Introduction
This paper examines the causal factors of the M/V Rook incident, a ship that ran aground in England. The report aims to establish the core causes of the accident. One limitation of the information is that it does not consider environmental and weather aspects that could have highly contributed to the incidence.
This assessment is essential for pinpointing the most common errors regarding bridge resources and how they can lead to boat accidents, thereby preventing future incidents. Understanding this topic is also crucial for addressing safety concerns in navigation. Other reasons include inadequate preparation, ineffective communication, and a lack of safety protocols. The incident discussed is consistent with previous occurrences reported by the MAIB reports.
Methodology
From research conducted on various MAIB reports of case accidents in Plymouth, UK, several were selected to develop the case presented below. These include the BBC Marmara, Chem Alya, Karin Høj, Scoter Carrier, and the Finnmaster accidents, further analyzed in the text. Below is a summary of the incident that entailed the M/V Rook vessel. All the information about the incident is fabricated, but it follows the pattern of information gathered from understanding how other cases occurred.
Information on the Incident
The M/V Rook was a standard cargo vessel traveling up the coast of England. It was a bright, sunny day when the pilot, Captain Smith, was embarked at the designated pilot station. Captain Smith was responsible for safely navigating the M/V Rook through the busy waterways. The bridge team comprised the Captain, the helmsman, the navigator, and the lookout.
The M/V Rook was equipped with the latest navigational technology to ensure the voyage was as safe as possible. The bridge team was executing their duties as the M/V Rook continued up the coast. All seemed to be going well until the navigator noticed an increase in the vessel’s speed. He warned the helmsman to reduce the rate, but the helmsman ignored him and continued to increase the speed. This caught the lookout’s attention, who warned the helmsman to slow down again.
At this point, the navigator noticed that the M/V Rook was heading straight for a shallow sandbar. He immediately contacted the bridge team and warned them of the impending danger. Unfortunately, the bridge team could not respond quickly, and the M/V Rook ran aground on the sandbar. The impact of this incident was severe, causing significant damage to the vessel’s hull and the surrounding environment.
The engine room was flooded, disabling the engines and causing the ship to become stranded. The bridge team could not take any further action and was forced to wait for the tide to rise, allowing the vessel to be freed. The crew of the M/V Rook responded quickly and began assessing the damage. They could contain the flooding, and the engine room was stabilized. However, the hull was severely damaged, and the vessel was taking on water in some areas. The crew managed to contain the flooding, but the damage was extensive.
Meanwhile, the bridge team began to investigate the cause of the incident. It was quickly discovered that the helmsman had failed to follow the navigator’s instructions to reduce speed. The navigator had warned the helmsman of the danger of the shallow sandbar, but the helmsman had failed to take action. This was an inexcusable breach of the bridge team’s duties, and the helmsman was held responsible for the accident.
The bridge team was also found to have failed in their responsibilities and in responding quickly enough to the navigator’s warnings. The investigation concluded that the bridge team had not been adequately prepared for the voyage and had not taken the necessary steps to ensure the vessel’s safe navigation.
Analysis
The incident involving the M/V Rook resulted from a series of causal factors that led up to the accident. These factors can be divided into five main categories: inadequate preparation, ineffective communication, lack of responsibility and accountability, insufficient training and experience, and lack of safety protocols. Each of these causal factors will be discussed in further detail. One of the most significant causal factors was the lack of safety protocols on board the vessel.
The M/V Rook was not equipped with the necessary safety protocols, so the bridge team was not given the guidance to respond quickly and effectively to the navigator’s warnings. Also, it was not recommended that the navigator provide the bridge team with the necessary information to make informed decisions.
Furthermore, despite the navigator’s warnings, the helmsman had failed to reduce the vessel’s speed. This indicates a lack of accountability on the part of the bridge team, as they had failed to take the necessary steps to ensure the vessel’s safe navigation. The bridge team had also failed to ensure that the helmsman was adequately trained and experienced to handle the situation. This indicates a lack of responsibility on the part of the bridge team, which contributed to the incident.
Accident Causes
The MAIB reports provide a comprehensive overview of the causal factors behind these numerous accidents in UK waters. In the case of the flooding and loss of the Bella, the report found that the vessel had not been adequately prepared for the voyage. The crew had not taken the necessary steps to ensure the vessel’s safe navigation. This mirrors the fictional incident in which the bridge team failed to take the steps needed to ensure the vessel’s safe navigation.
The BBC Marmara, a Portuguese-registered general cargo ship, was reported to have been grounded due to a human factor: inadequate bridge resource management was identified as the core cause (Fan et al., 2020; Rine, 2022). The MAIB report revealed that the bridge team failed to identify the shallow water and did not take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard (Goerlandt & Liu, 2023). The report found that the bridge team had failed to assess and respond to the environmental conditions appropriately and had not adequately prepared the vessel for the voyage.
Moreover, it was discovered that inadequate training contributed to the grounding of the Chem Alya, an Oil and Chemical vessel. Here, the helmsman had not received sufficient training and experience to safely navigate the ship in the busy waters of the Needles Channel (Hasanspahić et al., 2021). There was poor team communication between the bridge members of the Karin Høj (8685844) vessel and the Scoter Carrier (9841782), resulting in a collision. Inadequate navigational watchkeeping contributed to the fatal outcomes (Kamis et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2022).
The last incident involved the Ro-Ro cargo ship Finnmaster departing from Hull, England. During the departure, a fire broke out in the auxiliary engine room (Ma et al., 2022). The investigation revealed that a combination of factors contributed to the fire. The first factor was the ship’s crew’s failure to inspect the engine room properly before departure. This led to combustible material that had not been removed. The second factor was the crew’s failure to properly inspect and maintain the engine room (Cao et al., 2023). This led to flammable oil and gas in the engine room, which was not detected until after the fire had broken out (Chuah, 2022).
The third factor was the crew’s failure to monitor the engine room properly during the voyage. This allowed the fire to spread unnoticed until it had become too large to be extinguished (Yildiz et al., 2022). The fourth factor was the crew’s failure to respond quickly and effectively when the fire was detected. This allowed the fire to spread and cause extensive damage.
Recommendations
First, the bridge team must be adequately trained in the principles of bridge resource management. This should include a thorough understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each bridge team member, as well as the proper use of navigational equipment and techniques (Jon et al., 2021). Clear communication protocols between the bridge team and the navigator should supplement this. Moreover, all vessels should be equipped with the necessary navigational equipment, and all crew members should be adequately familiarised with the ship and its operations. This should include a thorough understanding of the vessel’s safety protocols and the navigational procedures that should be followed.
All bridge team members should have the proper training and experience to guarantee safe navigation. This includes knowledge of bridge resource management principles as well as navigational techniques. Additionally, they should completely understand the vessel’s maritime and safety protocols (Hu & Park, 2020). The bridge team must accurately assess the risks associated with navigating the vessel and take the necessary measures to ensure a safe passage (Adland et al., 2021). This requires the implementation of risk assessment protocols, which allow the bridge team to identify potential threats and take the necessary steps to mitigate them (Aziz et al., 2019).
Establishing clear communication procedures that enable the bridge team to receive the required data from the navigator and the navigator to provide the team with the needed information for making sound decisions can lower the rates of accidents. Moreover, safety protocols should be implemented to ensure that all individuals on board are familiar with their roles and responsibilities, as well as the proper use of navigation tools and techniques (Rawson & Brito, 2022). Management should also ensure the crew can act swiftly and appropriately should the need arise.
Conclusion
The accident involving the M/V Rook underscores the importance of effective communication, thorough preparation, and prudent action from the bridge team and navigator. The lack of safety protocols, inadequate training, and lack of communication contributed to the incident. The risk of such an incident can be minimized by implementing appropriate safety protocols, providing adequate training and experience, and establishing effective communication procedures. This incident serves as a reminder of the importance of proper bridge resource management and the need for all vessels to be adequately prepared for their voyages. Taking reasonable precautions can significantly reduce the likelihood of a similar incident occurring.
Reference List
Adland, R. et al. (2021) ‘The value of meteorological data in Marine Risk Assessment‘, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 209, p. 107480. Web.
Aziz, A. et al. (2019) ‘Operational risk assessment model for marine vessels‘, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 185, pp. 348–361. Web.
Cao, Y. et al. (2023) ‘Analysis of factors affecting the severity of marine accidents using a data-driven Bayesian network‘, Ocean Engineering, 269, p. 113563. Web.
Chen, P. et al. (2022) ‘Risk assessment of marine accidents with Fuzzy Bayesian networks and causal analysis,’ Ocean & Coastal Management, 228, p. 106323. Web.
Chuah, J. (2022) ‘Admissibility of air and Marine Accident Investigation Records in arbitration and Litigation‘, Regulation of Risk, pp. 185–210. Web.
Fan, S. et al. (2020) ‘Incorporation of human factors into maritime accident analysis using a data-driven Bayesian network‘, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 203, p. 107070. Web.
Goerlandt, F. and Liu, H. (2023) ‘Readability of maritime accident reports: A comparative analysis‘, Maritime Policy & Management, pp. 1–13. Web.
Hasanspahić, N. et al. (2021) ‘The role of the human factor in marine accidents‘, Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 9(3), p. 261. Web.
Hu, Y. and Park, G.-K. (2020) ‘Collision risk assessment based on the vulnerability of marine accidents using fuzzy logic‘, International Journal of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering, 12, pp. 541–551. Web.
Jon, M.H., Kim, Y.P. and Choe, U. (2021) ‘Determination of a safety criterion via risk assessment of marine accidents based on a Markov model with five states and MCMC simulation and on three risk factors‘, Ocean Engineering, 236, p. 109000. Web.
Kamis, A.S. et al. (2022) ‘A systematic scoping review on ship accidents due to off-track manoeuvring‘, WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 21(4), pp. 453–492. Web.
Ma, X.-F., Shi, G.-Y. and Liu, Z.-J. (2022) ‘Tar-based Domino Effect Model for maritime accidents‘, Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 10(6), p. 788. Web.
Rawson, A. and Brito, M. (2022) ‘Assessing the validity of Navigation Risk Assessments: A Study of offshore wind farms in the U.K.‘, Ocean & Coastal Management, 219, p. 106078. Web.
Rine, A. (2022) ‘A.L. Report‘. Web.
Yildiz, S. et al. (2022) ‘Spatial and statistical analysis of operational conditions influencing accident formation in narrow waterways: A case study of Istanbul Strait and Dover Strait‘, Ocean Engineering, 265, p. 112647. Web.