was removed before the confession was made. In the case of David Vasquez, the entire confession was a sham. He was mentally slow and expert evidence categorized him as mentally retarded. That alone should have nullified his confession, but the trial proceeded. Secondly, the detectives executing his interrogation practically fed him with information on the crime, including the lie (deception) that his fingerprints had been found on the scene. They practically dictated his confession for him. Worse yet, Vasquez did not fit the killer’s profile; he was smaller in statute, and not as strong as the perpetrator, facts which were obvious to the prosecution, but which the prosecution ignored while making its case against Vasquez. But perhaps the worst offence as that of Henry E. Hudson, recorded when years later another detective sought to right his wrong by putting the correct criminal behind bars after it became evident that Vasquez could not have continued murdering and raping women in an identical manner while still at the penitentiary. After collecting all the evidence that would exonerate Vasquez, Detective Joe Horgan called in Hudson to present it to him. Hudson’s response was, “”I certainly wish him the best and regret what happened. However, I offer no apologies (Hudson, 2010, p. 67).” The man was clearly unapologetic. Vasquez was a mentally retarded suspect. The investigators, the prosecution, the defense, the judge, and the jury ought to have exercised more caution before passing a verdict of guilty. As it was, the admission of his induced confession was immoral, incompetent, and plainly unjust. None of the parties responsible adhered to the rules of evidence that govern the admittance of confessions and as a result, a grave miscarriage of justice ensued resulting in the incarceration of an innocent man. Luckily for Vasquez, he escaped Virginia’s electric chair. Others are not so lucky.
References
Garland, N. (2009). Criminal Evidence 6th Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hudson, E. (2010). Quest for Justice: From Deputy Sherrif to Federal Judge. Arlington: Chicago Press.