Erdogan’s Attitude Towards Israel and Economic Relations Essay

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Political relations are tightly connected to economic interaction between states. Erdogan’s actions and decisions have a significant effect on the countries’ political attitudes toward each other. The question is whether and to what extent Erdogan’s attitude, along with the policy of AKP, influenced the trade between Turkey and Israel. To address this issue, the paper will address several historical intervals and analyze the conditions of economic relations and their outcome. The analysis will show that economic processes can be relatively independent of the political situation.

The years right after the establishment of Israel and up to AKP winning the elections were probably the most pleasant regarding both political and economic relations between Turkey and Israel. Notably, the countries had an extensive agreement on military technology trade (Çakmak & Ustaoğlu, 2017; Kanat, & Hannon, 2017). Although there was a period of relative stagnation in 1980, from 1986, economic negotiations resumed (Çakmak & Ustaoğlu, 2017). Consequently, commercial relations caused raised in the amount of bilateral trade, which increased from $54 million in 1987 to $440 million in 1995 (Çakmak & Ustaoğlu, 2017). Thus, Turkish-Israeli economic relations observed a significant improvement before the AKP government.

The years 2002-2003 seem to be the beginning of explicit tension between the countries. These are the years when AKP came to the government. There were worries that anti-Semitic spirits would rise because of the Muslim philosophy leading political decisions (Aviv, 2019). Moreover, there was the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, about which Turkey and Israel expressed opposite opinions (Çakmak & Ustaoğlu, 2017). Nevertheless, these conflicts did not seem to spoil the trade. According to Rivlin (2019), “[b]etween 2000 and 2005 two-way trade in goods more than doubled” (p. 179). Therefore, the changing of Turkish policy, along with the military disputes, did not lead to a decrement of trade with Israel.

The most dramatic and demanding period of Turkish-Israeli relations has been provoked by the events in 2010. The Mari Marmara catastrophe resulted in the strongest discord between the countries. Erdogan reacted, implying anti-Semitic views and depicting Israeli media as manipulators (Aviv, 2017). Nevertheless, anti-Semitic spirits rose significantly, causing severe social conflicts. The number of visitors from Israel to Turkey fell from 455,000 in 2008 to 82,000 in 2012, with the remaining visitor being mostly Israeli Arabs (Rivlin, 2019). However, some aspects of the economic agreements seemed to remain the growth. For example, as stated in Çakmak and Ustaoğlu (2017), “the number of exports from Turkey to Israel increased by 18% in 2011, when imports increased by 51%” (p. 310). In other words, the notorious event in 2010 affected only some domains of economic relations.

To conclude, the process of economic relations between the countries did not seem to be entirely dependent on government policy. Although the most significant events, such as the Mari Marmara incident, did affect some aspects of economic relations, and Erdogan has changed his attitude to Israel from supportive to opposing, the overall trade remains increasing. Nevertheless, the period before AKP is still considered the peak of Turkish-Israeli relations (Çakmak & Ustaoğlu, 2017). Therefore, Erdogan’s policy and attitude towards Israel have influenced some aspects of economic relations, such as tourism, for the most part, to manage to function relatively independently.

References

Aviv, E. (2019). The Turkish government’s attitude to Israel and Zionism as reflected in Israel’s military operations 2000–2010. Israel Affairs, 25(2), 281–306. Web.

Çakmak, C., & Ustaoğlu, M. (2017). Politics vs. trade: a Realist view on Turkish‒Israeli economic relations. Israel Affairs, 23(2), 303–323. Web.

Kanat, K. B., & Hannon, J. (2017). Turkey-Israel relations in the new era: opportunities and challenges. Mediterranean Quarterly, 28(4), 64–86. Web.

Rivlin, P. (2019). Economic relations between Israel and Turkey. In A. Sever & O. Almog (Eds.), Contemporary Israeli–Turkish relations in comparative perspective (pp. 177–193). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

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IvyPanda. 2022. "Erdogan's Attitude Towards Israel and Economic Relations." February 14, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/erdogans-attitude-towards-israel-and-economic-relations/.

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IvyPanda. "Erdogan's Attitude Towards Israel and Economic Relations." February 14, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/erdogans-attitude-towards-israel-and-economic-relations/.

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