Over the course of recent months, the international community’s attention has been drawn to the ongoing dispute between Japan and China, concerned with both countries claiming the ownership of uninhabited islands of Senkaku (or Diaoyu, as Chinese refer to them) in the East China Sea. In September of 2012, the dispute-related tensions between both countries came to a particularly dangerous point.
On September 13, China sent three of its naval ships to patrol the area, adjacent to the disputed islands (Harlan A7). Even though that, as of today, there is no immediate danger for Japan and China to become involved in the military confrontation, while defending what they refer to as their ‘historical sovereignty’ over the disputed islands, there can be few doubts as to the fact that, due to the earlier mentioned dispute, the relationship between both countries had sustained a major blow.
In order for us to be able to gain an in-depth insight, as to what accounted for the objective preconditions for this territorial dispute between Japan and China to emerge, in the first place, and also as to what defines the essence of this dispute’s observable emanations, we may well refer to the reading of discursively relevant articles, contained in The New York Times and The Washington Post newspapers.
Given the fact that Senkaku islands represent very little value, as potentially habitable places (they are essentially rocky mountains that stick out of the seabed), it may appear that there is no much rationale for Japan and China to persist with claiming these islands a part of their national territories. This, however, is far from being the case, because during the course of recent decades, geologists confirmed that the seabed, around Senkaku islands, contains large deposits of oil and natural gas (Fackler A9).
Because the proper functioning of both countries’ economies is being utterly dependent on the natural resources, exported from abroad, there is nothing particularly odd about the strength of China and Japan’s commitment to claiming sovereignty over the concerned islands. Apparently, both: Japan and China, do regard the possession of Senkaku islands as such that is being vitally important, within the context of these two countries striving to increase the extent of their economic independence.
In this respect, the China’s stance in the dispute appears not altogether intellectually honest. This is because, while continuing to advance its geopolitical agenda, in regards to the islands in question, China stresses out the ‘historical injustice’ of Senkaku islands having been annexed by Japan in 1895.
Yet, it was specifically during the course of seventies (when the seabed around Senkaku islands has been proven rich in natural resources), that China had laid a territorial claim on these barren rocks in the sea. Apparently, prior to the discovery of oil and gas underneath the disputed islands, China could not care less about the ‘reestablishment of justice’, in this respect (Harlan A9).
There is, however, another aspect to the issue – the fact that China and Japan’s economies are thoroughly interdependent. According to Fackler and Johnson, as of today, Japan is being referred to as the China’s second largest trade partner (after the U.S.), with the extent of Japan’s economic dependency on China appearing even greater, because for a number of years China has been considered the Japan’s most important trade partner (A4).
As it was pointed out in the earlier mentioned article, Japanese companies currently employ 10 million of Chinese workers. In its turn, this explains the manner in which Chinese authorities handled the ‘sporadic’ outbreaks of Chinese citizens’ anger over the fact that, contrary to China’s demands, Japan continues to claim sovereignty over Senkaku Islands.
As it was noted by Bradsher, Fackler and Jacobs, the August of 2012 saw a number of violent protests taking place on the streets of many Chinese cities (A8). While manifesting their frustration with what they perceived as the Chinese government’s lack of enthusiasm in reclaiming Senkaku islands from Japan, protesters set on fire a number of sushi restaurants and Japanese-manufactured cars.
Nevertheless, given the fact that in China, no people’s ‘sporadic’ demonstrations take place, without being orchestrated by governmental authorities, and also the fact that China’s riot-police did apply a rather excessive physical force, while trying to disperse demonstrators, many political observers in the West concluded that there was a certain message to the outside world in how Chinese authorities handled these anti-Japanese ‘pogroms’.
Apparently, the Chinese government wanted to say that; whereas, its stance in regards to Senkaku islands is being thoroughly supported by the majority of China’s ordinary citizens, this alone will never serve as a good enough reason for China to use a military force, while reclaiming the disputed islands (Wan A10).
Even though that the earlier mentioned message does not appear to have had an addressee, there is nothing utterly impossible about identifying one of the dispute’s concerned parties, to which it was actually sent – the U.S. The reason for this is quite apparent – being considered the Japan’s foremost geopolitical ally, America has obligations to provide a military aid to Japan, in situations when the territorial integrity of this country is being threatened. What it means is that, if left unresolved for a prolonged period, the ongoing territorial dispute between Japan and China may in fact result in the U.S. becoming involved.
The validity of this statement can not only be explored, in regards to what account for the subtleties of a military cooperation between America and Japan, but also in regards to the fact that, even though that the U.S. had removed its military bases from Taiwan, it nevertheless maintains very close links with this country.
Yet, China considers Taiwan an integral part of its territory – even though temporarily separated from the mainland China. To make things even more potentially threatening to the region’s geopolitical stability, the Taiwanese officials also consider Senkaku islands as such that rightfully belong to Taiwan (Tabuchi A8).
In its turn, this partially explains why, as of today, American governmental officials discuss the dispute’s geopolitical implications as such that only concern Japan and China, while trying to come up with public statements, relevant to the dispute, in a thoroughly careful manner. Apparently, neither of the dispute’s directly and indirectly involved stakeholders is being interested in allowing tensions to escalate.
Nevertheless, given the Senkaku Islands’ geopolitical and economic importance, it is very likely that both: China and Japan, will continue taking an advantage of just about every peaceful opportunity to ensure their sovereignty over them. In its turn, this explains why there were a number of extensive negotiations, regarding the dispute, held between Japanese and Chinese top-officials.
Even though that, as of today, the actual outcome of these negotiations remains unclear, the very fact that the dispute’s major stakeholders expressed their willingness to resolve the issue in a thoroughly civilized manner, suggest that it is being indeed possible for Japan and China to reach a peaceful agreement, in this respect. It may well be the case that Japan and China will agree to a shared ownership of Senkaku islands (Fackler A5).
One of the earlier mentioned articles’ foremost strengths can be well considered the fact that, while expounding on the subject matter, all the authors remained thoroughly analytical.
This is exactly what allowed them to ensure that their articles can indeed be referred to as fully legitimate sources of information about the China-Japan territorial dispute’s origins, and as to what can be deemed this dispute’s discursive significance. What also adds to these articles’ value is the fact that, while working on them, the authors appear to have made a deliberate point in keeping their written texts buzzword-free.
Apparently, throughout the course of writing their articles, the authors never ceased being aware of a simple fact that there can be indeed very little rationale in infusing just about any written text with sophistically sounding but essentially meaningless politically correct euphemisms. This is the reason why the reading of these articles will come in particularly handy for those who aim to gain a better awareness of how the international politics actually work.
Nevertheless, even though that there can be few doubts, as to the fact that all of the earlier mentioned authors did in fact succeed in providing readers with a plenty of factual information, relevant to the currently ongoing territorial dispute between Japan and China, there appears to be a certain drawback to the lines of argumentation, deployed in the articles.
This drawback is being mainly concerned with the fact that the authors appear to have paid little attention to how the process of China becoming ever more economically and militarily powerful, on the one hand, and the process of the America’s geopolitical influence continuing to weaken, on the other, created objective prerequisites for China to adopt an aggressive stance, while claiming the ownership of Senkaku islands.
In addition, very little attention has been given to the fact that, even though the U.S. strives to act as an impersonal mediator between China and Japan in their most recent territorial dispute, this country hardly fits the role.
This is because America is being objectively interested in Japan continuing to exercise an authority over Senkaku Islands. The reason for this is apparent – once Japan is being put in charge of extracting oil out of the seabed that surrounds Senkaku islands, this country will be much more likely to allow the process to be controlled by American oil-corporations.
As far as my personal opinion on the issue is being concerned, I believe that in the long run, Japan will not stand a chance against China in the territorial dispute, concerned with Senkaku islands. The reason for this has been revealed earlier. Being only the de jure independent country (even today, Japan is forbidden to maintain a proper army), Japan simply does not have adequate means to defend its territorial interests in the region – especially while confronting China.
Given the fact that, due to a number of objective reasons, the America’s influence in the region is very likely to continue growing undermined, there can be very few doubts as to the fact that it is being only the matter of time, before Japan agrees to China’s demands to withdraw from Senkaku islands.
Works Cited
Bradsher, Keith, Martin Fackler and Andrew Jacobs. “In Cities Across China, Protests Erupt Against Japan Over Disputed Island.” New York Times 20 Aug. 2012: A8. Print.
Fackler, Martin, and Ian Johnson. “Sleepy Islands and a Smoldering Dispute.” New York Times 21Sep. 2012: A4. Print.
Fackler, Martin. “China Snubs Financial Meetings in Japan in Dispute Over Islands.” New York Times 11 Oct. 2012: A9. Print.
Fackler, Martin. “China and Japan Say They Held Talks about Island Dispute That has Frayed Relations.” New York Times 13 Oct. 2012: A5. Print.
Harlan, Chico. “Island Ownership Prompts Naval Standoff.” The Washington Post 15 Sep. 2012: A7. Print.
Harlan, Chico. “Japan Recalls its Ambassador from China Over Island Dispute.” The Washington Post 16 Jul. 2012: A9. Print.
Tabuchi, Hiroko. “Near Disputed Islands, Japan Confronts Boats from Taiwan.” New York Times 26 Sep. 2012: A8. Print.
Wan, William. “China Reins in Anti-Japan Protests.” The Washington Post 19 Sep. 2012: A10. Print.