Introduction
In human society, it is normal for people to express varying views regarding a certain concept, idea, or even opinion. It is not obvious that all societal members would take a similar perspective regarding some of the popular ethical issues, such as drug abuse, abortion, prostitution, and even euthanasia.
Disagreements exist because of individual orientation to the world meaning that people are given different instructions on how to handle certain issues. In many cases, an individual’s opinion would be based on culture, rules and regulations, and societal norms. Each individual would tend to give evidence to support his or her view, which makes it difficult for an individual to believe one side of the story.
In many cases, those in high positions because of their educational levels and exposure levels would think that they are well versed with issues affecting society hence they might be in a better position to give accurate views. This means that an individual would think others are inferior because of their cultural backgrounds, which is not actually true. An individual would find a reason to claim that his or her opponent is biased.
Lackey (2007) noted that those who engage in fierce debates are always epistemic peers. Scholars are fronted with one major question regarding the significance of disagreement among epistemic peers. This article looks at various perspectives regarding disagreements. The paper evaluates the views of various theorists regarding the value of differences in opinion.
Views on Disagreement
Philosophers have designed two major perspectives to explain some of the reasons that make epistemic peers engage in debates over controversial topics. One of the perspectives is non-conformism, which holds that a disagreement among peers is reasonable. One of the scholars named Gideon Rosen (2001) observed that peers are allowed to engage in disagreements, irrespective of whether there is enough evidence.
In this regard, disagreeing with another individual over an issue does not mean being unreasonable since differences in opinions are productive to the society. According to Rosen, the jury could perhaps express varying opinions regarding the direction of a certain case, but this does not show inability to reason among the judges. In the same way, respected paleontologists have always disagreed over the real causes of death in dinosaurs, but they still agree over some facts.
The above scholar seems to suggest that, even though evidence could be evaluated carefully, it should not be the reason for agreement since some individuals could still be having divergent views based on other factors.
On his part, Kelly Thomas justified his varying views by suggesting that equality in terms of intelligence, thoughtfulness, and acquaintance with his peers does not prove any inferiority on his side. In other words, he was trying to show that accessing similar educational system and going through similar set of standards does not mean that people should reason in the same way. Suggesting a different perspective or opinion is a sign of democracy and openness.
Peter van Inwagen was of the view that a good philosopher ought to be skeptic meaning that he or she should accept some sort of criticism from his or her peers (Lackey, 2007). In any defense of a philosophic thesis, some are opposed to the contents of the thesis while are others are always in support of it. Those who reject it should not be viewed with contempt since they would simply be expressing their views based on what they know.
Knowledge is always cumulative implying that an individual will accumulate it over a long period. This does not mean that each person would accumulate it in the same way. The level of interpretation is always different meaning that people will always have differences. Opponents of a certain opinion or view should not be subjected to unnecessary criticism since they might be having something to prove.
In this regard, dissenting views in philosophy should not be revised, but instead they should be analyzed to understand their meaning. Scholars aligned to nonconformist perspective justify their stand with two explanations. The first explanation is given through egocentric view meaning that an individual will always give weight to what he believes to be true.
Based on this, Ralph Wedgewood (2005) observed that an individual would always tend to trust what he or she knows meaning that intuitions are given greater weight in any discussion. People rarely trust what other people say since they believe that they might be harmful. In any discussion, an individual would be biased towards his or her view. However, an individual would as well rely on the views of others in case they are rational.
Wedgewood made a statement that, “the fundamental asymmetry between one’s own intuitions and those of other people is just that it is rational to trust one’s own intuitions even if one has no antecedent or independent reason to regard them as reliable. Moreover, it is only rational for an individual to trust his or her own intuitions if he or she has some such antecedent reason to regard intuitions as reliable (11)”. An individual is easily convinced to apply his form of knowledge because he or she trusts it.
Nonconformists give corrective reasoning as the other way of justifying their position. This is because an individual gives an opinion because knowing that it is a product of correct reasoning. In other words, an individual will never be wrong since the knowledge he or she possess is believed to be accurate. Kelly (2005) supported this view by observing that the views of two peers would depend on the perspective employed in evaluating the available evidence.
Regarding the accuracy of the statements, Kelly suggested that the one with adequate evidence is always selected as the best philosopher. This does not mean that the views of the opponent are rubbished away since they could be used to supplement or even compliment the views of the peer believed to be accurate. A peer with adequate evidence to support his or her claims would be considered reasonable.
Conformists
Conformists believe that there cannot be a reasonable argument among peers because of the established values and norms in every society. Richard Feldman claimed that disagreements should be based on situations where there is no evidence. Once there is full evidence or disclosure of certain information, there should be no variations in views since the evidence act as the basis of agreement. There cannot be mutual disagreements once full details of a concept or idea is given.
In fact, those opposed to generally agreed knowledge should be termed unreasonable since they would be competing with authority. On his part, Christensen (2007) underscored the fact that peers should be willing to concede in order to accommodate each other’s views. This means that an individual should adjust his reasoning towards the views suggested by his or her peer.
Elga reinforced these views by observing an individual should consider the views of his or her peer valuable meaning that all ideas of peers should be given equal weight, but an individual should not be biased towards his or her view Lackey, 2007). An individual is never assured that whatever he or she suggests is accurate since he might have made a mistake in judging or interpreting the scenario or situation.
To prevent any disagreement among peers, new knowledge should be revised to reflect the standardized set of knowledge in any society. However, conformists are in disagreement over the best revision method to be applied when re-evaluating the dissenting views. Based on this, Feldman suggested that revision should be extensive meaning that any variation should be replaced in the text.
This view demands that the original provisions of a concept are withheld without any change meaning that status quo should always be maintained. Christensen and Elga on their part had a different view regarding revision of the dissenting views since they advised that the degree of belief should be used a yardstick in advocating for revision of the differing views (Lackey, 2007).
This means that the views of a dissenting scholar should not be eliminated, but those revising them should strive at reaching a consensus. In other words, both the dissenting scholar and the revising peers should be willing to concede to a certain degree, based on facts.
If revising peers provide adequate evidence, they would definitely be declared winners while the views of a dissenting scholar would be accepted if the facts given outweigh those of the revisionists. All conformists are of the view that knowledge should be revised to reach a common ground to avoid unnecessary controversies.
Justification Account
Conformists and nonconformists tend to share a common feature, which is related to uniformity. This view suggests that differences among peers are similar, irrespective of the perspective discussed in the above sections. It does not matter whether an individual agrees or disagrees with his or her peer over a political suggestion, or a religious view. The views of an individual would be subjected to critical review or they would be accepted based on evidential equality and cognitive equality.
Evidential equality means that those disagreeing with a view should be prepared to offer adequate information suggesting that what they claim to be true is indeed support by evidence. In other words, their data should be verifiable through established instruments of authentication.
Cognitive equality suggests that two individuals would be allowed to engage in a debate in case they have similar levels of education. This means that they must both be competent, intelligent and fair-minded to offer their suggestions. This would allow such individuals to evaluate the quality of evidence before suggesting any new idea. Feldman contributed to this by arguing that peers under disagreement should disclose their evidence to allow other peers to establish who might be on the right side (Lackey, 2007).
Individuals involved in a debate are believed to be peers because they can perhaps provide evidence and are both intelligent. This implies that cognitive equality and evidential equality should exist before individuals could be terms as epistemic peers. In this regard, disagreements among peers could be referred to as idealized disagreement since the two opponents have genuine claims that must be subjected to thorough verification to ascertain their accuracy.
This type of disagreement is very different from ordinary disagreement because it is based on facts and evidence. In ordinary debates, individuals are not required to give justifications of their claims through adequate provision of evidence, analyzing an event or situation through cognitive processes, and disclosing the nature of evidence.
In an idealized disagreement scenario, there must be evidence that the two opposing peers are equal in terms of cognitive processes and evidence, but this is not the case in ordinary disagreement since individuals would simply assume that they are equals. This assumption might be misplaced meaning that the peers might not even reach a consensus since they are not equals.
Conclusion
Nonconformists tend to appreciate the fact that knowledge is cumulative meaning that today’s knowledge is not tomorrow’s knowledge. Since scholars are constantly involved in research, there is a very high possibility that new knowledge would be obtained. It would be irrational to dismiss a body of knowledge derived through research. Peers should be allowed to generate various forms of knowledge, provided they give adequate evidence to support their claims.
Nonconformists encourage new discoveries while conformists are against invention and discovery since they do not accept new information. In the scholarly world, democracy should be allowed since every person would wish to test his or her level of understanding by examining a phenomenon so closely. In case peers are strict on the procedures and processes of conducting research, many individuals would be unwilling to share critical information.
References
Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News. The Philosophical Review, 116(2), 187-217.
Kelly, T. (2005). Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lackey, J. (2007). A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance. Northwestern: Northwestern University
Rosen, G. (2001). Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism. Philosophical Perspectives, 15(1), 69-91.
Wedgewood, R. (2007). The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.