Introduction
Expeditionary warfare refers to the use of the military force outside the United States to influence events taking place abroad (Federoff & Melhuish 1994; Federoff & Melhuish 1994). The expeditionary warfare approach is flexible, adapted, limited in objectives and designed for specific regional operations. It may also entail deploying forces on another country’s terrain (under U.S. control) to sway or influence events.
Since the demise of the former Soviet Union, the world has changed a lot and the security threats to the U.S. have lessened. Nonetheless, global security remains a major issue to-date. In this regard, the President’s National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS), a team whose main objective is to detour and prevent conflict has visibly reflected that concern (Federoff & Melhuish 1994; Federoff & Melhuish 1994).
With regard to that, the new National Security Strategy is selective and regional (compared to its precursors) in its attempt to solve problems of post Cold War, such as global terrorism. Following budgetary cuts in military expenditures, expeditionary warfare has emerged as the main form of warfare to combat irregular warfare in a cost-effective way.
There have been several initiatives to address how expeditionary warfare can support national security objectives. The establishment of OPNAV 85 by the chief of Naval Operation is one such initiative. In addition, several deliberations that relate to expeditionary warfare have been carried out to explore various facets of how expeditionary warfare could be used to prevent regional disputes (Federoff & Melhuish 1994).
Following the considerations outlined above, a methodology for expeditionary warfare was devised by NSS. A number of assumptions were made regarding challenges posed by irregular warfare and how expeditionary warfare approach could be used to address them. Second, provision for a starting point and facility study centre was necessary to develop definition of both dispute prevention as well as expeditionary warfare.
Finally, a chart that reflected the use of military force was developed to provide visual presentation of the background range of the area of concern, adding further accuracy to the study effort. On the basis of these assumptions, a link was established between expeditionary warfare and dispute prevention. The U.S. explored various ways in which expeditionary warfare could be used to deter conflicts in various regions abroad (Federoff & Melhuish 1994; Federoff & Melhuish 1994).
A number of scholars have engaged in lively debates on whether expeditionary warfare can best explain the nature of warfare today (Hoffman 2006, p. 395; Higgins et al., 2004). For instance, the United State is currently the frontrunner in the use of expeditionary warfare, especially following the 9/11 attacks, to pursue and neutralize domestic and foreign threats. The U.S military approach is nowadays less direct compared to what it was in the last century.
A good example is Pentagon’s Global Posture review which describes the flexible approach of the U.S military in foreign countries (Hoffman 2006, p. 395). This paper will therefore discuss the relevance of expeditionary warfare in combating present-day terrorism threats. Special attention will be directed to the manner in which expeditionary warfare approach has been adopted by the U.S. Army, Air Force, Marines, and Navy to combat global security challenges, especially terrorism.
The U.S. Army
The United States Army has adopted a number of reforms in readiness for irregular warfare. The main goal of the Army is convert itself into a modern infantry capable to effectively engage in expeditionary warfare in foreign land. The new vision entail the ability to not only carry out critical warfare operations, but also to prolong operations for an indefinite period. It also includes the ability of the Army to adjust to unanticipated circumstances. This vision focuses on asymmetric opponents in the war on terrorism.
The main basis for this argument is that adversaries will employ nonconventional military approach to launch attacks on US and its allies. Therefore, the Army must adopt an expeditionary approach in order to prevail over its adversaries (Hoffman 2006, p. 400; Higgins et al., 2004).
One of the benefits of adopting the expeditionary approach is that it enables a combat unit to adapt instantly to any hostile environment and react immediately. It shifts the Army from its present position toward predictable adversaries to an indulgent that the new adversaries are elusive and must be pursued to remote parts of the world. In this regard, soldiers are the main focus for the transformation in the U.S. Army.
Therefore, the adoption of expeditionary warfare approach in the U.S. Army lends credence on the combatant education, ethos and training of each soldier. The education programs emphasize on instructing combatants on how (as opposed to what) to think, given that the Army must outthink the adversary in order to overcome elusive enemies. The vision statement fittingly emphasizes on the urgency for superior adaptability and agility which will be acquired via modularity at the brigade level (Hoffman 2006, p. 401).
Regrettably, the U.S. Army’s theoretical transformation does not correspond to transformations in its key force structure as well as Future Concept System (FCS) program (an array of automatic and manned vehicles connected via networks). The major aspect of the conceptual shift is the development of the division-based Army to one that focuses on brigade combat teams (BCTs). Nonetheless, the modularity concept has some setbacks.
For instance, the army has been forced to reduce its expenditure on manoeuvre units in order to create more resources to finance and develop other support units in the Army. Although, the U.S. Army civilian headship asserts that the premeditated transformation will boost military power by 30%, the real combat power (gauged in either companies or battalions) is in fact decreased (Grossman 2006, p.1).
What’s more, the structure of the Army force lends credence on combat operations and fails to provide adequate resources to deal with requirements for post-conflict stabilization (Watson 2005). The U.S. Army is also under pressure to address the fiscal expenditure of $160 billion (in FSC program) as well as the equilibrium between manpower and modernization (Jaffe 2005, p.3).
The U.S Air Force
The America’s military supremacy in the last several decades is principally attributed to the U.S. Air Force. Given the prevalence of irregular threats, this dominance must be sustained. Although airpower has played a distinctive role with regard to small wars at one time, latest combat cases reveal that airpower is helpful but not adequate to attain political objectives of the U.S. Whereas the U.S. Air Force has made significant contributions with respect to operational success, its claim regarding airpower supremacy is somewhat exaggerated.
Kosovo is a better example that demonstrates the adaptive capacity of enemies to counteract the U.S. technological advantage and preference for face-off warfare (Daalder &O’Hanlon 2000, p.203).
The U.S. military operation in Afghanistan provides an ample example of how air power supremacy can make a significant contribution in warfare. A mixture of precision strikes supported by a small unit of U.S Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan revamped assertions regarding the advancement in pinpoint bombing. However, the U.S military campaign in Afghanistan underpinned the experiences from Kosovo.
The various disadvantages of expeditionary warfare approach are aptly demonstrated by U.S. led wars in Tora Bora where Al Qaeda fighters were able to evade U.S attacks as a result of lack of ground troops (Biddle 2006, p.6). Given that the application of airpower is subject to the type of warfare, the war against terrorism (new form of conflict) will reduce the applicability of strategic airpower.
Consequently, the U.S. airpower supremacy will have to be restructured to offer effective outcomes since the current warfare are geographically disseminated. Consequently, the United States Air Force will be compelled to invest in space exploration in order to successfully engage in expeditionary warfare (Hoffman 2006, p. 402; Federoff & Melhuish 1994).
The requirement for precision engagement (especially in urban areas) will persist. However, although airpower is a formidable military tool, it s effectiveness is severely limited, particularly in the current world characterized by irregular warfare (Bacevich 2001). This means that urgent renovations must be implemented within the U.S. Air Force.
For example, the Air Force has been restructured into Air Expeditionary Forces and is currently formulating mission-based task-forces. The Air Force is also developing its unmanned vehicles which are, nonetheless, operated by fighter-jet elites. The U.S air supremacy will thus remain unchallenged (in spite of the current irregular warfare) except by an advanced air defence infrastructure (Hoffman 2006, p. 403).
The U.S. Marines
Following the demise of the Cold War, the United States Marine Corps has maintained a standby mode, ready to engage in any combat operation. Although the Marines’ cultural strength is extremely useful with respect to irregular warfare, it must be re-focused for expeditionary warfare (Hoffman 2006, p. 405).
For instance, higher-ranking Marines confess that priorities and procedures of peacetime have failed to adequately prepare the combat unit (Marines) for expeditionary warfare (i.e. war on terror). They assert the importance of establishing and enhancing training programs for NCOs. Inducements to attract and keep exceptional Marines for senior leadership roles are also required to improve the military operations of the combat unit.
Novel training systems must also be adopted to prepare inexperienced squad leaders to make swift and sound decisions during irregular warfare. These challenges have been acknowledged by senior leaders within the U.S. Marine. It is against this backdrop that several remedial measures have been initiated to train and equip the Marines. For example, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, located in Virginia, is spearheading these initiatives (Hoffman 2006, p. 406).
The U.S. Navy
The U.S. Navy’s plans have been characterized by poor vision and a discrete reluctance to embrace novel ideas. In spite of the extensive efforts to implement the Navy’s conceptual approach (Sea Power 21), the Navy’s programmers have experienced problems with respect to describing the exact fleet design for the new concept.
However, opponents to Sea Power 21 assert that the adoption of this novel concept will play a minimal role in the war on terror. The main criticism levelled against this concept is that it lends credence on sea operations as opposed to riverine and littoral operations. The striking power possessed by the United States Navy is unmatched anywhere in the world. However, the Navy is plagued by serious under-investments in its core capabilities, such as expeditionary platforms and anti-access capabilities (Hoffman 2006, p. 407).
However, the increased number of strike-enabled combatants, enhanced missile-carrying capability of current vertical-launch system equipped fleet and enhance aviation artillery precision is a clear revelation that the U.S. Navy has already accomplished the crucial renovations required for expeditionary warfare.
In addition, the Navy’s ship-buying plans have been reframed by the chief of naval operation. However, this new plan has already attracted criticism because it lends credence to irregular warfare but ignores the deployment of expeditionary forces (Hoffman 2006, p. 407).
Special Operations
In the recent past, the Congress has come to acknowledge the significant role of special operations in expeditionary warfare. Small teams of Special Forces were able to swiftly initiate collaborations with leaders of Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and skilfully employed the U.S. military power against the Taliban. There are numerous examples that demonstrate the important role of Special Forces in expeditionary warfare (Robinson 2004).
In addition, the DoD has acknowledged the crucial role of Special Forces in the war on terrorism and granted the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) permission to combat global terrorist networks. Ever since the 9/11 attacks, the combative strengths of SOCOM have been augmented with the addition of more SEAL teams, army special forces and aviation support (Hoffman 2006, p. 408).
Given that the world is currently characterized by persistent irregular warfare, it is crucial that SOCOM is restructured into a distinct unit, Special Operations Force (SOF) for the purpose of expeditionary warfare. In addition, SOF will require more resources to accomplish its goals.
For instance, SOF is particularly valuable for carrying out surveillance in restricted areas in foreign lands and executing pre-emptive military operations in intricate terrain. However, SOF is currently unable to engage in expeditionary warfare since over 80% of its assets are currently used in Afghanistan and Iraq (Hoffman 2006, p. 409).
Conclusion
As noted earlier, Expeditionary warfare refers to the use of the military force outside the United States, short of a major regional contingency (MRC), to sway events taking place distant lands (Federoff & Melhuish 1994). It is flexible, adapted, limited in objectives and designed for specific regional operations. It may also entail deploying forces on another country’s terrain (under U.S. control) to sway or influence events.
The discussion above has demonstrated that expeditionary warfare is currently the best approach used in combat operations, such as war on terror. The U.S. has perfected the use of expeditionary warfare approach in its various combat operations, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Desert Storm (Biddle 2006).
In addition, several initiatives have been introduced, such as BCTs, FSC program and Sea Power 21 to boost the U.S military capabilities in expeditionary warfare. Given the prevalence of irregular warfare (i.e. terrorism), expeditionary warfare presents the best opportunity for U.S military to effectively identify and neutralize adaptive adversaries with minimal collateral damage on innocent lives and infrastructure.
References
Bacevich, A & Cohen, E 2001, War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, Columbia University Press, New York.
Biddle, S 2006 ‘Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq,’ International Security, pp.6.
Daalder, H & O’Hanlon, M 2000, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, Brookings, Washington, D.C.
Federoff, A & Melhuish, E 1994, Expeditionary warfare deterrence, Naval War College, United States.
Grossman, E 2006, ‘Study Finds Army Transformation Plan Weakens Combat Capability’, Inside the Pentagon, pp. 1.
Higgins, E, Higgs, R, Parkins, G, Tionquiao, V & Wells, C 2004, Expeditionary Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
Hoffman, F 2006, ‘Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs’, Irregular Warfare, pp. 395-411.
Jaffe, G 2005, ‘Army Weighs Slower Troop Growth To Keep Modernization on Track,’ Wall Street Journal, pp. 3.
Robinson, L 2004, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces, Public Affairs, New York.