Summary of the Incident
Reports from Solent Port indicate that a commercial tanker that was inward-bound struck a quay heavily as it approached its berth as a result of poor visibility. Due to the limited vision, the pilot and the bridge crew had a difficult time performing an accurate assessment of the situation in order to make the necessary modifications. Limited visibility made it challenging for the bridge team to identify whether the tanker was on course or not. Before the incident, there were no reports of malfunctioning bridge equipment being used. A pilot had boarded at a pilot station and, therefore, had adequate knowledge about the region but still failed to steer the tanker to its berth.
The team’s lackluster performance in terms of communication and track monitoring is, nevertheless, cause for concern. Lack of proper communication within the team contributed to the delayed response, whereas poor track monitoring acted as a barrier to the crew knowing where the tanker was. The crew also had poor bridge management techniques and, therefore, could not guarantee safe and efficient navigation. The damage caused by the commercial tanker during the incident indicates a need for improved resource management techniques to prevent similar incidents in the future.
Identification of the Causal Factors
One of the factors that are likely to be associated with the tanker crashing into a quay is poor visibility, making it difficult for the pilot to control the tanker. According to the first reports that have come in regarding the incident, the visibility was relatively good at the beginning of the pilotage but deteriorated as it went on. This suggests that by the time the commercial tanker was getting close to its berth, the crew had a tough time controlling the vessel and ensuring that it remained on course.
Poor visibility has remained to be a key factor associated with vessel and tanker accidents. An occurrence that took place on November 8, 2020, in the United Kingdom provides support for the idea that poor visibility was a major contributing factor in causing the accident (MAIB, 2021). One of the relevant incidents from the published accident investigation involved a collision between a fishing vessel and a general cargo ship that were both sailing in low visibility conditions as a result of fog. Both vessels were failing to keep an adequate lookout, and in the case of the fishing vessel, there was no one on board to do so. In conditions of low visibility, it was also necessary for the vessels they provide sound signals as part of the navigation process; however, none of the vessels complied with the rules. Poor visibility and failure to adhere to stipulated guidelines led the vessels to collide with each other.
An issue that might have contributed to the commercial tanker striking a quay is communication within the bridge team being poor. It was impossible for the crew of the tanker to communicate effectively, which made it difficult for them to take the right action that would have helped to prevent colliding with the quay. Due to problems with communication, the team had limited opportunities to discuss the matter at hand and come up with an effective solution (Schoeman et al., 2020). It is absolutely necessary for the pilot and the bridge team to keep all lines of communication open at all times in order to guarantee effective cooperation.
Recent investigations suggest that inadequate communication among members of a team may have been a key factor in the occurrence of accidents. A second incident from a published accident investigation is an incident that occurred on March 13, 2022, a cargo ship known as the Ever Forward ran aground for this very reason (Buitendijk, 2022). According to the reports that were generated by the investigation into the occurrence, the third officer was aware that the container ship had to turn for it to remain in the channel. However, the officer did not. immediately inform the pilot but rather reiterated the ship’s heading numerous times as a signal for the pilot to turn the ship. Even though they were aware of the situation, two other members of the bridge team neglected their duty to inform either the pilot or the master about making the turn until after the ship had already crashed into the ground. According to the investigation, the ship may have been kept from running aground if the bridge team members had notified either the pilot or the master that they needed to perform a turn in order for the ship to remain in the channel.
Poor communication, being the factor behind vessel accidents, was also reported in the case of a vessel that was moving along the Suez Canal, which is the third incident for the analysis. The pilot was on board and was supposed to be moving along the channel’s center line, but the vessel started to drift away. The pilot and bridge team relied on the corrective helm and engines to counter the drifting, leading the vessel to contact the rocky bottom (Bhanawat, 2021). The vessel’s speed was reduced and picked up again, allowing it to resume the canal transit. The senior officer and the master were not informed about the issue, which led the impacted area to weaken with time. The weak zone crumbled away as the vessel was loading in a load port. The damage would have been prevented had the pilot and the crew members informed the master about the impact. Early communication would have allowed an assessment and initiation of appropriate measures.
An aspect that can be linked to the cargo ship striking the quay is poor track monitoring. In this particular instance, the bridge crew did not conduct sufficient track monitoring for the tanker’s position, speed, and course as it was getting closer to its berth (Safety4Sea, 2020). As a result of inadequate track monitoring, the team had a difficult time determining whether or not the tanker was traveling in the appropriate direction. Lack of proper track monitoring also decreased the possibility of the crew taking preventative action to avert the collision.
The fourth incident is that of a general cargo vessel that crashed in the International Maritime Organization, which indicated insufficient track monitoring as a contributing factor in the collision. The crew of the vessel was supposed to keep it on the proper path as it got closer to its reporting point, but they botched the job. The vessel continued along the planned course, which was one nautical mile to the north of the southern cardinal mark, which meant that it did not take the northerly route that was advised (MAIB, 2020, p.3). A watchkeeper became aware that the ship was not traveling in the correct direction and alerted the communication officer. In response, the communication officer made an effort to steer the ship back onto the correct path. However, it was already too late because the action was followed by two significant collisions before the vessel came to a complete halt. If the crew of the vessel had been able to maintain proper track monitoring, they would have been able to keep the vessel on the appropriate path, which would have prevented the accident.
The commercial tanker colliding with a quay might also be attributed to a lack of adequate bridge resource management (BRM) techniques. BRM procedures are a set of best practices that strive to optimize the use of all available resources on the bridge of a vessel to ensure safe and efficient navigation. Poor BRM techniques enhance the likelihood of human error, ineffective communication, and decision-making, which increase the risk of accidents. Inadequate BRM techniques also make it difficult for the bridge team to work collaboratively when addressing the issues at hand. The availability of adequate BRM techniques is necessary to reduce the risk of vessel accidents.
Inadequate BRM techniques have been identified to have contributed to vessel accidents in the recent past. The last incident involved a container carrier that collided with two shore cranes while trying to make a turn under pilotage in Jebel Ali (Safety4Sea, 2018). One of the findings from the accident’s investigation indicated that the carrier was too fast for the maneuver that the pilot was trying to make. The pilot was aware that the carrier was moving a bit faster than what he would have wanted but still believed tha it would successfully complete the turn. The bridge team did not have an agreed plan on how to make the turn which was influenced by the members lacking the knowledge and experience , One of the recommendations that pilots and their bridge teams have to observe to minimize the risk of collision, needed to correct the pilot. Failure to apply BRM techniques as expected made the pilot initiate a turn at a higher speed, hence the accident.
Recommendations for Future Good Practice
One of the recommendations that pilots and their bridge teams have to observe to minimize the risk of collision is following recommended guidelines for navigating in poor visibility. To guarantee that a vessel stays on its intended course while navigating in a region with limited visibility, utmost vigilance must be exercised throughout the whole journey (KaranC, 2019). It is essential for the pilot to give some thought to appointing sufficient staff to keep a check on the course that a vessel is traveling. If there is a sufficient amount of staff in the engine room, it will be easier to ensure that there is sufficient power for immediate maneuvering (Wang and Fu, 2022, p.2). When navigating in an area that has limited vision, it is also recommended that a vessel moves at low speed.
A strategy that can be used to minimize the risk of future marine accidents is enhancing communication among bridge members. Making sure that all members of the crew speak the same language and that there are few opportunities for misunderstanding is one way to improve communication and bring it up to a more effective level (Raunek, 2020). In this particular scenario, it is necessary to make certain that the information regarding the vessel is transmitted when it is required and that the recipient comprehends the information. Messages should be shared in a clear and precise manner to minimize the risk of misunderstandings (Libramar, 2023). It is also necessary to make certain that there are no delays in the transmission of information because delays can have an effect on the beginning of the process of remedial action.
Enhancing track monitoring for the commercial tanker is also necessary to prevent future collisions. Track monitoring is vital since it not only helps increase the possibility that a bridge team will begin corrective actions at the appropriate moment but also ensures that the tanker is traveling in the correct direction (Hiteshk, 2019). In this particular scenario, it is possible that the members of the bridge crew will need to complete training in track monitoring. Participating in the training will help to guarantee that they have the necessary abilities and information to enable them to be aware of the tanker’s position at all times (Wawrzyniak et al., 2019). Track monitoring is essential because it helps to guarantee that a vessel is traveling in the correct direction, which in turn reduces the risk of a collision.
Future instances of a commercial tanker striking a quay can also be eliminated by ensuring that the bridge team is aware of existing bridge resource management techniques. This will help to guarantee that members of the team have the ability to make use of the various resources and pieces of equipment that are at their disposal to ensure safe navigation (Oways Online, 2020). BRM makes it possible to combine technological and human skills in order to carry out activities more effectively. It is likely that a bridge team will work together to address the issues they confront in the course of navigation if the bridge team members have enough information about the procedures of bridge resource management (BRM). When making decisions that are likely to have an effect on navigation, it is necessary to take into account the input of each individual.
Techniques of adequate BRM are required for enhanced situational awareness, which comprises knowledge of internal and external aspects that are likely to affect safe navigation. This awareness is vital for increased situational awareness (Mukherjee, 2021). The crew on the bridge is able to respond appropriately to evolving circumstances because they have situational awareness. While trying to make a turn in an area that is known for having poor weather, it is especially helpful to have this ability.
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