There is no doubt that a state leader enjoys impressive power. With political, economical, financial and even social issues under control, a political leader can possibly turn into a dictator[1].
Despite the fact that in the resent-day world, the leader of a state controls every single sphere of the life of the state, the restrictions imposed on the leader by qualified exceptionalism principle allows for making sure that no power abuse is taking place. In his article, David Rudenstine explains where the power abuse that can be currently observed in a number of states stems from. According to Rudenstine, the seeds of constitutional dictatorship were planted in a governmental system since Ancient Rome.
As Rudenstine explains, the principle in accordance with which the leader of a stat might consider authoritarian regime as a means to lead the state out of a crisis “is rooted in the Roman Republic.”[2] In their turn, Owens and Loomes analyze the work of the U.S. Congress without the references to earlier political practices, as well as without analyzing a particular political situation.
According to Owens and Loomes, as long as the policy of qualified expectations persists in the U.S. government and the Congress has its impact on the President’s actions, democracy is safe.[3] Despite the work of the Congress, however, power abuse can possibly take place unless strong moral principles are established, which will help coordinate the steps of the government[4].
The aforementioned Congress does not necessarily speak from the perspective of people. Rather, Congress considers what will be most favorable for the state. After all, the members of the Congress often dispute and rarely come to terms: “American voters can become frustrated by the inability of their leaders to move forward.”[5]
However, it cannot be denied that the Congress controls the actions of the President, thus, preventing him/her from making the steps that conflict with the interests of the U.S. population: “Even today, Congress limits the President’s powers.”[6] In addition, the way in which the Congress limits presidential power also leaves much room for thoughts.
Stacey Kaper gives a very graphic example of the failure of the Congress to voice the opinion of the nation by explaining that the Congress should “provide the president with explicit self-defense authorization to address specific emerging threats,”[7] yet it never does. Perhaps, one of the key reasons for this is that “we expect too much of government”; however, it is the duty of the state representatives to take care of people, and it is necessary to make sure that they attend to their duties.
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that for an average person, connecting with the Congress for the latter to translate their demands into reforms is extremely hard. As Independence Hall Associations explains, USA is “far too large a country to operate effectively as a direct democracy.”[8] With that being said, it can be assumed that the existence of Congress is justified, especially when such issues as waging war are at stake: “The implication often given is that these powers are somehow incompatible.”[9]
Although there are a number of opportunities for abusing power for a man/woman in presidency, it seems that dictatorship is highly unlikely to occur in the states where restrictions are provided. While it is important to trust the person chosen democratically to rule the state, it is essential to show that gaining presidency means taking responsibilities. As long as the reminders of the responsibility of being a state leader exist, democracy is going to be the basic principle of governing the state.
Bibliography
Independence Hall Associations. “American Political Attitudes and Participation.” In American Government. Philadelphia, PA: Independence Hall Association, 2008. Web.
Independence Hall Associations. “How Do Citizens Connect with Their Government?” In American Government. Philadelphia, PA: Independence Hall Association, 2008. Web.
Independence Hall Associations. “Congress: The People’s Branch?” In American Government. Philadelphia, PA: Independence Hall Association, 2008. Web.
Independence Hall Associations. “The Presidency: The Leadership Branch?” In American Government. Philadelphia, PA: Independence Hall Association, 2008. Web.
Kaper, Stacy. “How to Restrict the President’s Power to Wage War.” National Journal 6, no. 15 (2013): 37.
Machiavelli, Nicolo. The Prince [Excerpts]. 1513. Web.
Owens, John E. and Burdett A. Looms. “Qualified Exceptionalism: The US Congress in Comparative Perspective.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 12, no. 3–4 (2006): 258–290.
Rogers, William. “Congress, the President, and the War Powers.” California Law Review 59, no. 5 (1971): 1194–1214.
Rudenstine, David. “Roman Roots for an Imperial Presidency: Revisiting Clinton Rossiter’s 1948 Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies.” Cardozo Law Review 34, no. 3 (2013): 1063–1078.
Footnotes
- Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince [Excerpts], 1513.
- David Rudenstine, “Roman Roots for an Imperial Presidency: Revisiting Clinton Rossiter’s 1948 Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies,” Cardozo Law Review 34, no. 3 (2013): 1063.
- John E. Owens and Burdett A. Looms, “Qualified Exceptionalism: The US Congress in Comparative Perspective,” The Journal of Legislative Studies 12, no. 3–4 (2006): 258–290
- Independence Hall Associations, “American Political Attitudes and Participation,” in American Government, Philadelphia, PA: Independence Hall Association, 2008.
- Independence Hall Associations, “Congress: The People’s Branch?,” in AmericanGovernment, Philadelphia, PA: Independence Hall Association, 2008.
- Independence Hall Associations, “The Presidency: The Leadership Branch?,” In American Government, Philadelphia, PA: Independence Hall.
- Stacy Kaper, “How to Restrict the President’s Power to Wage War,” National Journal 6, no. 15 (2013): 37.
- Independence Hall Associations, “How Do Citizens Connect with Their Government?,” in American Government. Philadelphia, PA: Independence Hall.
- William Rogers, “Congress, the President, and the War Powers,” California Law Review 59, no. 5 (1971): 1194–1214.