To believe without sufficient evidence
William Clifford strongly held on his epistemological dictum that people should believe without systematic evidences. His idealism clung on the fear or error through questioning on evidences. He committed his pragmatist view on empiricist basis of verification. I do not believe in this perception whatsoever. I don’t want to believe on phenomenon or ideas without solid evidences. Clifford’s biased imperialism principles are greatly erroneous (Moore 98).
Our beliefs are efficacious at levels beyond what is personal. They affect the social integration among people. For this reason, it makes less sense to believe things with regard to fear of making an error. We cannot therefore believe without sufficient evidences as Clifford postulates (William 524).
This is especially so when it comes to such things where empirical data can be used as evidences. However, in cases where such evidence is exempted, it becomes very difficult to believe. This should be a personal choice and no one should be forced in whatever means to take any line of thought. Every person should be given the opportunity to choose whether to believe or not to.
Religious and metaphysical beliefs on the other hand should be respected but as James believes they should not be believed fallaciously especially when they affect the people rationally or irrationally. They should however be analyzed for the greater good of the people. No believe therefore should be accepted on mere faith (William 524).
Scientific theories should be hypothesized and scientific methods should be incorporated to ensure that we have a ground to believe in these theories. Evidentialism for instance led to scientists like Lamarck to postulate fallacious hypothesis about evolution. He said that acquired characteristics were inheritable and therefore could be passed from one generation to another. This was however disapproved through evidenced approaches and hypothesis.
It therefore leads to a general conclusion that the fear of error should not lead individual to believe in non-evidenced approaches especially in social and natural sciences (William 524). This phenomenon puts across the numerous errors that are made upon believes with sufficient evidence. The effects in our decisions are much more rampant and could have far reaching effects in our social lives.
For this reason, it becomes greatly important to re-evaluate circumstances and seeking of empirical evidences before we can solidly conclude some issues. I strongly disagree with Clifford and I believe that it is quite vulnerable to make an error from assumptions and insufficiently evidenced beliefs than in properly researched and evidenced cases.
People should understand that evidentialism leads them into constrictive skepticism and irrational subjectivism. Philosophy should therefore cut in and allow people to understand decision making especially in such dogmas that cuts across epistemology, philosophy of religion and philosophy of science (Moore 98).
It should also allow us to think rationally and be in a position to classify genuine believes and those that try to avoid error. Clifford’s point of view is erroneous and reinforced by fear and it should therefore not form any basis of decision making in individuals (Moore 98).
As James observed, life changing ideologies based on metaphysical beliefs and religion should be purely on free will. Clifford’s perceptions that scientific probabilities as mere assumptions was wrong as scientific methods with substantiated empirical data are applied to come up with the probabilities (William 524).
Works Cited
Moore E. C. William James: The Great American Thinker Series, New York: Washington Square Press, 1965. Print
William J. Pragmatism in William James Writings: 1902-1910, New York: The Library of America, 1987. Print