Egypt’s liberal period saw the incorporation of European-style democratic ideals and citizen participation into the nation’s political scene. Meaningful, if sporadic, parliamentary rivalry between people and organizations, cross-class engagement in the process, and an operational, if defective, concept of political and personal freedoms were all hallmarks of the era (Botman, 1998). While elites dominated democratic practice, members of lower socioeconomic strata also participated in politics. Eager for self-rule from the British and social and economic liberalization, the public explored various philosophies for Egypt’s economic and political growth, including liberalism in the western fashion, kingship, Islamic fundamentalism, feminism, and secularism (Botman, 1998). Unfortunately, the dynasty’s overwhelming privileges, the unavailability of a politically powerful local capitalism, and the dearth of a mature workforce capable of defending the liberal endeavor conspired to obstruct pluralistic political institutions.
Britain awarded Egypt complete sovereignty in 1922, subject to four British-imposed scenarios: the safety of colonial connections, Egypt’s protection against attack, the safeguarding of international corporations and minorities, and ongoing British governance of Sudan. The colonial administration elevated Egypt’s constitutional monarch from the sultan to King and authorized a constitutional amendment within a year (Botman, 1998). The period of liberal politics began with Egyptians exerting growing authority over their nation. Egypt’s legislation was modeled after liberal western writings and drafted by Egyptian legal scholars allied to the pharaoh and the British.
The constitution’s writers aimed to restrain the young Wafd party, the vast mass uprising that had arisen during the 1919 nationalistic upheaval, and establish a restricted degree of self-government in the republic. They found a legislature comprised of a senate and a chamber of representatives elected by male citizens, save for the King’s appointment of two-fifths of the senatorial (Botman, 1998). Legislation passed by the parliament did not become law until the emperor signed it into law. If the monarch disapproved a reform bill and returned it for alteration, the deputies might then pass it by a two-thirds plurality; the King was then required to sign it into law (Botman, 1998). The King, the senate, and the assembly of deputies were to share regulatory power in this manner. Egypt’s challenges and issues in its liberal and contemporary eras are discussed below.
First, Egypt faced imperialism issues from its authorities in power. From the start, King Ahmad Fu’ad despised the government and was vehemently opposed to power distribution. Unfortunately for the fledgling constitutional republic, the constitution allowed the extensive king powers, including the capacity to terminate ministries, postpone assembly, and appoint or remove heads of government. King Ahmad Fu’ad and his son Faruq spent thirty years subverting the judicial process and opposing the independence cause (Botman, 1998). As a result, while Egypt demonstrated Western-style democratic ideals, the monarchy and its selected ministers routinely undermined its implementation (Botman, 1998). Although the law was intended to be a semi-liberal political text, it could not wholly retain liberalism’s participatory essence. Despite numerous significant parties, polls, congressional proceedings, and press and associational freedoms, the constitution has been routinely ignored, delayed, and even amended (Botman, 1998). In essence, democratic conduct was sometimes halted since neither the Wafd – Egypt’s dominant populist movement – nor any other lobbying group could adequately restrain the King’s authority.
In Egypt, army generals and imperialistic tendencies have progressively controlled politics. Civil agencies that were once confident of their autonomy, including the court, parliament, central inspection agency, and intelligence community, have been robbed of their independence (Dunne and Dunne, 2020). A recent statute requiring the recruitment of a military advisor to each state governor codified what had already occurred in exercise: a field commander with veto authority is positioned alongside senior civilian leaders such as ministries and mayors (Dunne and Dunne, 2020). Elections continue, but opposition figures are barred, the procedures are murky, and few citizens bother to vote except those in urgent need of food assistance.
Moreover, independent political groups, youth programs, the mainstream press, and nongovernmental institutions have been destroyed, and the few brave remnants have been constantly pursued. There has been a dramatic increase in the military’s economic engagement through deliberate modifications to legislations and regulations as if armed enterprises already profit from the compulsory workforce, tax-exempt status, and unrestricted access to enormous swaths of federal property (Dunne and Dunne, 2020). The military currently controls a sizable portion of public procurement and has relentlessly expanded into lucrative markets traditionally owned by private firms, such as concrete, metallurgy, and communications.
Privately held cement enterprises in Egypt were crumbling due to Military corporations hitting the market with cement. Over the last five years, a cursory examination of Egypt’s spending reveals it focused on massive projects and weaponry acquisitions that bolstered its reputation and benefited its commanding soldiers (Dunne and Dunne, 2020). Therefore, militarization has affected Egypt’s political structure, the sovereignty of its people, and the autonomy of independent political institutions.
Second, there has been ever-increasing societal poverty among Egyptian citizens since the liberal era. The Wafd was an alliance of rural middle-class and high-status urban organizations, including lawyers, physicians, business people, entrepreneurs, philosophers, and learners. The Wafd gathered rustic backing through its associations with landowners, educators, and community’ umdas who promoted peasant allegiance during campaigns (Botman, 1998). However, it was approved by the effendiyya, experts, civil servants, and segments of the minor elite and urban and rural laborers (Botman, 1998). The party advocated for mainstream philosophical and macroeconomic views, primarily Egypt’s elite.
As a result, while officials recognized the importance of improving the living conditions of the state’s needy population, this was always a faraway secondary goal. During the legislative period, these political groups controlled legislative activity. Their strategic executives used the organizations as forums to enhance their careers and convey their beliefs. None promoted or achieved sovereignty and independence through autonomous people engagement in the electoral arena. Dunne and Dunne (2020) enumerated that while Egyptians have descended into greater impoverishment over the last few decades, Egypt has spent finances on luxury infrastructure projects. For instance, most finances have been spent constructing the $58 billion new state headquarters in the Sahara, 30 miles east of Cairo (Dunne and Dunne, 2020). Not only did Egypt not require a new metropolis, but the location renders it unreachable to the majority of inhabitants and exceedingly troublesome in terms of water use.
Third, during the reign of Wafd, fascism and societal exclusion were widely witnessed among the Egyptian population. The Muslim Brotherhood, Young Egypt, and communist organizations could develop and grow in Egypt attest to pluralism’s uniqueness. Founded in 1933, Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatat) was a nationalistic, paramilitary, and socially conservative group (El Shakry, 2021). Following its Islamic perspective, Young Egypt emphasized theology and decency as governing precepts and was aggressively and intellectually antagonistic to the Wafd’s embrace of European-style governance (El Shakry, 2021). In the 1930 and 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood was the most potent Islamic organization (Gershoni, 2020). Along with its educational activities, the Brotherhood developed urban initiatives that created jobs for the underprivileged and established residential and manufacturing firms that aided the needy while also strengthening the movement economically.
Its numbers expanded in the 1930s as it became more pan-Islamic and conspicuous. Although the Brotherhood’s leading lights were incredibly responsive to missionary activities, the general economic misery of the 19×9 downturn aided the group’s growth in popularity (Gershoni, 2020). The Wafd and the implementation of conservatism in the European form weakened in Egypt, rival movements emerged. Fascism attracted followers, a left-wing advanced civilization developed, and growing alienation manifested in religious fanaticism (Gershoni, 2020). Nonetheless, Wafd repeatedly thwarted democracy; widespread activism remained tenacious in the face of institutional and social impediments.
Fourth, women constitute half of humanity in Egypt, but, as is the case in many emerging economies, they confront a range of obstacles to education, medicine, and involvement, which impairs their awareness of social issues and hinders their powers and abilities. Women in Egypt have pushed for participation in and contribution to political and public life across antiquity (Botman, 1998). Even though feminist individuals fought alongside men during the fierce nationalistic fight of 1919, women were denied official constitutional voice following independence and the promulgation of the constitution (Botman, 1998). They could not vote, run for office, or influence government legislation.
Women were not permitted to attend the inauguration of the national assembly unless they were governments’ or other high-ranking authorities’ spouses. Men entrusted themselves the unique ability to establish and impose standards governing the public sphere and the personal realm of the household in this fledgling democratic society. Huda Sha’rawi and other upper-class and well-connected women founded the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU) in 1923 to criticize and minimize male supremacy (al-Sayyid-Marsot, 2020). The high percentage of female illiteracy (37.5 percent) and poverty are two primary barriers preventing most women from acquiring and controlling assets (al-Sayyid-Marsot, 2020). Egypt has not yet achieved the third Millennium Development Goal, which calls for the advancement of gender fairness and women’s enhancement (al-Sayyid-Marsot, 2020). As a result, this is especially critical in areas like women’s education, paid work, and political engagement.
Lastly, Egypt faces the challenge of anti-democratic behavior that often leads to civil wars and public execution of citizens living in Egypt. From the end of World War I through the entrance of the independent officials to authority in 1952, the battle for political supremacy was frequently contested in an anti-democratic manner (Botman, 1998). In Egyptian politics, a familiar pattern surfaced: whenever a fair election was conducted, the Wafd had assured a landslide victory (Botman, 1998). However, a clash with the British or the King inevitably resulted in the Wafd’s withdrawal or disqualification, the dissolving of the senate, and the cessation or adjustment of the founding document.
The Wafd would continue to resist until a clash between the monarchy and a minority group or a British ruling brought the Wafd back to power. Anti-democratic and obtrusive behavior recurred in May 1926, when the new British special envoy, Lord (George) Lloyd, forbade Zaghlul to assume control following another Wafd electoral success (Botman, 1998). Lloyd, a stalwart supporter of neocolonial ambitions in Egypt, disclosed that he had requested the British government send a warship outside Alexandria to reassure Zaghlul of Britain’s determination (Botman, 1998). In June, Zaghlul decided to form a majority government with the Liberal Monarchists, led by Prime Minister cAdli Yakan. Zaghlul was the house of deputies’ President.
Additionally, as predicted, the Montreux Agreement of 1937 brought an end to the practice of debacles. Immigrants and minority groups became the Egyptian state’s duty, and hybrid institutions were dismantled during a 13-year timeframe. Egypt built diplomatic missions throughout the world after being authorized to apply to the League of Nations (Meijer, 2018). Thus, for the first time since the British seized the kingdom in 1882, Egyptians had the freedom to define their international affairs and national interests (Meijer, 2018). Whereas the Anglo-Egyptian treaty was widely supported, its military elements drew resistance. Disappointment came from political extremes. For the left, the agreement was insufficient because British forces would remain in Egypt for a further twenty years, and there were no guarantees of unhindered independence or identity (Meijer, 2018). The treaty, according to the right, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood and Young Egypt, was insufficient; any accommodation with the invading government was considered inappropriate.
In 1923, the Egyptian ruling elite established a political culture modeled after European colonization to expect the Western world’s advancement to be replicated in Egypt. The architects of this new age presented jurisprudence, personal civil liberties for men, and freedom. However, they did not effectively adapt the institution to the sociopolitical circumstances of Egypt. Civil entities formerly self-assured, such as the judiciary, legislature, national auditing agency, and intelligence agencies, have had their authority snatched away. Furthermore, Egypt’s system of government has been subverted by European power that tampered in the region’s internal affairs regularly, by legislative figureheads who purposefully impeded the functional democracy, and by a system that denies women the liberalism-enshrined rights and protections. Eager for independence from the British and cultural and financial openness, the Egyptian population examined various economic and political growth ideas, including progressive civilization, Islamic fundamentalism, feminism, and secularism.
Egypt’s ruling rulers confronted concerns of colonialism. King Ahmad Fu’ad loathed the authorities from the onset and opposed power-sharing. Regrettably, for the embryonic federal democracy, the constitution granted the King broad powers, including the authority to dissolve public institutions, suspend assembly, and nominate or replace cabinet ministers. Additionally, women were denied a legitimate democratic voice following self-rule and the adoption of the founding document, even though feminist persons fought alongside males during the bloody patriotic struggle of 1919. They were not eligible to vote, seek office, or control government policies. In this modern embryonic democracy, men credited themselves with the unique authority to set and implement standards controlling the public domain and the private sphere of the family. Finally, Egypt was confronted by anti-democratic conduct, which frequently resulted in military conflicts and public executions of Egyptian civilians. Between the end of World War I and the accession of autonomous politicians to power in 1952, the struggle for political supremacy was regularly fought in an anti-democratic manner. A typical pattern emerged in Egyptian politics where whenever a democratic election took place; the Wafd ensured a resounding win.
References List
al-Sayyid-Marsot, A.L. (2020). Egypt’s liberal experiment: 1922–1936. University of California Press.
Botman, S. (1998). ‘The liberal age, 1923–1952.’ The Cambridge History of Egypt, 2, pp.285-308.
Dunne, M. and Dunne, M. (2020). Egypt: Trends in politics, economics, and human rights. Web.
El Shakry, O. (2021). ‘Rethinking Arab intellectual history: Epistemology, historicism, secularism.’ Modern Intellectual History, 18(2), pp.547-572.
Gershoni, I. and Jankowski, J. (2020). Confronting fascism in Egypt. Stanford University Press.
Meijer, R. (2018). The quest for modernity: Secular liberal and left-wing political thought in Egypt, 1945–1958. Routledge.