Introduction
The intention of the United States is to get a blueprint for promoting the civilian authority of America to enhance the national interests. This country has been at war for many years with a global network of violence and hatred forcing different administrations to initiate strategies for advancing the security needs of its citizens. The country adopted the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) to help it lead through civilian power.
I have noted with concern that the first QDDR centered largely on using development assistance as a device of civilian authority. It conspicuously ignored to include security assistance, which includes military training, law enforcement, sales of arms, and such security related elements. The failure to include security assistance in the QDDR has left a considerably precarious gap.
As much as focusing on development assistance is a rational decision, the omission seems to be an oversight, rather than a purposeful verdict. Security assistance has conspicuously remained almost completely unevaluated for efficiency and impact yet it is the core to the building of a cohesive and peaceful country Notably, numerous research reports have flagged the need for revaluation of the significance of security assistance. An attempt to delay the evaluation would appear a consequence of lack of adequate information on national surveillance. For the country to achieve better transparency and accountability of foreign aid, it is essential that the government take an initiative to provide defense aid.
Given that since the launch of the first QDDR in December 2010, it has not achieved its core objective, now is the opportune time to begin the process a fresh. As the country battles with the decision on whether to repeat the process, here are some leading lessons that we took from the last go-round that are of significance for our consideration.
Foremost, we have an obligation to carry out actions for the right reasons. The point is that our conduct needs to be above reproach. Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review is not about having polished public relations information sheets or fighting home turf political wars. It is challenging the false conceptions regarding our foreign policy, finding out the flaws in our systems, and determining a method for putting in place crucial amendments.
It is apparent that the State Department’s intention to stump its authority and ensure the government’s study directive section did not bestow too much autonomous a voice to USAID breached the rights of the citizens to get the best out of the QDDR. The internal wars negatively affected the policy drafting process.
Another complicating factor is the legislation that the State Department has proposed as a solution to the tuff of war between the two departments. The bill is not in the interest of the people of the United States because it will help fortify the State Department’s tyranny and push USAID to the peripheral wall, where it will have no official footing in the entire policy formulation and implementation process. We must reflect on our moral obligations to deliver the best quality service.
If we need to better amalgamate international relations and development, then the problem is how to be acquainted with the impact of each of the offices and exploit the distinct contributions of each of them. However, even after recognizing the essentiality of the departments, we should consider if the current prevailing circumstances will favor the implementation of the QDDR.
The problem is that we have not considered consultation as an opportunity, but a requirement. The government should have engaged all security stakeholders to dialogue at two crucial stages in the process. First, consultation was indispensable at the onset, when we were determining the core factors and focal points of the review. Second, it has been vital since stakeholders reached some considerable consensus and there were chances of presenting further recommendations.
While the first QDDR was mostly consultative within the State Department and USAID, the other complicating element was that the bureaucracy that characterizes consultation between the departments could not generate ideas on how to reform itself. In addition, the bureaucracy could not come up with either bold fresh thinking or the government’s imprint. Therefore, the secretary’s staff chose to write it practically from scratch. This explains the sources of frustrations and cynicism among those who had spent a lot of time and energy in the consultations.
Additionally, consultations with the Unite State government agencies, the private sector, and other interested parties were merely updates on progress. This noticeably provided no chance for momentous exchange of thoughts. The lack of constructive consultation deprived the drafters the opportunity to gather helpful feedback that could have been valuable for establishing which views had the most following and which ones would run into the most resistance.
Another important aspect that we need to think about at this stage is the implementation process. The policy had certain useful provisions that cannot become helpful due to lack of goodwill from the aggrieved stakeholders. Besides, the extensive hard work that went into the first QDDR left no enthusiasm for its execution. Many authors of the policy left the administration shortly after its adoption. The other obscuring factor was that the authors never finished the job of developing an execution plan. There were hardly any cases where the staff drafted some execution plans.
Rather than making an implementation plan a product of postscript, we should make it part of the QDDR process. The significance of the implementation makes it indispensable to allocate it an equal amount of prominence as the security policy. This apparently requires a third stage of consultation. The consultation would center on either the reform process or individuals who the reforms would lead to the makeover of their present styles of action.
Maintaining focus is, therefore, an element that forms a significant part of our policy development process. We must keep in mind that the increase in the number of foreign policy dilemmas facing America will not end. At the same time, having a limit to the quantity of course corrections that we will need to undertake will have no end. As a result, it is prudent to act with caution. Attempting to solve all problems at once, with inadequate budget and personnel resources, is inappropriate.
The most rational thing to do is focus on a specific subset of issues over the next couple of years. I suggest that over the next four years, we focus on modernizing the structure, training and rules of the Foreign Service. Alternatively, depending on availability of resources, we can focus on creating an enhanced toolkit for precautionary diplomacy. We can also invest in incorporating new technologies into our security system and advancing data gathering into US foreign policy issues.
Besides, the United States can take advantage of the grand vision that the National Security Strategy has already set out for the country’s role in the world. The vision would help make QDDR to be a better tool for advancing the role of the US in the world. It can result into an agenda that is reasonable and realizable.
Maintaining focus requires consistency. The security of the United States requires the implementation of strategic regulations and laws with consistency. The country has been having the foresight and leadership that is essential to forging international operations. The forging of numerous diplomatic relations after the World War II demonstrates this competence.
Critical Evaluation of the 2010 National Security Strategy
Currently, the President Obama’s National Security Strategy 2010 also demonstrates the nation’s ability to advance peaceful operations, security and opportunities for all people. The main accentuate of this strategy is on cooperation with the international community through a multilateral model. One of the sections of the strategy, Use of Force, emphasizes that force is exploitable only as a last resort.
The promulgation of the national security strategy and the December 2010 State/USAID Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, signified that the Obama administration was putting its stamp on the nation’s security policy and strategy as the best strategies. However, it is apparent that the documents are disappointing in a number of aspects.
Despite the essentiality of the 2010 national security strategy, it cannot provide essential outcome until the US government evaluates and resolves the extent of discrepancy and continuities in both the 2010 strategy and the QDDR.
The documents lack elements of a realistic central plan and objectives. The QDDP puts too much emphasis on internal organizational and procedural issues. Through there is nothing wrong with focusing on internal review of organization and process, the policy should cater for the essential security needs provided by the 2010 strategy, as well. An unembellished review and reform could come in handy, particularly given the splintered quality of foreign assistance and diplomacy.
The Impact of Changing the QDDR policy
The administration, therefore, need to adopt a new policy that will support the objectives of the strategy. The new policy should complement the 2010 strategy in strengthening old alliances that have served the United States well. This will help extend the country’s influence to many capitals and subsequently develop more partnerships in every region. The international order that the US seeks is one that will counter violent extremism and recalcitrance, protract a global growth, resolve and prevent conflict, and bring to an end the spread of nuclear weapons, while healing wounds. This will be an opportunity for the US to demonstrate its global influence and power. The constitution recognizes the sovereignty of the US. The Changes will enable the country to demonstrate the sovereignty.
Apart from sovereignty, change in QDDR will also promote the liberties and happiness is the citizens Declaration of Independence. With the disparities between the 2010 strategy and the QDDR, the country has no guarantee of promoting these principles. The government will have secured the rights of Americans to peace by improving global security.
The change will also allow the US to provide the international community with military training. This will lead the entire world to experience peace and the influence of the sovereign state. Consequently, Americans and residents will lead peaceful and productive lives. Incorporate security assistance in the current QDSR will help improvement the economy and security of the United States.
Finally, the change in QDDR will help increase coordination of American resources through American civilian agencies. It will therefore lift the country out of poverty into self-governing, flourishing, and stable states.
Patently, the United States military has taken critical incentives against terrorists as a part of a commitment to disrupt and defeat insecurity agents such as Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. The enhanced policy will make America to focus on rebuilding the foundation of American’s might and influence.