Nowadays, it is commonly assumed that, despite its affiliation with the religion of Islam, Turkey is essentially a European country. After all, a part of Turkey (Eastern Thrace) is located in Europe. Moreover, the country is the member of NATO and is scheduled to join the EU at some point in the future. The assumption’s validity is further confirmed, in regards to the fact that, just as it is happened to be the case in European countries, Turkey adheres to the ideals of democracy (at least formally), with one of the main principles of the country’s political system being the separation between church and state.
Nevertheless, a closer analysis will reveal that the practice of referring to Turkey as a European nation per se is conceptually fallacious. The reason for this is that the manner, in which Turkey continues to manage its internal affairs, and the country’s current stance in the arena of international politics, suggest that it has so much more to do with Turkey’s historical legacy as the former Ottoman Empire than with its today’s thoroughly secular/democratic positioning. In its turn, this implies that Turkey is, in fact, a Middle Eastern country. In my paper, I will aim to substantiate the validity of this suggestion at length.
Probably the main characteristic of Turkey’s system of political governance is that the country’s military enjoys a rather hypertrophied power within the domestic body politics – something that can be illustrated, in regards to the military coup of 1960. Even today, one of the country’s constitutional provisions entitles the military to right to intervene in the political process, once Turkey is in danger of facing a civil disorder of any sort, “Turkey’s main divergence from the normal parliamentary pattern has been the shadowy presence of the military as an independent branch of government” (Palmer, 2006, p. 324).
Even though the provision in question is commonly seen as a temporary measure to ensure the proper functioning of the country’s democratic institutions, this is far from being the actual case. After all, Turkey has a long legacy of the military order of Janissaries (captured Christians, converted to Islam) having exerted a strong influence on the governing process within the country when it was still the Empire. As Palmer noted, “The sultans had become dependent upon Janissary support. Indeed, it was not unusual for new sultans to begin by lavishing gifts upon Janissaries” (2006, p. 305). Thus, it is in Turkey’s very nature to remain highly militarized and obsessed with conquest, as something that has the value of a ‘thing in itself’ – even the country’s most recent history leaves only a few doubts as to the full validity of this suggestion.
The continual occupation of northern Cyprus by the Turkish army, contrary to the numerous resolutions by the UN, serves as a good example, in this respect, “The United Nations condemned Turkey and the U.S. threatened economic reprisals, but Turkey refused to budge” (Palmer, 2006, p. 315). In its turn, this can be explained by the fact that, despite having sustained numerous military defeats at the hands of the Russians, the French and the British back in history, Turkey continues to aspire for the reestablishment of the ‘Islamic caliphate’ – even at the expense of providing the unofficial support to such notorious terrorist organizations as ISIS. It is understood, of course, that this sets Turkey apart from the rest of the Western countries. In fact, this makes Turkey the de facto enemy of the West – despite the country’s membership in NATO.
Another notable difference between Turkey and these countries is that unlike what it is the case with the latter, Turkey’s democracy is essentially about citizens being provided with the opportunity to express their ethno-cultural, personal and religious loyalties during the political elections. According to Palmer, “Turkey’s party system from the 1980s onward was characterized by exceptional fluidity. Parties formed, merged, fragmented, and re-formed with a different name or face. Individuals were often more important than ideology” (2006, p. 326).
This, of course, implies that Turkey can hardly be referred to as a democracy, in the conventional sense of this word – just as it happened to be the case with other formally democratic, but essentially tribalistic countries that attained their statehood rather incidentally, such as Ukraine. The reason for this is quite apparent – the democratic form of governance serves the purpose of allowing citizens to affect the process of political decision-making in the country, rather than the purpose of legitimizing the continual rule of the country’s rich and powerful elites, as it is the case in Turkey.
This suggestion directly relates to what can be deemed as yet another qualitative aspect of the functioning of Turkey’s political system – the fact that this country’s stance on world politics continues to sway in a rather unpredictable manner, and also the fact that Turkey’s bureaucratic apparatus is, in fact, nothing short of the entity of its own. As Palmer pointed out, “The Turkish bureaucracy is a bloated apparatus that absorbs much of the budget left behind by the military” (2006, p. 329). There is nothing surprising about this situation – during the Imperial era, it used to account for a commonplace practice among sultans to be primarily concerned with experiencing sensual pleasures, at the expense of leaving the matters of state-governance in the hands of viziers (advisors), “Weak sultans depended on the viziers…
Many sultans were corrupted by the harem and had little interest in the affairs of empire” (Palmer, 2006, p. 305). Partially, this explains why even today, many Turkish top-officials tend to act irresponsibly, while addressing geopolitical challenges. The President Erdogan’s most recent order to shoot down the Russian bomber-plane, which was on the mission of bombing the ISIS installations in Syria, exemplifies the soundness of this suggestion perfectly well. After all, the world will be lucky not to be plunged in the nuclear WW3, because of the incident. This once again illustrates that, even though Turkey may appear European (rational) on the outside, it is strongly Middle Eastern (emotional) on the inside – something that hardly qualifies the concerned country as the would-be legitimate member of the EU.
Turkey’s legacy as the Ottoman Empire’s descendant helps to explain yet another indication that this country can be referred to as anything, but European – the fact that the Turkish government continues to proclaim that Turkey is homogeneous, in the ethno-cultural sense of this word, while refusing to acknowledge the very existence of Kurds, as the representatives of the country’s largest ethnic minority. After all, even though the Empire’s rulers used to allow their subjects to enjoy a certain degree of religious freedom, the latter never ceased being considered Turks – regardless of the concerned people’s wishes, in this respect.
The Empire’s approach to addressing people’s dissent with such a policy was simple – those who did not want to be considered Turks had to be exterminated physically, “Between 1894 and 1897… more than 100.000 Armenians were slaughtered in an attempt to stem growing separatist tendencies in Turkey’s Armenian provinces” (Plamer, 2006, p. 307). Even today, the Turkish government refuses to admit that the genocide of Armenians had ever taken place – contrary to the fact that in most European countries the denial of the ‘Armenian holocaust’ is considered a criminal offense. Apparently, Erdogan believes that the ‘Kurdish problem’ could be solved in a similar manner – hence, Turkey’s practice of subjecting Kurdish villages to the indiscriminate bombing raids, on which the West prefers to turn a blind eye while screaming bloody murder about the violation of ‘gay-rights’ in Crimea.
It is understood, of course, that some Western countries (such as Germany or the U.S.) are no strangers to having tried exterminating the ‘undesirable’ nations (such as the Jews and the Native Americans) en mass in the past. However, these countries have condemned their former affiliation with such a practice long time ago. The Turkish governmental officials, on the other hand, even today do not seem to think that there is anything wrong about it. This, of course, confirms even further that the country in question is strongly alienated from the values of tolerance and democracy, which define the realities of today’s living in Europe.
Therefore, there is nothing accidental about the fact that, even though Turkey has submitted the application to join the EU as far back as in 1987, it is highly unlikely that this country will ever have its membership-request approved. As Palmer pointed out, “Both the EU and Turkey maintain that Turkish membership is on track, but the situation remains iffy” (2006, p. 321). The EU continues to feed Turkey with promises, in this respect, but there is clearly no light at the end of the tunnel. The same can be said about the situation with yet another self-proclaimed ‘European’ country – Ukraine, in which people’s average salary amounts to approximately $30 per month.
While answering the question about when would Ukraine be allowed to join the EU, the organization’s spokesmen usually say that this will happen after Turkey is accepted. When asked to specify the time when Turkey is to be granted the full-membership in the EU, they say – never (off the record, of course). Apparently, a nation can consider itself ‘European’ all it wants, but it does not make it European per se – especially, there is no nation to speak of, in the historical sense of this word.
I believe that the earlier deployed line of argumentation, in defense of the idea that, despite having succeeded in mimicking Europe in a number of different ways, Turkey remains as Middle Eastern (Asiatic) as ever, is fully consistent with the paper’s initial thesis. The main conclusion that can be drawn from what has been said is that the innate essence of a particular country cannot be altered – especially if this country’s government remains committed to implementing reforms, recommended by the international organizations that are there to make sure that the ‘developing’ nations never become fully developed, such as the World Bank or IMF. It appears that despite not being a particularly bright individual, Erdogan has come to the same conclusion – hence, his decision to turn Turkey into yet another Islamic state. Such his decision, however, may cost the country dearly – especially if Turkey continues to support Islamic terrorism, as the mean of trying to affect the geopolitical dynamics in the world.
References
Palmer, M. (2006).The politics of the Middle East. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.