Introduction
The issue of gun possession has always been a burning one for the human society on the whole and the Canadian community in particular. And it is natural, that the idea of controlled gun possession has always had its supporters and opponents. The former argued about the increased control over firearms possession and traffic in the country as the sole positive effect of such a control. The latter always claimed the control system applied to firearms possession and use was nothing but the waste of money. They motivated such a point by the assumption that ordinary people living according to the country’s law would never use guns illegally even without such a control system, while criminals would never voluntarily agree to register their firearms with the state.
The case study of the Canadian Firearms Program developed by Wan and Neufeld (2006) discusses the situation in which the opponents of the gun control system turned out to be right. The Canadian Firearms Program proved to be ineffective and excessive in costs, while its major expected effects, i. e. the reduction of gun deaths and increase in safety levels, were never achieved (Canada Government, 2009). This report focuses on the analysis of the Canadian Firearms Program, defining the reasons for its failure, and recommending the ways for the Canadian Government to solve the CFP problem.
Background
History of the Program
The major point about the Canadian Firearms Program is that the period of almost 15 years it has been in use proved to be not enough for this program to give any notable results. Approved by the Department of Justice in 1995, the Canadian Firearms Program has a long history of development and the similarly long list of the failures it had in this history (Canada Government, 2009a). According to Wan and Neufeld (2006, p. 1), the main reason for the Government to implement the Canadian Firearms Program was the need to increase the safety of people after a number of tragedies that involved uncontrolled gun possession and use:
- December 6, 1989: Montreal massacre during which 14 young women were killed;
- August 24, 1992: Concordia University shooting during which four professors were killed;
- April 28, 1999: Taber tragedy during which a student was killed and another one wounded by their former classmate;
- March 3, 2005: Four Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers shot dead investigating the marijuana growing case.
Finally, the last point that made the Canadian community protest against the Canadian Firearms Program was Toronto Boxing Day shooting in 2005 that took the life of a 15-year-old girl as a result of a quarrel between 10 to 15 youngsters that possessed guns (Wan and Neufeld, 2006, p. 2). This case made the whole Canada wonder what the use of the Canadian Firearms Program was if even such a governmentally-funded project could not provide safety on Canadian streets.
Problem Statement
The Problem
Thus, the main problem that this report focuses on is the fact that the Canadian Firearms Program lacks efficiency and does not bring the results it was, and still is, supposed to bring. During its licensing, registration, and ongoing operations phases the program succeeded only in licensing over 2 million gun owners and registering more than 7 million of firearms. As well, the program proved to be useful for court procedures as it provided affidavits on the people that used the online resource of CFP during a period of time (Canada Government, 2009a). But here the pros of the Canadian Firearms Program end and the cons come into play.
First, several controversial and scarcely effective information systems were designed to help CFO, including Restricted Weapon Registration System, Canadian Police Information Centre System, Firearms Interest Police, etc., that proved to only confuse the system instead of helping it (Wan and Neufeld, 2006, pp. 2 – 3). Second, the Canadian Firearms Program faced organizational and community acceptance challenges that made its implementation more difficult. Finally, the program costs overran (officially, from $119 million to over $1 billion, unofficially to $2 billion) making the nation wonder why the taxpayers had to fund the obviously ineffective program (Canada Government, 2009; Wan and Neufeld, 2006, pp. 2 – 3, 5 – 7).
The Stakeholders and the Governance
Needless to say, the implementation of the ineffective and outdated Canadian Firearms Program touched upon the interests of the major stakeholders and the governance of this very program. The group of the stakeholders was rather wide and included:
- Canadian gun owners (both registered and not-registered) who often saw the threat to their human freedoms in the Government’s attempt to control the use acquisition and possession of guns. The Canada’s Recreational Firearms Community was especially active in opposing the program;
- Canadians willing to own a gun, i. e. the Canadian Firearms Program applicants whose claims were processed slowly and inadequately;
- Canadian firearm traders that might experience sharp decreases of sales as a result of reluctance of ordinary people to provide their personal data to the Government while buying a gun;
- Canadian Firearms Program officers whose work was complicated by the disorganized and confused operation and leadership in the program.
The governance of the program can also be included in the stakeholder list although its interest was purely social. The Government and the Department of Justice needed the Canadian Firearms Program to make sure firearms are controlled and the country is safer, but the interests of the listed stakeholders and governance bodies were not met by the actual performance results of the Canadian Firearms Program.
Alternatives
Seemingly, the alternatives to such an ineffective program are easy to find, but it is necessary to make them as focused as possible to avoid the pitfalls of the currently implemented Canadian Firearms Program. The first alternative that might be proposed has the legislative nature as it demands the Government to modify the rules of gun use in public places (Belda, 2006).
As the history proves, the majority of firearm related tragedies happened in public places like schools, universities, shopping areas, etc. The adoption of the law prohibiting the carriage of guns to public places and use of checking systems at the entrances to public places might ease the task for the Canadian Firearms Program and increase its efficiency (Belda, 2006).
The second alternative is the re-development of the Canadian Firearms Program, restructuring of its database, and re-designing of the leadership of the program from the very lowest to the CEO levels. The data by Wan and Neufeld (2006), Belda (2006), and the Canada Government (2009, 2009a) prove that lack of organization and confusion in operation brought the program to its failure, and the improvement of these points is seen as the way out (Belda, 2006).
Evaluating Alternatives (Score Matrix)
The score matrix for each of the alternatives offered can better illustrate the potential effectiveness of those alternatives and help in selecting the one fitting the best.
Figure 1. Legislative alternative score matrix
Figure 2. Organizational alternative score matrix
Implementation
Major Steps
Thus, the results of the score matrix for both possible alternatives prove their efficiency, although to different extents. Thinking logically, it is actually true that the direct improvement of the Canadian Firearms Program will turn out to be more effective than the legislative initiative aimed at the same goal. Therefore, the organizational alternative is the most fitting option to modify and improve the Canadian Firearms Program. This alternative is a long-term option meaning that it is implemented not in a day but in at least 2 years and demands qualitative restructuring of the whole system on which the Canadian Firearms Program is based. The major steps of this alternative’s implementation thus include:
- In-depth study of the current condition of the Canadian Firearms Program;
- Identification of the major failing factors;
- Elimination of the current, obviously confusing Canadian Firearms Program and design of the new one;
- Outline of the goals of the new Canadian Firearms Program;
- Selection of fitting staff for the program and distribution of functions among staff members;
- Establishment of the proper subordination and control in the Canadian Firearms Program;
- Development of success criteria and measurement techniques for assessing the program performance;
- Appointment of special bodies to supervise the performance of the Canadian Firearms Program;
- Monthly control of the program performance, reporting of results, and readiness for making changes;
- Definition of responsibility for failing to fulfill their functions for all program staff members.
Potential Effects
The potential expected effects of the organizational alternative implementation include the proper functioning of the Canadian Firearms Program, the decrease of gun-related tragedies, deaths, and crimes, and overall increase of safety in Canada. These goals are measurable as the Canadian Firearms Program will be considered successful if its costs come to the expected projections and gun-crime statistics conforms to the established standards. The decrease of gun-related crimes and increase in overall safety will be measured against the previous years assuming that the effective Canadian Firearms Program should reduce crime at least by 20% in its first operation year.
Recommendation
General Notions
Generally, the recommendations for the Canadian Government include the need to restructure the Canadian Firearms Program and take legislative steps to limit, or eliminate, the possibility of carrying firearms in public places. Obviously, both recommended steps require radical changes in the currently operating system of gun control in Canada. To succeed in this radical modification process, the properly developed change management and sourcing strategy will be required. Simply to put it, the Government will need to realize the ways in which the Canadian Firearms Program can be restructured and where the resources for this process will be derived from.
Change Management
The first point that an organization that experiences problems needs to realize is that it does experience these problems and faces the need for change. This is the task for the phenomenon called change management, i. e. the practice to make the organization understand how change is necessary and how it is important. In the case when such an organization is the Government of Canada, the change management should be developed at the highest possible level of adequacy and include at least:
- The ability to explain the organization members that their organization faces a problem;
- Development of the sense of urgency, i. e. manifestation of the importance of the problem for the organization and its stakeholders;
- Involvement of the key stakeholders and governance bodies into the change management;
- Development of a clear plan for the change;
- Defining the stages of the change process and people responsible for those stages;
- Creation of control bodies to supervise the change process and report possible violations;
- A proper sourcing strategy to see how the change process is funded and supported.
Sourcing Strategy
The sourcing strategy that is recommended for the Canadian Government in the process of solving the issues with the Canadian Firearms Program includes two major elements, i. e. resources as such and accountability to the key stakeholders and other possible investors that provide those resources.
In more detail, the key stakeholders of the Canadian Firearms Program that might be interested in its modification are the Canadian Government, social organizations promoting peace and safety, industrial and business companies interested in preserving safety in public places on the whole and in their facilities in particular, legal gun-owners, and ordinary people of Canada. To make a win-win deal the Government is recommended to agree its Canadian Firearms Program with the stakeholders who will help in sourcing it. Thus, the Government will receive additional funds to improve the program while the stakeholders will obtain guarantees of the efficiency of the program they fund.
At the same time, the issue of accountability comes into play as the Government will have to be accountable for every cent of the invested stakeholder money. Thus, it is recommended that the Government should establish the accountability body to trace the use of sources and report the data to the stakeholders of the program.
Conclusion
Thus, it is obvious that the issues of gun control and firearm registration are still controversial and difficult to solve. In Canada, this issue has had considerable public attention due to the actually failing attempt of the Government to control the firearms in the country through the Canadian Firearms Program. The latter, although planned as a socially useful phenomenon, turned out to be the ineffective and outdated system with confused structure, lack of leadership, and overrunning operational costs. The history of the Canadian Firearms Program proves that it needs improvement and the two alternatives offered in this report are sure to help if they are properly implemented. To ensure safety, the Canadian Firearms Program should be restructured and its main goals should be supported by respective legislative acts and laws.
References
Belda, C. (2006) Changes to the Canadian Firearms Program. LECO. [online] Legal Documents. Web.
Canada Government. (2009) Canadian Firearms Program, Implementation Evaluation. DJC. [online] Canada Department of Justice. Web.
Canada Government. (2009a) Canadian Firearms Program. RCMP. [online] Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
Wan, Z. and Neufeld, D. (2006) Canadian Firearms Program. Case study by Richard Ivey School of Bsiness, University of Western Ontario.