Escalation, as generally defined, refers to a significant change in the character or severity of a dispute. It happens when at least one side in a disagreement passes what that party views as a crucial barrier (Borghard & Lonergan, 2019). Consequently, a state can choose between deterrence and compellence strategies. Knope (2009) claims that deterrence is a preventative influence that primarily relies on negative incentives. When employed as a deliberate technique, deterrence seeks to prevent an action that another party could do. This approach contrasts deterrence with the alternative coercive technique of compellence, which seeks to force the target to conduct a new activity or halt or reverse an existing activity (Knope, 2009). Schelling (2009) suggests that it is always up to the governments involved whether or not to retaliate in kind; there are dangers of further escalation and military efficacy to consider. Moreover, there is no suggestion that a corresponding response cancels the first act, tactically or quantitatively.
The crucial question is whether the cyber operations may risk inadvertent escalation. Borghard and Lonergan (2019) emphasize that escalation might proceed via comparable channels in cyberspace. Notably, cyber literature is primarily concerned with situations in which one state’s deployment of aggressive cyber capabilities may unwittingly start an escalation with a competitor in another state (Borghard & Lonergan, 2019). This scenario may potentially happen if the target replies with more severe and costly cyber methods, cyber escalation within the cyber domain, or cyber-kinetic threshold breaching — in other words, cross-domain escalation. Borghard and Lonergan (2019) state that the offensive cyber operations’ deployment will not result in escalatory responses, both inside cyberspace and across other domains. Cyber operations have neither proven escalatory nor particularly efficient in attaining decisive results to the present (Valeriano & Jenson, 2019). Therefore, cyber operations and capabilities do not risk inadvertent escalation.
Although cyberspace may pose serious escalation threats, cyber escalation has not yet happened. According to Borghard and Lonergan (2019), cyber escalation has not materialized since cyber operations are ineffective escalation instruments. Borghard and Lonergan (2019) provide four essential features of offensive cyber operations that constrain escalation. Firstly, aggressive retaliatory cyber operations may not exist within the specified employment duration. Secondly, their effects are often unexpected and limited even when they do emerge. Furthermore, several aspects of offensive cyber operations are significant determinants for decision-makers. Finally, due to the limited cost-generation capability of offensive cyber activities, cross-domain escalation is unlikely to be used unless in extreme circumstances.
To conclude, just as offensive cyber activities’ limited capacity to create real and persistent consequences against a target decreases their appeal as weapons of escalation, so does the possibility of cross-domain escalatory reactions to a cyber event. Borghard and Lonergan (2019) mention that cyber operations, such as cyberattacks on power grids, can exert a substantial economic influence and, in some cases, second-order effects on human life. They have not, meanwhile, generated the physical carnage and atrocities of kinetic conflict or even terrorism that would elicit a severe public reaction that would compel decision-makers into escalatory measures (Borghard & Lonergan, 2019). The technological aspects of offensive cyber operations play a crucial role in limiting governments’ alternatives (Borghard & Lonergan, 2019). For instance, they produce trade-offs for decision-makers to evaluate, as well as breathing room during emergencies, which, when combined, limit possible escalation paths.
References
Borghard, E. D., & Lonergan, S. W. (2019). Cyber operations as imperfect tools of escalation. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 13(3), 122-145. Web.
Knope, J. W. (2009). Three items in one: Deterrence as concept, research program, and political issue. In T.V. Paul, P. M. Morgan, & J. J. Wirtz, Complex deterrence: Strategy in the global age (pp. 31-58). University of Chicago Press.
Schelling, T. C. (2009). Arms and influence. Yale University Press.
Valeriano, B. G., & Jenson, B. (2019). The myth of the cyber offense: The case for cyber restraint. Cato Institute Policy Analysis, (862). Web.