Executive Summary
The Columbia gas of Massachusetts experienced a failure in its system that resulted in significant damages. On September 13th, 2018, a natural gas piping system malfunctioned in Lawrence, Massachusetts, and the Merrimack Valley, resulting in considerable overpressurization. This was caused by the Feeney Brothers’ pipeline work, which was part of a line replacement project. Multiple flames and explosions occurred concurrently across three cities as a result of the malfunction, with one fatality. Columbia Gas of Massachusetts (CMA) and Feeney Brothers made several mistakes including poor communication and mismanagement of the outdated pipeline system, which resulted in the explosion (Maltzman, 2020). CMA, a NiSource, Inc. subsidiary, owned and operated the gas distribution system. 141 fires, 5 explosions, 21 serious injuries, and 1 death resulted from the impact of the high-pressure gas lines (Maltzman, 2020).In this report, four main issues are addressed:
- Poor pipeline replacement project management,
- The lack of key personnel,
- The failure to communicate with internal and external stakeholders,
- The system’s inability to shut off the lines remotely.
This report entails identification and explanation of the major issues pertaining to the CMA’s system malfunction, identification of viable solutions, and finally, recommended approaches based on the solutions’ analysis and ranking.
Background
On September 13th, 2018, a natural gas piping system malfunctioned in Lawrence, Massachusetts, and the Merrimack Valley, resulting in considerable overpressurization. This was caused by the Feeney Brothers’ pipeline work, which was part of a line replacement project. Multiple flames and explosions occurred concurrently across three cities as a result of the malfunction, with one fatality. Columbia Gas of Massachusetts (CMA) and Feeney Brothers made several mistakes, including poor communication and mismanagement of the outdated pipeline system, which resulted in the explosion (Maltzman, 2020). CMA, a NiSource, Inc. subsidiary, owned and operated the gas distribution system.
The monitoring center in Ohio received two high-pressure alarms for the South Lawrence gas pressure system at 4:04 pm and 4:05 pm, according to the NTSB final event report. At 4:06 p.m., an Ohio controller transmits the alarms to Lawrence, Massachusetts’ meters and regulations group. The regulator requesting more and more gas was turned off at 4:30 p.m., but it was too late (Maltzman, 2020). The system had been saturated with gas, and around 20 minutes later, many gas explosions occurred. Several crucial valves were not cut off until about 7:30 p.m., and house values were not totally shut off until nearly 24 hours after the original alarm (Maltzman, 2020). 141 fires, 5 explosions, 21 serious injuries, and 1 death resulted from the impact of the high-pressure gas lines (Maltzman, 2020).In this report, I’ll go through a few of the factors that led to the disastrous exposures that afflicted so many people in the Merrimack Valley.
In researching this incident, it became clear that there were four major issues. The issues analyzed are poor pipeline replacement project management, a lack of key personnel, and a failure to communicate with internal and external stakeholders. In addition, the system lacked the ability to shut off the lines remotely. The advantages and cons of various solutions will be assessed, as well as recommendations on how the explosion and fires could have been avoided.
Issues Identification
Issue 1
The first issue concerns the management of pipeline replacement projects. The Leader of Field Engineering (LFE) noted that their protocols included examining the job, but not the step-by-step construction process, according to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident investigation. The LFE could have spotted the risk Feeney Brothers would face if they had gone over the step-by-step instructions before starting construction on September 13th, 2018. “I don’t go through and actually—on every single project look at every single step of the process,” the LFE assigned to the project said in an interview with the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board, 2019, p.19). The engineering team at CMA clearly did not have a strategy in place for gas pipeline replacements, as evidenced by this incident. The worksite engineer would have noticed the risk of disconnecting a sensor line during installation if better engineering processes had been used.
Issue 2
It is evident that CMA lacked key personnel to oversee the pipeline replacements. Massachusetts has an aging infrastructure and is gradually replacing cast iron mains with contemporary polyethylene mains, which will necessitate meticulous management to avoid future problems. CMA only had two inspectors for about 5,000 miles of pipeline at the time of the overpressurization (Maltzman, 2020). The company management does not have enough engineers to handle the review process, as seen by the efforts they put into examined construction projects. CMA also employs a large number of subcontractors to replace obsolete lines. The lack of a more thorough assessment of subcontractors tendering the jobs, as well as coordination with CMA engineers and subcontractors, led to the overpressurization of the lines.
Issue 3
The CMA failed to communicate promptly to consumers, emergency personnel, and gas line workers, and engineers were confused after the hazards of the gas lines were discovered. Municipalities in Massachusetts are free to choose their own emergency radio communications. Due to a lack of standards, different communities received the danger signal in different ways. The Massachusetts State Police and the city of North Andover both used the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Interoperable Radio System (CoMIRS). Andover and Lawrence didn’t employ a CoMIRS system, instead of relying on a mix of mobile phone alerts, media, and local town websites. Andover decided to issue a voluntary evacuation order to anyone with a natural gas-powered home or structure via local television channels, the town website, and a citizen alert phone system (National Transportation Safety Board, 2019). According to the NTSB investigation, each fire station had just one radio channel for interdepartmental communication, resulting in a lot of radio traffic and confusion.
Additionally, CMA and NiSource needed to swiftly communicate with personnel to ensure that all gas lines that constituted a concern were turned off as soon as possible. CMA and NiSource clearly did not have a good communication response mechanism because they did not have easily available service professionals to contact in the case of an emergency. In fact, early on September 14th, NiSource executives had to make a request to the Northeast Gas Association for assistance from local service specialists (National Transportation Safety Board, 2019). NiSource and CMA also failed to notify customers, miscommunicated with city officials, and lacked a proper customer alert plan. For hours, their online channels were silent, and it seems that they relied on local governments to warn citizens about the threat (Maltzman, 2020). In essence, CMA displayed dereliction of its duty to communicate effectively and promptly on key issues of concern to the relevant bodies.
Issue 4
The system at CMA was not technically enabled to shut off the lines remotely. With any gas emergency, prompt gas line shutoff is critical, and CMA failed in this role during the Merrimack Valley’s overpressurization of gas lines. The values couldn’t be turned off remotely, and CMA didn’t notify essential staff who could have responded swiftly to all of the shut-off sites. Understanding the regulators’ position in the gas line is crucial to completing a system shutdown. Regulator information was insufficient due to outdated infrastructure and improper record-keeping. A director of the CMA Measurements and Regulation Departments comments that “Employees sometimes used older legacy recordkeeping systems to complement newer isometric drawings of the regulator stations since essential information lacked from the new drawings.” (National Transportation Safety Board, 2019, P.12). The lack of technical expertise, outdated systems, poor record-keeping, and system incapability to shut off the lines preventing further damage, contributed to the worsening of the situation during the incident at CMA.
Proposed Solutions Table
Pros and Cons Matrix
Solution Ranking Table
Recommendations
As described in the solutions table above, NiSource and CMA must take a number of steps to improve not only the safety of Merrimack Valley people but also the safety of all customers they serve across the country. The necessity for a full redesign of project management and engineer reviews is obvious. The challenges were exacerbated by a lack of knowledgeable key employees throughout the company, and staffing needs to be reviewed and enhanced. Staff improvement can be done by hiring new employees or training and equipping the current workforce. The decisions made regarding staff depend on the CMA’s financial capacity and priorities.
NiSource and CMA’s emergency communication plan also has to be completely overhauled to ensure that future crises are handled promptly. Municipalities in Massachusetts must also improve communication between key personnel such as emergency agencies, engineers, and citizens. A uniform strategy would ensure clear communication and aid in catastrophe mitigation. Finally, all gas lines should be mapped to the latest versions, with clear indications of where the shutdown and regulator are located. The lack of proper recordkeeping and high-quality records contributed to the issue’s sluggish reaction and complete comprehension. The company should implement current record-keeping techniques to ease the burden on supervisors and make it easier to detect and correct errors. These solutions are all viable but the company should carefully consider the implications of each in line with its expectations.
References
Maltzman, R. (2020). Columbia Gas of Massachusetts – Project Issue Analysis – AD642 Individual Assignment 2 (pp. 1-4, Rep.). Boston, MA: Boston University Metropolitan.
College. National Transportation Safety Board. (2019). Overpressurization of Natural Gas Distribution System, Explosions, and Fires in Merrimack Valley, Massachusetts. (pp. 1-73). Washington, DC: NTSB.