Abstract ideas
According to Locke, an abstract idea is an idea which opens with a general term or terms. In this idea, the words are not arbitrarily used but stand for concepts which in turn represent things. This means that abstract ideas are not necessarily images as images can not be completely abstract (Locke II.8.8)
Abstract ideas are applied in perceptual judgement by picking out the common elements from the perceptions which look alike. According to Locke, this process is called abstraction. For example, when a person sees an object, the abstract idea that is registered about in the mind is the shape and brightness. Therefore, accustomed use of an object affects our perceptual judgement (Locke II.8.8-10).
According to Locke, the acquisition of abstract ideas (abstraction) is achieved through experiences at certain instances and later by comparison of ideas of meaning (percepts). The characteristics which are common in the percepts are then retained. Therefore, as the idea is experienced, it is also perceived and represented in perceptual experiences (Locke II.8.12-15).
How abstract ideas are possible
Locke points out that a triangle’s abstract idea as possible because it is a derivative of experience with various objects in nature with varying shapes. A composite mental picture forms having only common elements of perceptions of shape (Locke IV.7.8). Since there is possibility of images becoming abstract (according to Locke), the visualized image of the triangle may not determine the certain number of sides or other features.
The image so visualized however corresponds to several other shapes (common element) which have a difference in the number of sides. The common element leads to a general name or a general idea (e.g. shapes or triangles). This is possible because the triangle equally conforms to all shapes but is none of the shapes in particular (Cummins’s notes).
Abstraction of the triangle takes place by eliminating features which link it to other shapes. However, the different shapes cannot be recognized as it is the possession of the concept of shapes or triangles which necessitate recognition (Locke IV.7.9).
Why Locke disagrees with innate ideas/principles
Locke objected innate ideas because he believed that some of Descartes’ followers did not change the Pre-Cartesian position justified arbitrarily that almost all aspects, mans knowledge originates from innate principles.
He discredits Descartes’ platonic argument because the innate is a derivative of God and cannot err hence man is not infinitely perfect because at no point does experience present such a chance. Locke uses the concept of abstraction to object Descartes perception of simple and complex ideas by asserting that God’s idea is complex and man only experiences simple components in it (Locke I.1.3)
This issue is important because Locke takes an indirect approach and doesn’t address the fact that innate things are from God. Instead, he assumes truthfulness of whatever is innate and doesn’t argue at any point against this. He further portrays the compatibility of innate principles with denial by defining innateness in various forms.
It is important to note that in these definition forms, Locke accepts one which offers relative but not absolute rejection that “innateness is no guarantee of truth”. This also implies that Locke to some extent concurred with Descartes’ idea that if innateness occurs, then it is the work of God, a true fact (Locke I.1.1-3).
Furthermore, the form of definition adopted by Locke that “whatever is innate is true”, if false, could mean that he defends innate principles. At this point, it would be difficult as he had no basis (Cummins’s notes). Moreover, Descartes in his book (Med III) does not address facts supporting innate principles. Therefore, it is important that the innateness of a principle be ascertained for it to be demonstrated as true (Locke I.1.1-3).
Adequacy of our simple ideas
Locke explains adequacy of simple ideas from the basis that visual presentations e.g. ring and abstract ideas e.g. yellow have to agree for a person to perceive appearance (“what people call yellow”) (Locke IV.1.4). According to Locke, the word ‘yellow’ is an idea which is simple hence the difference between agreement of visual presentations and abstract ideas is taken care of by the perception of appearance.
This would however be impossible even based on Locke’s idea that ‘whatever is innate is true’ because of the complexity of the visual presentation which may vary in aspects such as texture, shape, color and size (Locke IV.1.4).
Moreover, how adequate the abstract idea is poses less concern than the perception because the mind is unable to generate simple ideas (Locke IV.iv.5). This means that Locke is unable to link perception of appearance into the agreement of visual presentations and abstract ideas. However, this is possible because only adequacy with respect to the abstract idea is required and not adequacy with respect to the perception (Locke IV.1.4).
Ideas of secondary quality and objects
By pointing out ideas of secondary quality lack of resemblance in the object, Locke does not approach secondary qualities as real qualities in objects but as powers. This means that concepts of secondary qualities are not those of real qualities but they are of powers.
Lock uses the containment thesis to point out that powers (which he approaches as secondary qualities) are not used in objects unlike the existing thesis which implies that secondary qualities are non-existent in objects ( Locke II.8.8-12). The thesis pointed out in the later perceives ideas of secondary quality as being untrue with regard to objects, an argument which Locke fails to accept.
In addition, the fact that ideas of secondary qualities (which are powers) may lose the power in them and still not change is not absolute because of the occurrence of the sense where secondary qualities do not exist in the objects that possess them. In this case, ideas of secondary quality are perceived as they were originally i.e. as conspiracies between objects. In summary however, Locke’s work and thoughts in this case does not emphasize the aspect of secondary qualities being existent in the objects (Locke II.8.12-18).
Locke’s anti-skeptical arguments
In these arguments, Locke seeks to demonstrate the extent of knowledge i.e. intuition and demonstration and distinguish them from demonstration and faith. In the first anti-skeptical argument, he asserts that the existence of finite beings which lack us is not probable and certain because intuitive knowledge is from things which are external in our minds.
Moreover, he mentions examples of objects which may be external in our minds such as wormwood and roses and suggests that these objects can be external in our minds but their revival is achieved by memorizing and hence they come to the mind through experience or senses (Locke IV.2.14).
In the second argument, Locke strengthens the first argument further by asserting that objects cannot exist in our minds without us as it is certain that we experience them first. According to Locke, an argument contrary to this is nothing but skeptical, since the existence of objects even in dreams is perceived by our senses.
It is therefore from these arguments that he comes up with the third degree or extent of mans knowledge, sensitive knowledge, which like intuition and demonstration varies in aspects of certainty, degree and proof mechanism ( Locke IV.2.14).
State of nature and state of war
Locke uses the state of nature to explain political power clearly. He perceives that nature, bound by its own laws predisposes man to equality in terms of possession, political power and jurisdiction. With the above in place, Locke means that subordination is difficult to occur unless the lord gives dominion of one over the other. In turn, this yields charity, obligatory mutual love, responsibility and justice (Locke Treatise II.2.4- 5).
According to Locke, liberty hence prevails amongst man in these conditions and only the obligatory laws of nature to act on man. However, Locke suggests that destruction can only be used to punish offenses which present unequal opportunity to nature (Locke Treatise II.2.5).
Lock further points out that if the laws of nature are to be violated, then the same opportunity should be given to every man to avoid subjection. For the offenders who are locked up or punished, the intention is to present an equal opportunity for the remaining persons (Locke Treatise II.2.8-9). This jurisdiction to punish is sometimes not left to all men as some may act in a manner contrary to laws of nature (Locke Treatise II.2. 13-14).
The state of nature is different from the state of war because in a state of war, enemity and destruction prevails to avert possible subjection.
This is because the acts of subjection and subordination which occur in a state of war predispose a group to destruction therefore the need to ‘destroy before you are destroyed’. In a state of war, the attempt to put others in one’s power is the real cause of subjection hence perceived threats are destroyed to present an equal opportunity (Locke Treatise II.3. 16-18).
After the perceived threat has been destroyed in a state of war, there exists equal application of the law. Locke however argues that this is not always the case unlike in a state of nature hence the existence of a superior judge whom no one can prevail over (Locke Treatise II.3.19 – 20).
Ends of political society and government
Locke points out that civil societies are formed based on the key objective of the repressed members to protect their lives, estates and freedoms which Locke calls property. This is because the state of nature and its freedom negates the need for people in civil society to subject themselves to control and dominion by other powers (Locke Treatise II.9.123).
The noxious way of exercising power by a government leader forces people to go into civil societies to protect their property, themselves and others. Therefore, in society, they derive legislative and executive powers which are checked by the society laws known to every member and entrusted to a few people who act as judges (Locke Treatise II.9.127-128).
However, Locke acknowledges that civil society or even government may split to associations because of the leaders’ noxious way of applying the law irregularly to their own advantage.
In a civil society, men delegate their power, freedom and equality previously possessed in nature to the society with the sole intention of protecting their property by guarding against the defects in government hence a haven of peace and safety is created for people in a civil society (Locke Treatise II.9.131).
In certain cases, the concept of civil society leads to a justification of revolution. This occurs because though laws of nature are equally applied to creatures, leaders in governments are biased and driven by their own interests and they contravene the fact that laws should be common and impartial to all.
This means that to these leaders, the law is not binding. (Locke Treatise II.9.124). Moreover, the leaders in governments are both the leaders and the execution apparatus of laws hence they apply the law to their own interests.
Since the state of nature negates the need for people to be subjected to control and dominion by other powers, revolutions eventually ensue because the leaders offend men, who by the laws of nature resist injustice to reprise the noxious leaders (Locke Treatise II.9.126).
Compensating an offender and the injured party
According to Locke, a magistrate can exonerate an offender from punishment based on the state of nature that every man has a right to punish an offender. He cannot however forego reparation of the injured party because this reparation belongs to the person who is injured.
He (Locke) argues that it is almost similar in a case where a magistrate confers punishment in his own way for the good and safety of the public but not in the way stipulated by law. The same magistrate however cannot satisfy the injured party for the damage he has suffered. This is because the injured party himself reserves the right to claim. He is the only party or person who possesses the ability to remit the damage caused (Locke Treatise II.2.11).
In addition, every man has the ability to punish crime and to prevent it from occurring again hence in this way, the injured party has the right to remit in a manner which he perceives as being commensurate to the offence and the offender. This implies that the issue of compensating the injured party is more weighty or critical than punishing an offender.
Moreover, Locke perceives that all persons in nature’s state can punish crime or even kill depending on the degree to which the injured party can remit himself. Locke even cites illustrations from the bible to this end! He uses Cain’s fear f being killed after murdering his brother to point out the fact that every man is empowered by the state of nature to destroy a criminal before he is destroyed (Locke Treatise II.2.11).
Leibniz and Locke on innateness
Wilhelm Leibniz defends the notion of innate knowledge against Locke’s inability to prove beyond doubt about incoherence of innate knowledge. Leibniz argues that if it were to be based on Locke’s concept, then it doest mean that man knows his innate truths.
According to Leibniz; the mind is linked to innate knowledge through predisposition. He perceives ideas as “indicators, dispositions, tendencies or natural potentialities and not actualities (Leibniz 52). Unlike Leibniz, Locke unknowingly attributes knowledge to be independent of any innate perceptions. Therefore according to Locke, man is born devoid of knowledge and what he acquires is only through experience (Locke I.i.4)
Locke further suggests that if principles are universally agreed upon, then it would not be proof of innateness unless there exists other explanation forms (Locke I.i.4) However, Leibniz objects to think that principles which are universally agreed upon are innate through definition citing that “a principle being rather generally accepted among men is a sign, not a demonstration, that it is innate” (Leibniz 76).
Locke perceives beliefs as a kind of thought which occurs consciously. However, this is a rare phenomenon in beliefs. Leibniz on the other hand discredits this thought and refers to memories which can occur devoid of conscious awareness.
Despite the fact that all truths are universally agreed upon, there exists no proof for the lack of innateness because “even though they were known, they would still be innate, because they are accepted as soon as they are heard” (Leibniz 76).
Therefore, Leibniz objects Locke’s argument that all that which is known is a derivative of the senses partially rejecting the concept of acquisition of knowledge by using senses (Leibniz 77), and to a certain extent, Locke agrees with Leibniz regarding the concept of innateness.
Works Cited
Cummins, Robert. Notes on Locke: Essay Concerning Human understanding.2009.Print.
Leibniz, Wilhelm. New Essays of Human Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1981. Institute of Learning Technologies. Web.
Leibniz, Wilhelm. New Essays of Human Understanding. Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press. 1981. Institute of Learning Technologies. Web.
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 6th ed.1689. Institute of Learning Technologies. Web.
Locke, John. Second Treatise on Government. 1690. Institute of Learning Technologies. Web.6 Oct. 2011.