Concept in Understanding Contemporary Policy Processes in Europe with Respect to Government and Policies Essay

Since multi-level Governance (MLG) theory has originated from European Integration escorted by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, therefore it can be best analysed in the light of its two phase development in the European Union (EU). The first phase was refuted by the International Relations due to critics. However it is the second phase that after considering various critics of the first phase reshaped it in favour of the public policies. Today, we study MLG on the grounds of the second phase, which is all about studying in detail the EU integration.

MLG originally developed as a means of analysing policy development within the EU the term has since been developed and extended to other political arenas. In its original formulation, the argument was made that the role of national governments within the EU was diminishing, and in their place a new, multi-level, system of governance was taking shape (Jordan, 2001). In fact many proponents of MLG believe that this system has emerged so that nation-states no longer monopolise policy making, given that supranational bodies have an independent influence over these processes.

The emergence of MLG where on the one hand has created the need for collective decision making over complex problems which leads to a loss of control for nation-states, on the other have brought the supranational, national and sub national political arenas to a single platform and that even through policy networks (Bulkely & Betsill, 2003, p. 28).

The Emergence of Multilevel Governance

However opponents consider the notion that MLG has failed to realise and understand policy making processes. Therefore one reason for MLG failure in UK according to critics is the continued efforts over the years to regularise EU policy processes that had been caught up in distributional policy-making and allocating of resources to different groups, sectors, regions, and countries, whether intentionally or unintentionally.

The framers of the original treaties included some elements of distribution in the policy repertoire to be exploited. The CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) was funded from a collective base and for a long time accounted for the lion’s share of the EU budget. Farmers became the clients of European funding. When the single market was being pushed forward in the mid 1980s, the debate about the distributional impacts of integration was joined again, but this time more explicitly couched in the language of relative wealth and poverty.

Multilevel Government decided to add the term ‘cohesion’ to the policy-makers’ vocabulary, therefore it connoted a commitment to pay attention to economic and social divergence, and the needs of the more backward regions and social groups. This appeared to signal a shift from haphazard distribution of resources (especially from the EU budget) to a more planned redistribution through designed resource transfers. However the main spending mechanism was through the ‘structural funds’, which involved programmes and projects for, on the one hand, agencies dealing with training and employment creation, and, on the other hand, regional and local authorities.

It was this opening for more direct contacts between the European and the infranational levels of government, and the politics that developed around them, that provoked the term ‘multi-level governance’ to characterise this new policy mode. It rested on two essential points: first, that national central governments could no longer be able to monopolise the contacts between the country and the EU levels of policymaking; and, secondly, that engagement at the European level created an opportunity to reinforce a phenomenon of regionalisation. The multi-level governance model inverted much of the discussion on how the EU worked by its emphasis on politics on the ground, and that of course is not without critics (Wallace & Wallace, 2000, p. 32).

Usefulness of Multi-level Governance in context with the European Policies

There is no doubt that MLG does not hesitate to take decisions in a wide range of areas which directly affect public and private interests policies in the EU, and in that respect it seems to resemble national states more than international organisations. However, compared to national states, MLG has extremely limited means to exert political rule. Yet, it is expected to get these resourceful entities on its side, which are potent alternative centres of authority on their own. That is a formidable challenge, because EU member states have distinctly different institutions, practices, and patterns of interest representation moulded by distinct trajectories of state-building. No emerging national state had to deal with such powerful and diverse alternative loci of authority (Marks, 1995).

From the advent of EU policies to decision making, MLG has always been in a state of negotiation with the supranational, local and regional governments to reshape the policies towards betterment in order to avoid the critics from the public and private sectors.

An example is that of EPIGOV (Environmental Policy Integration and Multilevel Governance) – an EU funded project (UK) which is subjected to flaws like weak implementation of development strategies, lack of resources, and weak political leadership. Despite the benefit of improving policies EU in context with MLG lacks in proper implementation. There are many examples in Europe in which concerns were initiated for procedural environmental justice and were first addressed in the EU Directive on the assessment of the effects of public and private projects, but remained unable to acquire justice because of the lack of attention from distributive environmental justice in Europe (Paavola & Lowe, 2005, p. 153).

However, the central task is therefore, time and in what context the MLG has perceived policies, how policy-makers can develop a coherent common policy at the European level, and yet give attention to the variation in political practice, institutions, and players in the member states. Or more pointedly, what sort of institutional and policy arrangements can convince potent national states to put their national sovereign power at risk in collaborative European efforts? This challenge is going to grow as European policies deepen and Union membership increases. The reason might be the widening gap between MLG and its understanding of European policies.

How MLG changes relationship between national and sub-national government?

The criticism to which MLG is confronted is that despite of acting as a theory, it has proven itself as an approach which has increased the distances between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Reason is the public policies behind European Union member-states which have changed the relationship between national and sub-national government. Since 1980s, the European integration process took the form of MLG in which the two main actors were the nation-states and the supranational institutional framework. The regions became important players in pushing the European integration process and developing strategies to enhance their role in the decision-making structures of the European Community.

After the obsoletion of the two player game in 1990s in which supranational and national actors were involved by Robert Putnam, regional governments of Belgium, Germany, and Austria achieved some representation in the Council of the EU after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. They were able to successfully influence decisions that may concern social and economic cohesion (Keating and Hooghe, 1996, 221). Followed by numerous innumerable networks of public, private, and voluntary organisations that connect with the EU policy process, networking is seen as a greater component of the essential conditions for greater democracy, transparency, coherency, and efficiency in decision making and implementation.

Because of the breadth of its responsibilities, UK sub-national government (SNG) has been expected to play a key part in facilitating this process. In addition to their domestic policy obligations, local and regional authorities are responsible for the execution and oversight of a wide range of EU directives including environmental protection, trading standards, and procurement. The EU policies, as seen from the SNG’s point of view resulted in convincing the local authorities to adapt their existing policies and working practices. In this manner SNG was considered as a success to mould local businesses to meet the challenges and opportunities of the internal market. Their growing reliance on Community assistance has also stimulated greater awareness of EU policies (Magone, 2003, p. 48).

What Intergovernmentalists think of MLG policies?

For intergovernmentalists, EU regional assistance may be regarded as primarily a side payment an opportunity for states to advance domestic objectives and repatriate financial contributions from other member states. They dismiss efforts to use the principle of subsidiary to legitimise decentralisation or devolution within the member-states or the possibility of direct links between SNG and the Commission.

Successive reforms to the structural funds may have been intended to facilitate partnerships involving SNG and local/regional economic and social actors, but these principles have frequently been resisted by the UK national government. Indeed, EU cohesion policy objectives have steadily unravelled in favor of employment policies more likely to be coordinated by national and state authorities (Magone, 2003, p. 137).

According to Hooghes (1998) “European integration has resulted only in the decline of power” (Hooghe, 1998). Moreover, the MLG concept, in adopting an actor-centred approach to the decision-making process, is one that sees policy makers, including politicians, as reliant on establishing ties and sometimes even coalitions with strategic constituencies. This leads to the collapse of other social movements as MLG only considers that comes or appears under the interest of those consider reliable in the context of the EU (Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter, and Streeck 1996, 97).

In such a situation, MLG theorists argue, the ‘boundaries’ between the actors involved in making decisions of public policy become ‘fuzzy’ and, further, the conceptual coherence of the categories themselves become problematic (Marks, Scharpf, Schmitter, and Streeck 1996, 96).

Marks, Hooghe, and Blank are correct in their view that nation-states and national governments are now constrained in their ability to control supranational organisations at the European level. While higher- order decisions are still taken by state executives, they cannot control day-to-day policy making. The process of European integration has often been technocratic. Consequently, it has been civil servants rather than politicians who conduct key negotiations and make policy (Bache and Olsson, 2001).

What Critics say?

Critics of MLG theory are also able to point to the asymmetric structure of regional and local governance across the European Union. Germany, with its highly institutionalised federal structure, could be expected to display strong evidence of MLG, but, even here, national interests have compromised direct links between the Lander and the Commission (Anderson, 1996). In the United Kingdom, MLG has not reshaped policies to the extent to compensate the problem of limited capacity of SNG so that European activities are extended (John, 1997). Despite of mobilising power and resources, MLG has remained unable to safeguard its gate keeping role, and the prospects of any significant realignment remain remote (Bache, George, and Rhodes 1996).

EU policies have been influenced but through triadic relationships that may have created superficial opportunities for active subsidiary. There are many examples demonstrating the effectiveness of SNG lobbying of the Commission for example, the treatment of additionality in respect of the RECHAR initiative and efforts to secure assistance for declining urban areas and those affected by the restructuring of the textile and defence industries. But they have usually required at least the tacit support of the UK central government, prior to any formal approaches to the Commission.

Barriers in European Trade Negotiations

The EU now plays a central role in international trade negotiations, due to its increased economic leverage and the decline in the willingness and ability of the USA to provide leadership in international trade diplomacy. The completion of European market integration in the single European market (SEM) gives EU international trade policy very significant leverage, because it can determine conditions of access to the largest unified market in the world.

The EU’s leverage has also been increased by an enlarged membership and the introduction of the Euro as a common currency in 1999. In international trade policy, as in other areas of EU decision-making, enlargement has also made EU membership more heterogeneous and thus made policy-making even more complex. EU international trade policy also has a potentially more important role to play, because of the declining willingness on the part of the USA to continue to provide a leadership role. The USA still supports multilateralism, but only when this produces the results demanded by a range of domestic constituencies (Wallace & Wallace, 2000, p. 375).

If we consider EU aloof from legal policies, it would be wrong as it has no land, no completely common currency or language, no citizens (save that they are first nationals of constituent member states), no independent taxing power, and no government save the supranational institutions previously mentioned. Despite facing many difficulties in defining the EU as a political or economic entity, as a trader it is the closest thing to the U.S. that exists in the world today.

Being the largest trading partner for investing more in the U.S. than all other nations combined, it has shown other American companies, for example, Gillette and Caterpillar, how to earn substantial profits in Europe. Indeed, the European Court has referred to the EU as ‘a new legal order’, which other trading blocs such as NAFTA certainly are not. Moreover, it was established for an unlimited duration (Fischer, 2000, p. 77).

As far as the MLG in context with the policies are concerned, it upholds many barriers like lack of sufficient information to develop policies. This has resulted in the impact of impediments to trade in services that undermines the liberalisation process. Therefore it is not right to say that MLG has protected the European services industries, as evidence suggest that service industries remain protected for many of the standard political economy reasons.

One of which is protection is safeguarded to uncompetitive service industries with significant political measures. For multilateral and regional negotiations, this evidence tends to confirm those negotiations that are already expected on services and encounter the same barriers to progress that are so familiar in negotiations on merchandise and agriculture. Many domestic interests hidden in policies limit the extent to consider reshaping (Sauve & Stern, 2000, p. 60-61). The MLG lacks in identifying the barriers to progress in services that are even greater because of the relatively widespread involvement of the public sector in service provision and of the private sector in service regulation.

Lack of information is one factor which leads MLG to underestimate or overestimate policy processes in Europe. The EU trade impediment in services and their consequent impact on the economy has lead the policy reformers to ignore their fewer tools with which to push for liberalisation. MLG must understand the trade barriers by coming to a negotiating level, by adopting a negotiating framework so that EU appears to lead multi product negotiations to more liberal outcomes by extending the set of industries over which concessions can be traded (Sauve & Stern, 2000, p. 60-61).

How UK has affected the MLG in understanding EU policies?

UK follows two paradoxes in shaping policies. The first presents UK as an ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1994) in coordinating with EU. On the one hand, the UK is considered to be ‘at odds with the theory and practice of integration’ (Wallace, 1997), its position is none other than a third party negotiating with the European Union than a member of it. Its relationship with Europe has been one of ‘missed chances’ (Denman, 1996). It joined the European Communities begrudgingly at the third attempt, and has remained at best a ‘semi-detached’ participant ever since. On the other, the UK system for EU policy co-ordination has attracted widespread admiration which has made new member states to emulate it.

The second paradox highlights a contradiction painted in critics that exists between the UK’s reputation for administrative efficiency and being ineffective in securing favourable policy outcomes at the European level (Kassim et al, 2000, p. 23) The ‘contradiction’ that arises between the UK system’s efficiency and scepticism is only apparent by its co-ordination strategy with which it forms its policies towards European integration. It contends, moreover, that the contrast between the UK’s MLG in administrating and policy failure must be treated with caution (Menon and Wright, 1999).

The UK may not have secured desirable policy outcomes in all areas, but its record has been far from negative, and it can boast a number of important successes. It can be said that MLG has failed to administer efficiency and policy effectiveness, the main reason behind the notion that UK is not as straightforward as it may appear.

Since 1997, the Blair Government in UK has come up with a central reform program “Joined up Government”, therefore key policy developments at the EU level expansion, security and defence, and the debate about governance may seem remote after that. Still there are several aspects of EU policy that have direct implications for SNG in the United Kingdom like structural fund regulations which confirm the importance of promotion of economic and social cohesion.

Because local authorities have a leading role in developing public sector infrastructure and the integration of economic and community development, they will continue to seek to influence the content and implementation of structural measures. An important challenge for many English authorities has arisen from the reforms to structural policy that integrates the four strands industrial, urban, rural, and fishing to form the building blocks of the new regions.

Individual local authorities play a key part in implementing the new programs but, given the need to draw together urban and rural interests, they are increasingly engaged in collaboration at the regional level. In the longer term the process of EU expansion may lead to a reduction in structural funds for the United Kingdom, and given the importance attached to EU assistance in stimulating their involvement, the outcome could be a diminution of local authority interest in EU issues. However the UK participation in the Euro and SEM (Single European Market) has resulted in European competitors. Similarly, authorities serving rural areas also need to take account of reforms to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the preparation by MAFF of the England Rural Development Plan.

Devolution

The creation of the Scottish Parliament and assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland has caused fundamental changes in internal constitutional arrangements in the UK. To varying degrees, the denationalisation of statehood and the territorialisation of political power open up new opportunities in the rapidly developing European agenda and for advancing the standing of the proliferation of UK nations and regions in the EU. The outcome may be a fundamental shift in central-local roles and relations, with major consequences for SNG involvement in the growing range of EU policies that interface with domestic priorities at the sub national level.

Given that the larger, first tier local authorities have proved to be more adept than smaller district councils in EU policy debates and programs, the creation of new regional bodies might be expected to increase the capacity of English SNG to respond to EU policy developments. The reality is, however, more complex. The asymmetric nature of devolution is in fact likely to produce contrasting patterns of multilevel governance across the United Kingdom.

The Scottish Executive was granted much greater powers than its Welsh counterpart, whereas elected English regional assemblies enjoyed less autonomy than the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. In England, devolution may provide the opportunity to integrate regional policies and mobilise new institutional relationships and processes.

Recent research by Burch and Gomez (2002) confirms that one of the consequences of the government’s measures to strengthen the regional tier has been to encourage representatives from the key bodies in each of the English regions and central government to come together to deal with European affairs. Some of these groups, for example in the southeast and the west Midlands, are beginning to look beyond the implementation of EU programs to consider their region’s EU strategy more broadly (Kassim et al, 2000, p. 64).

Negative Impacts of MLG in context with the European Polity

The growth of transnational exchange – causes many impediments in communicating cross national interactions between individuals, firms, associations, etc within the territory of the EC. Such exchange generates an increase in the social demand for supranational organisations to reshape their rules and regulate their policies. While emphasising on courts and legal rules cross national exchange push, increasingly, for transnational rules and regulation that replace national rules and regulation, and for a stable mechanism of coordinating national and supranational legal frameworks. With the rise in trading national rules and practices that hinder trade becomes increasingly costly to traders, who then seek to replace them with a set of transnational rules and practices that favour their activities (Sandholtz & Sweet, 1998, p. 99).

Another impact is the effectiveness by which a European system is capable of quickly responding to the needs of transnational society. The problem arises when the courts go responding to the functional demands of taking legal action, because the courts does not have to simply take decision but to consider the aftermath of the legal action. Since reshaping rules constitutes the dynamics of effective adjudication, therefore judicial decision-making constitutes a powerful form of governance. In order to provide legal and technical reasons judges are required to prove legitimacy and in this sense the lawmaking impact of any decision uphold two consequences.

First, in order to settle a dispute, the judge is bound to produce a legal act which itself is particular and retrospective for every decision. Second, is the concern which exposes the judge to justify the decision and let him know to settle similar cases in the same way in the future? Therefore the legal act is a general and prospective one (it affects future potential disputants). Thus, every policy and rule upholds a significant position which after reshaping sets another example of applying the same to other similar disputes.

The EU has faced some difficult decisions in its 40-year history institutional reform, expansion and a single currency but the EU seems to be confused about being divided or united. Whatever is the choice, the reason is structural as different economic and monetary policies, categorising problems as chiefly political or should more sovereignty be sacrificed to the central institutions? Has MLG succeeded in solving problems like unemployment, security, and monetary policy and can these be better addressed at the national or Community level? The solution is not the protection of European markets but to pursue world markets. Every problem needs a proactive decision, a solution practically implemented to understand the reasons behind the real crises.

Another factor is the elaboration of supranational rules and policies at every level. When seen in context with the transnational society, these rules replace the national rules. That means these reshaping policies are responsible for reshaping legal structure. Furthermore in this manner the legislator serves a social function that is rather similar to that of the judge that means both serve the best of their abilities to reduce the transaction costs, thereby enhancing the legal certainty. In this way they stabilise the expectations of those already engaged in, or contemplating, exchange.

The effectiveness of the legal norms binds certain classes of people that are capable of getting along with their activities and production that poses a collective problem. This problem is the main concern behind reshaping policies since EC rules pre-empt national rules. This is for the reason why in judicial lawmaking, the European Court at times legislate before the Community legislator. Hence whatever is the case, in all polities that possess a permanently constituted legislature and an independent judiciary, lawmaking powers are shared. In this manner the boundaries separate institutional functions of the EC.

Analysing MLG or multilevel polity tells us that policy formulation at every level gives rise to many technical flaws of which the outcomes are selected. Therefore the solution is not in the notion to change every policy accordingly but to stick to the results after proper implementation as multilevel governance solutions are required in case of a large number of interdependent agents.

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