In this paper, I will argue that abortion is morally permissible, and Marquis’ argument that ‘abortion is immoral’ is flawed. I will explain the merits of Thompson’s argument and philosophical worth. On the other hand, I will point out inconsistencies in Marquis’ arguments about the immorality of abortion. According to Judith Thompson, the argument against the morality of abortion contains several inconsistencies. The author points out that most opposition against abortion is packaged under the premise that a fetus is a human being (Thomson 47).
Thompson does not explicitly disregard this premise, but she takes issue with the manner in which the opponents of abortion have made their argument. For instance, the author observes that the opponents of abortion do not correctly point out the exact moment when life starts. In addition, the people who oppose abortion do not differentiate which ‘life’ is more precious than the other. Thompson’s main opponent is Don Marquis, who argues that abortion is only permissible on very rare occasions. The two arguments are quite solid because they are well supported with viable facts. However, Thompson’s argument is stronger than that of Marquis because it makes more sense to both proponents and opponents of abortion.
According to Thompson, the argument that life starts at conception and that a fetus has the same rights to life as a fully-grown human being is flawed from the start. Therefore, it is likely for those people who consider abortion to be immoral to contradict themselves. Thompson uses the term ‘slippery slope’ to describe the arguments that dispute the morality of abortion (Thomson 48). First, it is not easy to identify the moment and time when a fetus becomes a human being.
Consequently, it is safe to assume that the argument that a fetus acquires full human features before it is born is viable. However, the fact that most arguments against the morality of abortion start and end with proving that a fetus is a person raises several questions. On the other hand, the proponents of abortion do not see the need to go past this argument, and they, therefore, present the argument that a fetus is not part of human tissue, but it only becomes a person after birth. Consequently, there is a need to expound the abortion debate past the ‘humanity of the fetus’ argument. An argument that goes beyond the validity of the fetus’ anatomy is the only one that can determine the morality of abortion or lack thereof.
Assuming that the fetus is indeed an entity that has the right to life, the mother’s right to terminate or continue with the pregnancy is trounced by the aforementioned right. Consequently, when a mother interferes with a fetus’ growth, it is tantamount to interfering with the life of another human being. Nevertheless, this argument is greatly undermined by the fact that a fetus cannot exist independently without the input of its mother.
Therefore, those who argue for the immorality of abortion often overlook this fact, and this oversight weakens a great deal of their argument. On her part, Thompson uses the example of a popular violinist whose life is dependent on an innocent stranger. In this case, the stranger has no say on the matter because all his/her rights are overruled by the violinist’s right to life. The morality of holding someone’s life at a ransom so as to save another ailing being is questionable. In addition, the fact that the ‘human being’ whose life is being saved cannot survive on his/her own raises several questions. For instance, it is hard to explain how life can be ‘wholesome’ if it is dependent on a parallel survival.
Arguments against abortion are often made on the premise that both the child and the mother have an equal right to life. However, this premise is quickly discarded in the event the pregnancy threatens the mother’s life. For example, a mother is given the right to abort when her life is in danger, thereby disregarding the fetus’ right to life. This development raises the question whether some lives are more equal than others. Furthermore, the issue of morality is hard to prove when someone is playing favorites with the lives of human beings. Overall, the argument against the morality of abortion using the premise that the fetus has a right to live just like the mother is self-defeating in nature.
The right to life as described by opponents of abortion tends to conflict with other natural rights. Human beings have the right to be independent and use their bodies in any way that they want. Some of these natural rights include the liberty to refuse to carry a baby for nine months. The fact that people have the right to life does not justify the interference of the rights of others; “a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person’s body-even if one needs it for life itself” (Thomson 49). Therefore, it is almost impossible to win the debate on the immorality of abortion using the ‘sanctity of life’ as the only argument.
It would be beneficial for the opponents of abortion to recognize and accept that a fetus is a dependent being. Consequently, a mother would be entrusted with this frail and dependent object. However, arguing for the independence of the fetus means that there is room to play favorites. In addition, the argument for an independent fetus necessitates a clash between the independence of the mother and the fetus.
However, in a scenario where the fetus is dependent on its mother, the latter has responsibilities that subject her rights to the service of the fetus. This premise can align with the argument that abortion is justifiable in special circumstances. In this case, normal circumstances would be that the mother subscribed to the pregnancy voluntarily. On the other hand, special circumstances would cover situations where a pregnancy occurs as a result of involuntary acts such as rape. Nevertheless, the opponents of abortion use the argument about the independence of the fetus and right to life as a tool of intimidation.
Marquis would fault Thompson’s argument against the immorality of abortion by noting that there is an element of ‘killing’ that is involved in this process (Marquis 183). Marquis points out that a victim of abortion can be denied future prospects. In addition, it is not only beings that are biologically human that have the element of future prospects. For instance, a species that has future prospects that mirror that of human beings might exist. Consequently, Thompson’s argument would be faulted by Marquis for not having an element of morality. It would be prudent to consider that abortion can cause a difference in an organism’s future prospects.
This argument lacks merit because it is largely one-sided. The future prospects of the fetus are not independent from those of the mother. Therefore, when the future prospects of an organism are considered independently, they contradict those of the mother. For example, consider the example of a Catholic maid who has a child out of wedlock when she is living in an Arabic sponsor’s home. After delivering the baby, the maid will most likely be deported for contravening the laws of the land.
On the other hand, the child is likely to be put up in foster-care. Marquis would consider it immoral for the maid to procure an abortion because this would hinder the future prospects of the unborn baby. However, by forwarding this argument Marquis explicitly ignores the future prospects of the mother (Marquis 190). In this case, the mother gets into trouble with the authorities, looses the prospects of a good life at her sponsor’s home, and she is denied the chance of raising her own child. All these factors cannot be ignored at the mere speculation that the maid’s baby will have a good future. For instance, the child is also a victim of circumstances that prevent him/her from growing in a fully functional family.
The argument for the morality of abortion would also be disputed using both the notions that it contravenes the sanctity of life, and terminates a form of life. Proponents of the morality of abortion are hard-pressed to explain the difference between the killing of helpless infants and abortion. In both cases, the victims are dependent entities that cannot make decisions on their own behalf. In addition, opponents of the morality of abortion challenge its proponents to distinguish between the sanctity of life in the case of little children and fetuses.
Nevertheless, there is a big difference between an infant and a fetus where life is concerned. For example, a fetus does not stand the chance of survival devoid of the mother’s input while an infant and the mother can survive independently. In addition, it is important to note the entity of an infant cannot pose any considerable danger to that of the mother while a fetus can compromise its mother’s physical wellbeing. Therefore, the entities of the infants and the fetus might be similar but they have very fundamental differences.
The proposition that abortion is tantamount to killing the young can be easily disputed using the argument that an infant and a fetus are similar but different entities. This situation can be explained using the example of the maid who is residing in the Arab sponsor’s home. During pregnancy, the maid is able to hide her situation from everyone because the fetus is two-dimensional and it exists only in respect to herself, but after birth the child can be possessed by the authorities as a result of its abstract existence.
In this paper, I argued for the merits of Thompson’s views that the arguments that are used to prove the immorality of abortion are lacking in merit. I used arguments that indicate that it is impossible to argue and prove that life starts at conception. In addition, opponents of abortion such as Marquis are unable to contextualize their arguments using viable real-life situations such that of a Catholic maid who is residing at an Arabic household.
Works Cited
Marquis, Don. “Why abortion is immoral.” The Journal of Philosophy (1989): 183-202. Print.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “A defense of abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs (1971): 47-66. Print.