One of the main discursive aspects of today’s living in the fact that there is still an ongoing dispute between those that support the idea that terminally ill patients should be provided with an opportunity to end their futile (and physically painful) existence, on the one hand, and those who oppose this idea as being unethical, on the other. Martin Gunderson’s 2004 article Being a Burden: Reflections on Refusing Medical Care represents a classic example of what kind of argumentation the opponents of voluntary euthanasia resort to while defending the validity of their point of view on the subject matter. In this paper, I will aim to outline the main argumentative points contained in the earlier mentioned article, while exposing what I consider accounts for the Gunderson article’s conceptual erroneousness.
As it was implied in the Introduction, in his article, Gunderson argues in favor of the idea that it is utterly inappropriate to even consider the legalization of voluntary euthanasia, due to a number of moral considerations. The author’s main objection to this idea is his assumption that the concept of euthanasia is inconsistent with the idea of love, which he believes is continuing to account for the Western medicinal paradigm’s theoretical foundation.
According to Gunderson, “Love gives a reason to accept care. Altruistic suicide (euthanasia) rejects not only the offer of needed health care but all other forms of care as well. It is the end of the possibility of being cared for” (39). While advancing this particular idea, the author had made a deliberate point in referring to the works of Aristotle, who used to treat the notion of love as a metaphysical construct, which is not being affected by people’s continually transformed perceptions of the surrounding reality. There are, however, a number of apparent shortcomings to the argumentative approach adopted by Gunderson.
First, even though that Aristotle continues to be considered one of the great Western philosophers, his views, in regards to the issue at stake, cannot be considered as such that represent an undisputed truth-value. The reason for this is simple – Aristotle used to write well before the concept of healthcare (in the contemporary sense of this word) came into being. Second, Aristotle’s conceptualization of love is essentially euro-centric, which suggests that it can no longer be considered emotionally appealing to contemporary Westerns, who have long ago ceased believing that Europe represents the actual ‘center of the universe.’
This alone prevents us from subscribing to the point of view promoted by the author. The fact that, along with trying to substantiate his line of argumentation, in relation to the works of Aristotle, Gunderson had also made a few references to the works of such authors as Mayeroff, Drebushenko, and Hill, did not add much validity to the promoted point of view. This is because, while advocating the notion that one’s life represents the greatest value of all, these authors appear to have failed to take into consideration the revolutionary breakthroughs in the field of medical science, which had taken place during the course of recent decades.
Nevertheless, the fact that the line of argumentation deployed by Gunderson cannot be considered discursively ‘updated’ is not only the reason why I think his article is not convincing. This is because a closer analysis of the article’s claims reveals their assumptions in nature. For example, according to the author, “Having a right to refuse treatment does not, however, tell us whether one has good reason to refuse treatment” (p. 40).
Apparently, Gunderson believes that the appropriateness of life-or-death decisions in the healthcare/palliative care settings should be assessed by certified professionals. However, the fact that these professionals have been certified does not eliminate the possibility for them to remain strongly opinionated, especially when such highly controversial issues, as the legalization of euthanasia, are at stake.
There is even more – Gunderson’s assumption, in this respect, appears thoroughly unobservant of what accounts for the contemporary developments in the field of bioethics. These developments are concerned with the fact that, as time goes on, more and more healthcare professionals grow increasingly comfortable with the idea that it is specifically patients who should be able to have a final word on what kind of therapy is being the most applicable in their case.
This should also be the case even in situations when terminally ill patients ask for the discontinuation of medicinal interventions, whatsoever. As Valerius (2006) noted, “Since it is commonly accepted that medicine should be looking at things from the point of view of the patients’ interests, it is plausible that the view that a patient’s autonomy should be respected even if the courses of action she is considering taking were harmful” (124).
This points out to another drawback of how Gunderson went about arguing that patients should not be allowed to ask for euthanasia to be performed on them – while promoting such his point of view, the author remained intellectually dishonest with himself and with the article’s potential readers. The validity of this statement can be illustrated in regards to Gunderson’s suggestion that “To promise to help another even to the extent of completely sacrificing one’s mental health or one’s ability to function independently amounts to promising to help even though it severely undermines the caring relationship itself” (42).
Apparently, while speaking on behalf of ‘love,’ Gunderson stayed ignorant as to the fact that terminally ill patients are the least concerned about the establishment of a ‘caring relationship’ between themselves and physicians. All they want is to stop experiencing an acute physical pain – pure and simple. Yet, these patients’ continuous exposure to essentially futile medicinal therapies makes this pain even more unbearable. Obviously enough, it did not occur to Gunderson that, in order for his article to be considered discursively sound, he would have to assess the appropriateness of the euthanasia’s legitimization from the perspective of terminally ill patients.
In all probability, it was specifically Gunderson’s own emotional unease with the idea of euthanasia, which prompted him to adopt a strongly negative stance towards the practice in question. As Fenigsen (2008) rightly pointed out, “The doctors who resist euthanasia are in many instances, people who entered medicine to conquer their own fear of disease and death” (157). This, of course, undermines the validity of Gunderson’s line of argumentation even further.
Thus, in will only be logical to suggest that Gunderson’s article is far from being considered convincing. Quite on the contrary – it exposes the defenders of ‘traditional values’, in the field of a healthcare, being intellectually arrogant individuals, who believe that the continual observation of outdated healthcare-related moral dogmas is so much more important than ensuring the patients’ actual well-being. The discussed article would have proven much more discursively valuable if, instead of defying the euthanasia’s assumed moral ‘wickedness’, its author came up with rational arguments, as to why he thinks this practice cannot be considered appropriate.
For example, he could have well mentioned the fact that the legalization of euthanasia may create objective preconditions for physicians to be in a position to abuse their executive powers, in regards to what patients they consider life-worthy and vice versa. In addition, Gunderson could have pointed out to the fact that the continuous progress in the field of a healthcare is being potentially capable of drastically reducing the number of diseases that are currently believed to be incurable. Nevertheless, the rationale-based arguments are nowhere to be found in Gunderson’s article. Therefore, I have no other option but to reinstate once again that Gunderson’s article cannot be considered argumentatively sound.
What has been said earlier can be summarized as follows: a) In his article, Gunderson had failed at convincing readers to adopt his point of view on the discussed subject matter. The foremost reason why I think it is being the case, is that the author presented himself as an intellectually inflexible individual, incapable of opening his mind to new ideas; b) Gunderson’s article appears incompatible with currently prevailing ideological trends in the field of bioethics; c) The line of argumentation, deployed by Gunderson throughout the course of his article’s entirety, cannot be referred to as anything but strongly opinionated. Thus, it will only be appropriate to suggest that Gunderson’s article indeed represents very little value. I believe that this conclusion fully correlates with the paper’s initial thesis.
Works Cited
Fenigsen, Richard. “Other People’s Lives: Reflections on Medicine, Ethics, and Euthanasia.” Issues in Law & Medicine 24.2 (2008): 149-168. Print.
Gunderson, Martin. “Being a Burden: Reflections on Refusing Medical Care.” The Hastings Centre Report 34.5 (2004): 37-43. Print.
Varelius, Jukka. “Voluntary Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and the Goals of Medicine.” Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 31.2 (2006): 121-137. Print.