The second Sudanese civil war lasted for 22 years, and the conflicting parties were the central government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). It started on the southern side of Sudan and later spread to other parts of the country. The second war seemed like a continuation of the first Sudanese war, which ended in 1972 after a peace agreement was imposed by the Addis Ababa agreement, which was between the government and the southern rebels. President Gaafar Nimeiry violated the Addis Abba agreement a couple of times. He wanted to control the oil fields at the border of the North and South regions. Nevertheless, he imposed the sharia law and abolished Christianity in the south. Sharia law greatly affected most South Sudanese and other Christians (Momodu, 2020). The law promoted the rise of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), led by John Garang, from the south region of animists and Christians, in early 1983.
In 1989, a coup occurred, and president Gaafar Nimeiry was ousted. The newly formed Khartoum government was led by Sadiq al-Mahdi. He and the rebel leader John Garang met for the first time for negotiations held in Ethiopia and ended with the Koka Dam agreement (Momodu, 2020). It aimed to call off Islamic law and convene a constitutional conference for Sudan. The war intensified, which led to an increase in the livelihood of Sudanese people, and hiking in introductory commodities prices led to people rioting, and the prime minister stopped the hiking prices. However, DUP left the government after the prime minister refused to approve the peace agreement. The new government was later formed, and it consisted Umma Party and the NIF. With the National Islamic Front (NIF), Colonel Omar Hassan al-Bashir took over from Sadiq al-Mahid’s government. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), a government of military officers, took over and banned political parties, non-religious institutions together with trade unions.
Things took a turn in 1991 when a criminal act that involved harsh punishments like stoning and amputation was implemented. The southern part exempted from the sharia law was affected since most of them were Christians because the act allowed the sharia law to be enforced in the southern part. The government introduced the Public Order Police to reign force the sharia law.
The Agreement
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and other neighboring countries started pursuing a peace initiative to help Sudan come up with ways for a comprehensive peace settlement. The government did not sign the initiative until they lost to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. The ongoing peace talks had a breakthrough in 2003 and 2004, and the government later signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 in Nairobi, which ended the civil war (Knopf, 2016). The act brought about power-sharing due to introducing an interim constitution. It also facilitated the sharing of revenues earned from oil. The interim constitution complied with the South Sudan constitution and the state constitution (Campbell, 2015). The CPA made it clear that the sharia law was only applicable in the northern region, and it did not have to the non-Muslims all over Sudan.
The Analysis
Analyzing the CPA, it is possible to outline several reasons behind the movement towards cooperation. First, the duration of the conflict served as the strong cause influencing the success of the negotiation (Bar-Tal, 2000). All parties were exhausted by the constant war, and the state was devastated. Second, the conflict in the region threatened the security of other nations and the overall development of the region (Butler, 2019). In such a way, the CPA became the only possible option to end the civil war and establish the basis for further cooperation.
At the same time, the analyzed case shows the power of external influences and how the involvement of other parties might help to resolve the conflict. The civil war in Sudan was characterized by a high level of violence and parties’ inability to find common ground. It is usually viewed as one of the conditions for negotiating (Paffenholz, 2004). However, the major allies involved in the conflict were interested in ending the war because of the instability in the region, and their interests linked to oil fields and the possibility of acquiring additional benefits from controlling the resource (Rudincová, 2017). In such a way, the external interests and pressure from other states trying to avoid losing control over the situation became the critical factor influencing the success of negotiations and outcomes.
Analyzing the major success factors, it is possible to refer to the Israel Jordan peace treaty because of the similarity of success and failure factors. Thus, speaking about the agreement, Portman and Teff-Seker (2017) view third-party involvement and stakeholder economic interests as the central cause promoting the success of negotiations between the two states. The same situation can be observed in the Sudan civil war. The incentive of other states belonging to IGAD, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and their supporters, became a critical force impacting all belligerents and their readiness to continue war (Butler, 2019). The IGAD’s economic interests regarding oil fields helped to pursue the idea of negotiations and make them an effective tool to resolve existing problems.
Furthermore, the balance issues could be viewed as success factors impacting CPA, making it similar to the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. Portman and Teff-Seker (2017) assume that balanced relationships between Jordan and Israel were critical for the region and its maintenance. A similar situation is observed in the analyzed case as the war in Sudan became a severe threat to the peace in the region (Butler, 2019). The opposing parties were supported by different camps, meaning that the further escalation was critical and undesired for other parties acting as arbiters (Pappas, 2015). As a result, to restore the balance in the region and ensure all nations have the chance for successful development, the CPA was signed.
The analyzed cooperation and the peace treaty could be viewed as a success. First of all, CPA ended the civil war, which had been devastating the lands for two decades. Second, similar to the Jordan Israel agreement, this one helped to meet the needs of the main parties involved in the conflict and the stakeholders’ economic interests. The control over oil fields, along with the Sharia law and other issues, were discussed and helped to make an agreement. In such a way, it is possible to view these negotiations as a success vital for belligerents and people living in the area.
The case can also be analyzed by applying the works of Pappas, Bar-Tal, or Paffenholz. The first author assumes that arbitration is vital for complex cases as it helps parties to negotiate (Pappas, 2015). The CPA’s success can be explained by IGAD states’ participation as arbiters in helping to make an agreement. Thus, from the perspective offered by Bar-Tal (2000), conflict resolution depends on psychological factors. In the analyzed case, parties were tired of war and were ready to alter their representations, which became a critical success factor. Finally, Paffenholz (2004) states that parties’ visions should be turned into achievable goals to succeed in conflict resolution. The conflict in Sudan showed that effective and transparent goal-setting helped to end the war and make a compromise. In such a way, the articles can be applied to the analysis to understand the results.
References
Bar-Tal, D. (2000). From intractable conflict through conflict resolution to reconciliation: Psychological analysis. Political Psychology, 21(2), 351-365.
Butler, M. J. (2019). Adaptive peacemaking in protracted conflicts: IGAD mediation in the second Sudanese Civil War. Global Policy, 10, 93-100.
Campbell, J. (2015). Ten years later: Taking stock of Sudan’s comprehensive peace agreement.Council on Foreign Relations.
Knopf, K. A. (2016). Ending South Sudan’s civil war (Vol. 77). Council on Foreign Relations.
Momodu, S. (2020). Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005).Welcome to Blackpast.
Paffenholz, T. (2004). Designing transformation and intervention processes. In: A. Austin, M. Fischer, & N. Ropers (Eds.), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict (pp. 151-167). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Pappas, B. (2015). Med-arb and the legalization of alternative dispute resolution. Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 20(157), 157-203.
Portman, M., & Teff-Seker, Y. (2017). Factors of success and failure for transboundary environmental cooperation: projects in the Gulf of Aqaba.Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, 19(6), 810-826.
Rudincová, K. (2017). Viability of a secessionist state in Africa: Case Study of South Sudan. ActaPolitologica,9(3), 66-82.