On January 22, 1879, The British army suffered a major defeat at the battle of Isandlwana in South Africa. Several factors contributed to this downfall. It was expected that since the British under Lord Chumsford had superior weapons, they would have easily won the battle. However, that was not the case; the Zulu used indigenous weapons but still emerged victorious. Analysis of what transpired on that day reveals several underlying factors that favored the Zulu to win the battle against the British.
One of the major reasons for the Zulu’s win was their numerical superiority as compared to the British. The Zulu army that faced off the British comprised 20,000 well-trained men. The British, on the other hand, had only 1,800 soldiers. This made it easy for the Zulu to attack the British’s main column and conquer. It led to the killing of about 1,500 British troops and around 1,000 warriors from the Zulu side. The British also suffered poor leadership from their commander, Lord Chumsford.
This made it impossible for the British to execute their plans in a successful manner. Lord Chumsford did not organize his troops well and had no proper information on how the Zulus were planning to attack. The lack of insight by Lord Chumsford saw the poor deployment of the British troops, thereby leading to heavy defeat (French 62). But what made the Zulu so successful. The Zulu led by Cetshwayo was more organized and devised better methods of attack. Horns of the beast were devised by Cetshwayo in order to attack. In addition, the Zulu had a larger troop as compared to the British troops. They enjoyed numerical superiority (Morris 34).
Hardly eleven days after the British army started their attack on the Zulu land had the Zulu settled and organized their warriors for a counterattack. Zulu force was made up of about 20,000 warriors, while the British troops were only 1,800. This numerical superiority acted to their advantage, especially because the Zulu were using traditional iron spears, for instance, an assegai. Further, the unity and will to fight the British further strengthened Zulu warriors. Zulu regimen also did so well in the co-ordination of their activities despite possessing inferior weapons. Chief Cetshwayo, the leader of the Zulu was very tactical.
He sent out over 20,000 shoulders across the White Umfolozi River with strong command. He commanded them to match slowly and attack at dawn and eat up all the red soldiers. Both sides employed different combat tactics. However, given the outcome of the war, it can be said that the tactics employed by the Zulu were superior. The Zulu were wise enough to apply and adhere to the principle of mass and surprise.
The British, on the other hand, lacked insight and went ahead and attacked the Zulu without securing their territory (Marks and Anthony 16). The Zulu left their main warriors behind and sent a few of them to encourage the British to attack. Immediately the British attacked, the rest of the Zulu warriors came out in full force and attacked. The ratio of Zulu to British soldiers was about 20 to 1. The British were therefore overwhelmed, leading to the painful defeat. In conclusion, we can say it is the organization and unity of the Zulu than made them realize their victory against the British.
Works Cited
French, Gerald. Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War. London: John Lane, 1939. Print.
Marks, Shula, and Anthony Atmore. “Firearms In Southern Africa: A Survey.” The Journal of African History 12.4 (1971): 517. Print.
Morris, Donald. The Washing of the Spears; a History of the Rise of the Zulu Nation under Shaka and Its Fall in the Zulu War of 1879. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965. Print.