Introduction
Children are human only that they are young beings. In this respect, children too have a moral status; some acts should not be done to them. Again, children are distinct from grown human beings it is reasonable to argue that children should not be subjected to some activities. For instance, as in many jurisdictions, children are not permitted to take alcohol, vote, engage in sex, marry or work for pay.
Children Rights
Generally, children are accorded legal rights in most countries. Most of the nations – except the United States – are bound by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The convention which was assumed in 1980, gives children several rights such as the right to serve their “best interests” as the “primary consideration”, “inherent right to life”, and for those can form their own opinions “to express these views freely in all matters affecting” them.” (United Nations, 1989). The “positive rights” that are protected by the law are distinct from the “moral rights” defined by the moral philosophy. Therefore, the fact that children are protected by the law under these positive rights does not satisfy the need for moral rights. Certainly, the concept of rights to children has elicited controversy. Simultaneously, there are arguments as to what rights children are entitled to if any.
The critical aspect that allows children to be of philosophical significance is a mixture of their youth and humanity as well as the elements that are connected to their youth. This paper is going to examine the critical question; do children have rights. Further, the discussion will explore the nature, value, and scope of rights as well as the children’s moral position.
According to the United Nations (1989), a child is any person who is under eighteen years of age. Some philosophers assume it is apparent that children have rights but the question arises to what extent they should be entitled to these rights. On the others side, skeptics believe children should not be holders of rights. Sumner (1987) and Steiner (1998) argue that if too many rights are given away, then they may not retain their significance and value which is vital. Sumner (1987) and Steiner (1998) symbolizes this argument to monetary value where he argues increase of rights lessen the value of the rights currency.
The Sumner (1987) and Steiner (1998) argument is a challenge to advocate of children’s rights. Nevertheless, there are more specific rationales suspecting the moral of children’s rights. In this regard, the issue of rights language comes into focus. So what is entails being a right holder. Some philosophers, for example, assert that rights are absolute in which case an individual possession of rights adequately outweighs any other moral perspective (Nozick, 1974). On the other hand, some hold to the belief that rights possession is not that significant as to discount other moral considerations.
The claim that children have rights gains account in the choice or will theory (Steiner, 1994; Hart, 1973 & Sumner, 1987), and); the interest or welfare theory contradicts the will stand (Kramer 1998; MacCormick 1982 & Raz 1984). According to the will theory, rights entail safeguarding the exercise of choice. Specifically, a right is to possess the power to impose or relinquish the task of which “the right is the correlative” (Kramer 1998; MacCormick 1982 & Raz 1984). In simple terms, for example, for one to possess the right to education means one has the choice of imposing the responsibility of other individuals or individuals to offer the education or liberate them from their duty. The interest theory observes right as the safeguarding of interests of ample significance to enforce on others’ particular responsibilities whose action enables the holder of a right to benefit from the interest.
The interest and will theory have limitations in the assertion that children have rights. Generally, the will theory excludes some humans; that is, even though all human being holds interests that deserve to be protected, some like children, comatose and the mentally challenged cannot choose. In this respect, the choice theory disqualifies them as rights holders. In addition, MacCormick (1982) argues that fact that it is obvious children have rights becomes adequate to discount the will theory hence making children’s a ‘test-case for the theory.
In most corners, the claim that for every right there is a corresponding duty holds water in children right. Thus, to possess a right means that someone else has the responsibility in respect to that right. Further, this should not be translated to mean there are no other forms of responsibilities that do not correlate with any right. Certainly, some opponents of children’s rights agree that grown-ups have the responsibility to safeguard the vital interests of young children but at the same time, they refute that these interests correlate with rights possessed by children.
Conclusion
The discussion of the interest and will theory does not put into consideration reasons for favoring either theory. It has merely explored the concern whether rejection of children’s rights can be considered as a test case for the integrity of the choice theory. However, there are possibilities of other considerations that discount the choice theory in support of the welfare theory; or maybe the interest theory is preferable to the choice theory irrespective of the will theory denial of children of rights.
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