Background
In the year 2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigations started an ambitious project to modernize its IT systems. The project was a complete overhaul of the existing software and computer systems in its offices. The project caused controversy over the size of the budget and the course it took in the next five years. While the FBI succeeded in implementing some of the phases of the project, the whole scheme had to be stopped in 2005 when it became impossible for the agency to complete some of the phases.
One phase was intended to replace the existing computers in FBI offices. The second part of the project was to create a computer network for the whole organization. Finally, the obsolete software used for investigation at the FBI offices was also to be replaced. By the time the project was stopped, it had spent less than half of the total amount of money allocated to it.
However, this money had gone to waste. Experts had recommended an overhaul of the software since it was obsolete (Eggen 5). Science Application International Corporation was given the task of installing the new software systems in FBI’s offices. DynCorp was awarded the contract for the installation of a new network for the FBI (Merkel 7).
There was pressure for the FBI to overhaul its information systems as the existing computer resources were an impediment to investigations and co-ordination of intelligence. Another event that complicated the bureau’s situation is the terrorist attacks on the September 11, 2001. The nature of the attacks and the fact that better sharing of information at the FBI offices could have helped prevent perpetration of the attacks put the FBI on the spotlight over the efficiency of its intelligence systems (Sensenbrenner 34).
Another reason for the FBI’s quest to install a new computerized system in its offices was to simplify the way it organized its data. Investigations needed large data storage facilities with good organization to be able to operate efficiently. These reasons made the FBI abandon the plans to upgrade some of the software used in its offices, and plan a complete overhaul of the systems.
The changing details of the project caused a disagreement among the key figures involved. One senator, a member of the executive group overseeing the project in SAIC, quit over allegations of mismanagement of the work, which was a sensitive security issue (MacGroddy 22).
Another problem that the projects faced was the constant disagreements with the contracted companies. When the first package of software was installed in 2003, the FBI claimed that the software could not meet its requirements. In self defense, the contracted company, SAIC, attributed the dissatisfaction of the FBI to the changes it had specified for the original structure of the software.
This was the major reason the company gave in its defense argument, and it held on to it. In 2004, Robert Mueller, the head of the FBI, reported to the congress that the bureau had predicted that the project would eventually be complete within the same year. Although the prediction went without a major challenge, it did not seem possible that the contractors could achieve the feat in such a short time.
When SAIC reported that it would need more money to finalize on the project, the Federal Bureau of Investigations declined to honor the request for funds. However, to avoid getting the project into a complete stall, the Federal Bureau of Investigations agreed to give sixteen million dollars to the contracted company.
FBI also hired another company, Aerospace Corporation, to revise the plan for the project. While the companies where struggling to deliver better software, the FBI was planning to cancel the contracts and start another project with a better plan (MacGroddy 28).
Analysis
An overall assessment of the project showed that there was poor initial planning and assessment of the situation. The designers of the software did not assess the situation to make the relevant changes that would make the whole project a worthwhile venture. Eventually, the project had to be stopped midway, with a loss of more than 120 million dollars (Godstein 8).
There were several reasons for failure of the project. In the first place, the FBI was not decided on its needs, and kept on changing the software specifications as it progressively discovered anomalies in its original specifications. This repeatedly changed focus for the designers of the software. The estimates of the projected budget had to be revised severally to cater for the changes in the specifications.
Interference of the Federal Bureau of Investigations with the ongoing project prevented the planners of the project from making a good plan for the software architecture. Furthermore, the FBI included some of its IT professionals in the project (Godstein 6).
The people that FBI included as executive directors of operations in the project were not competent enough to offer any assistance in the development of the software. All the FBI officials in the project did was to increase bureaucracy and obstruct implementation of proper changes to the software.
The original 383 million American dollars that was allocated for the project was not enough to implement the original plan and the changes that were continuously proposed by FBI officials. This forced the bureau to request for more funding from the federal government. The congress saw the urgency of the issue, and allocated an additional 123 million US dollars to the project.
The company that was tasked with the duty of creating the investigative software, SAIC, continuously requested for more funding throughout the time that operations on the project lasted. This put constraints on the budget planning for the Federal Bureau of Investigations.
Due to the additional details to the original software, the code definition of the software became so large that its implementation on a computer of average capabilities became difficult (Pearlson 88). It required more work and refinement of the software to get it to work on an average computer at FBI offices. This dragged back the schedule for the project.
Moreover, negotiations to expand the scope of the software took time, and sometimes an agreement would not be reached on time due to technical and financial limitations (Pearlson 45). Due to the delays and the failures of the upgrade program, the project lost more than a hundred million dollars of public money.
The FBI was blamed for most of the failures in the project. The security agency had interfered with almost every detail of the development of the software, and made it difficult for the specialized computer programming companies to construct a functional product (MacGroddy 40).
When the FBI started the upgrade project, there were obvious risks that it faced. One of the risks was the possible rise of cost of the operations to finalize the project. Since this was a new kind of a project, it was important for the FBI officials to create a budget estimate that would accommodate unexpected changes.
To do this, the FBI had to involve a team of knowledgeable computer scientists to assess the situation, and determine the amount of money and time that would be required to see the project through. In this regard, the FBI failed to harmonize its projections with the approximations of the companies undertaking the actual work.
There was also a risk of the failure of the completed project to perform its designated functions. Since estimation and prediction based on mathematical calculation was prone to error due to natural factors, the FBI should have expected that some of the parts of the project would not work properly, and would need revision. It was necessary for the FBI to account for these possibilities to avoid disagreements with the contracting companies (MacGroddy 36).
An assessment of technical performance of the engineers and specialists involved in the project showed that organizational and professional incompetence was one of the causes of disagreements while the project was underway. This incompetence was also the cause of the failure of the software design (Sensenbrenner 25).
Engineers working on the project should have redrawn a fresh plan of the software architecture once the FBI requested changes. This would have averted bloating of the software code. However, the engineers chose to add the changes to the software without considering the effect of the changes on the product that would be presented for installation (Calbom 48).
Managers at the FBI also displayed a significant level of organizational incompetence. While overseeing the implementation of the project, they did not involve the right personnel for the work. Instead, they chose to involve some of their regular engineers in the project. This contributed to the eventual failure of the software since the engineers working at the FBI were not competent in creation of complex software such as the one required at the time (Hite 11).
Role of systems engineering
For the project to succeed, the FBI should have involved a systems engineer in the project. Systems engineering is essential in gauging the viability of any project. This field of engineering could have helped the managers to accurately determine the cost of the project, including an estimation of the cost of the changes that were implemented later.
Systems engineering would have theoretically tested the probability of the proposed software working properly. The efficiency and appropriateness of the software would also have been gauged.
Through an assessment of the working environment of the software and the computer systems in which it would be used, a systems engineer would have determined the expected architecture for the software.
This would have helped the designers and planners in the project to come up with the right kind of software for the FBI’s requirements. In addition, a systems engineer could have determined the relationship between the software product and all other factors in its environment using mathematical assessment of the situation.
Conclusion
It is evident that professional and organizational incompetence was the cause of the failure of the FBI’s project. The Federal Bureau of Investigations failed in the organization of events, while the companies undertaking the project showed professional incompetence. It is important to assess a company undertaking such a project to determine its suitability for the particular work.
Works Cited
Calbom, Linda M.. FBI Trilogy responses to posthearing questions.. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006. Print.
Eggen, Dan. “Washington Post.” The FBI’s Upgrade That Wasn’t. Version 5. 2008. Web.
Godstein, Harry. “Who Killed the Virtual Case File? – IEEE Spectrum.” IEEE Spectrum: Technology, Engineering, and Science News. Version 4. Spectrum, 2012. Web.
Hite, Randolph C.. Information technology responses to Subcommittee post-hearing questions regarding the FBI’s management practices and acquisition of a new investigative case management system.. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005. Print.
MacGroddy, James. “A Review of the FBI’s Trilogy Information Technology Modernization Program.” National Research Council 5.3 (2007): 3-45. Print.
Merkel, Niels. “Neumann, Charette, Bellovin & Blaze | FBI Software Roundtable.” IT Conversations. Version 5. Conversations network, 2010. Web.
Pearlson, Keri, and Carol S. Saunders. Managing and using information systems: a strategic approach.. 4th ed. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2010. Print.
Sensenbrenner, F. James. Information security FBI needs to address weaknesses in critical network : report to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner Jr., House of Representatives.. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2007. Print.