Thomas Wright’s article looks at the collapse of the seven-decade-old status quo of American foreign policy under the Trump administration. It further discusses how this break affects party politics within the U.S., the difficulties Trump faced in actually realizing his vision of reduced American military presence globally, as well as the dangers associated with his potential reelection. Furthermore, the revelations about people’s attitudes towards a smaller American presence on the world stage and the popularity of Trump’s internally-focused strategy concerning global affairs revealed is examined.
For seventy years, the United States government enjoyed an implied bipartisan agreement on the broader strokes of America’s involvement in the wider world and its role on the global stage (Wright, 2020). While the minutiae were a near-constant source of disagreement between the Republican and Democratic parties, the general views on the “system of alliances, the forward positioning of forces, a relatively open international economy” (Wright, 2020, p. 10), all the while attempting to adhere to the principles of democracy, freedom and human rights were aligned. Under the Trump administration, that consensus was made null and void, to the concern not only of the opposing Democrats but members of Trump’s party.
The matter of the United States’ costly and drawn-out intervention globally is tied to the realist school of international relations. The argument is that, due to the secure position the U.S. enjoys globally, there is only minimal impact on national interests from the interventions. According to this view, retrenchment is a practical solution and the logical route of the future. Wright (2020) argues that as the focus of the U.S. foreign policy shifts from counter-terrorism to competition with the great powers of China and Russia, it should reduce certain overseas commitments but certainly not abandon a decades-long strategy that has seen great returns. Critics of the foreign policy status quo argue for two key foreign policy strategies needed going forward: drawing back the U.S. intervention abroad and practicing a hitherto unseen restraint in the case of foreign intervention.
The first strategy that supporters of retrenchment support are that of withdrawing the U.S. from prior commitments, both in terms of military operations and support in the Middle East and in the case of supposedly unequal alliances with countries and blocks within Europe and Asia. The second strategy, one of restraint, suggests a narrower definition of the U.S. interests, with a greater focus on economic, political, and diplomatic relations and a refusal to engage in military actions that do not directly affect the vital interests of the country (Wright, 2020). For these strategies to be implemented, the U.S. would have to cease military operations, such as those in Afghanistan, withdraw its forces from the broader Middle East, acquit itself of the reasonability for other state’s security, and rely on a new and untried method of upholding national interests (Wright, 2020). One aspect of the case for retrenchment is the immense economic cost of participating in a seemingly endless conflict in a far country such as Afghanistan. Indeed, one of the main arguments of some supporters of retrenchment is that the government has allowed itself to be distracted from the greater picture with expensive interventions and commitments abroad that do nothing to help the U.S. image.
Four articles, written between 2013 and 2020, look at America’s global role from various angles, and each reaches different conclusions. The overwhelming view presented by Wright (2020) is one of moderation in terms of radical changes to foreign policy and reducing overseas interventions. Wright’s (2020) overall argument is that the question of retrenchment must be analyzed from a truly global perspective, not focused solely on the Middle East. While bogged down and lacking purpose in the Middle East, he argues there is a clear rationale for continued presence in Europe and Asia, where shared interests and objectives are enjoyed with stable partners. This view is supported by Brooks et al. (2013), in an article suggesting that a minimal withdrawal may be sound in the current times, but that leaving entirely would have few benefits for the United States. Their article underlines the lack of assured economic profit from withdrawing and the importance of global involvement in securing peace in volatile areas and smoothing the path of international cooperation.
However, these conclusions are not universal and are indeed challenged by other perspectives. Posen (2013) offers a contrasting view: in fact, meaningful benefits to be found in a reduction of active involvement. This article maintains that the benefits of greater restraint on the global stage, given prudent actions from Washington, would save both resources, and lives, and prevent pushback (Posen, 2013). Wartheim (2020) is even more critical of America’s global role than Posen. Rather than focusing on the pros and cons of withdrawing the U.S. presence, Wartheim (2020) launches a scathing attack on American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War and argues it has made the world and America less safe. This view leads to a call for the complete withdrawal of the U.S. military, and a change in the overall strategy to focus, instead, on the common good. The only consensus between the articles is the need for withdrawal; however, the proposed scope of the withdrawal differs vastly. Wright and Posen argue for the devil you know, or in this case, the reliable return on active involvement in global affairs, while Brooks et al. and Wertheim are more critical of the status quo and demand more significant withdrawal and the charting of a new course.
References
Brooks, S. G., Ikenberry, G. J. & Wohlforth, W. (2013). Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement. Foreign Affairs, 92(1), 130-142.
Posen, B. R. (2013). Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, 92(1), 116-128.
Wertheim, S. (2020). The Price of Primacy: Why America Shouldn’t Dominate the World. Foreign Affairs, 99(2), 19-29.
Wright, T. (2020). The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw from the World. Foreign Affairs, 99(2). 10-18.