Executive Summary
After Action Assessment of the explosion at Bulk Processing Plant showed that no safety measures were in place to prevent the explosion. The company had failed to report and comply with regulations. At the same time, no government agencies responsible for hazardous chemical safety and regulations had ensured compliance at the plant. Hence, this explosion was large preventable and therefore could have never been witnessed.
It is therefore imperative for all government agencies to formulate new regulations and effectively implement them to ensure high standards of safety and security at fertilizer plants and other industries. Voluntary compliance will not work in any industry.
Introduction
This is an assessment report of the fire, which involved the seed and fertilizer building known as the Bulk Processing Plant. This After Action Assessment explored whether all safety precautions were taken to avert the explosion.
A brief account of the explosion
The plant explosion occurred on April 17, 2013 at the West Fertilizer Company in West, Texas. It killed 15 people, injured more than 200 and destroyed 350 nearby homes (StateImpact, n.d). Investigation reports from the Texas Department of Insurance and State Fire Marshall’s Office showed that ammonium nitrate was responsible for the explosion. They also revealed that the “fire first started in fertilizer and seed section and the cause of the fire was yet to be established” (StateImpact, n.d). Many people killed during the explosion were mainly volunteer firefighters and first responders (Henry, 2014).
In May 2013, the investigators announced that they were unable to “determine exactly what started the fire that was responsible for the explosion of ammonium nitrate at the store” (StateImpact, n.d). Consequently, they provided possible causes of the explosion such as “faulty electrical system, golf cart or an act of arsonists” (StateImpact, n.d).
The report ruled out “natural cases, weather, anhydrous ammonia, railcar with ammonium nitrate or fire within the bin containing ammonium nitrate” (StateImpact, n.d) as possible causes of the fire. Moreover, investigators clarified that water used in firefighting was not responsible for the fire or the explosion.
The plant has operated since 1962 and regulated under OSHA, EPA and TCEQ. Available information shows that the company had 270 tons of ammonium nitrate in the year 2012.
Safety Assessment
One year after the tragic explosion at the West Fertilizer Company, investigators released their report showing that the explosion was preventable and it should never have occurred. Hence, no safety measurements were in place to prevent a potential explosion (State Fire Marshal’s Office, n.d).
It was established that the plant had been storing 1,350 times the quantity of ammonium nitrate that could have attracted the attention of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) based on security reasons. Yet a source privy to the DHS activities claimed that the company did not report to the department about the potentially dangerous ammonium nitrate as required under the law (Schneyer, McNeill, & Roberts, 2013). Hence, the agency responsible for regulating such dangerous chemicals, which may also be used for making bombs, was not aware of such risks.
The plant had stored dangerous chemicals well beyond the recommended levels regulated under the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act (CFATS). Nevertheless, the DHS did not know about the existence of the factory until after the explosion. Therefore, the explosion resulted from the failure of the plant owners to take the required safety measures to avert potential fires and the subsequent explosion (Schneyer et al.,2013). In addition, all levels of the government, federal, state and local regulatory authorities, failed to identify a dangerous situation and correct it.
The report also noted that the company had stored its ammonium nitrate supplied to farmers as fertilizer in wooden bins within a wooden building without any sprinkler system (Seba, 2014).
The State of Texas generally does not have a statewide fire code. State laws have barred several rural counties from using fire codes. The lack of fire code in the county could have contributed to the explosion. Local fire departments require fire codes to ensure that plants handles hazardous chemicals in the right way and have maximum protection and safe storage facilities.
There is a need for more regulation and information on ammonium nitrate handling. First responders require necessary skills and effective coordination of activities at the scene. Best practices for fighting explosions caused by ammonium nitrate show that firefighters should stay away from “fires or flood the chemicals with water from a safer distance” (Henry, 2014). At the plant, however, this was not case. Many people who perished at the scene were first responders and lacked such knowledge.
Locally, the emergency planning committee lacked “an emergency response plan for ammonium nitrate” (Henry, 2014). This is a provision required under the Federal Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act. The lack of plan showed that the committee was not informed of any dangerous chemicals at the plant.
Generally, the DHS can fine or shut the plant altogether because of failure to report a large quantity ammonium nitrate. It is imperative to note that the DHS has the power to conduct spot visits and inspection at any facilities. However, the agency has a small budget for a small number of field officers (Schneyer et al., 2013). Companies are responsible for reporting the amount of ammonium nitrate and other hazardous chemicals they store to the DHS. The agency then assists with safety and security issues based on their assessment results.
The DHS did not receive any report from the plant and therefore it was “not regulated or monitored under the CFAT provision” (Seba, 2014). These are standards, which guide the use of dangerous chemicals and prevent criminals from accessing them.
The company also had other reporting, permitting and safety issues to observe. These are requirements spread across over states and federal agencies. Many critics have noted that they lead to patchworks of requirements that are hard to observe and ensure complete oversight.
Although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) are responsible for hazardous chemical safety in plants, they do not regulate storage of ammonium nitrate. This role is the responsibility of DHS and other local authorities responsible for emergency planning and responses.
Previously, the company had filed EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP). The company had reported anhydrous ammonia in its store, but noted that there were “no possibilities of fire or explosion, even in a worst-case scenario” (Seba, 2014) and it did not have blast walls for protection. The report indicated that the plant was used to store ammonia nitrate in the year 2012. This was contrary to the real situation as confirmed after the explosion.
The reported volume of ammonia on site was 270 tons (Henry, 2014). This is significantly large volume of ammonia nitrate, which most experts concurred that required external assistance to handle and store safely. Moreover, such a large quantity of ammonium nitrate in the facility was a cause for concern.
The explosion at the plant confirmed that regulations put in place for ammonium nitrate and other hazardous chemicals across several states were clearly inadequate. These facilities serve local, rural areas and farms, which lack clear and strict land zoning mechanisms. Hence, most of these facilities are located near residential homes.
Conclusion
The assessment of safety and security concerns at the Fertilizer Plant Explosion indicates that no single safety measure was observed with regard to handling and storage of ammonia nitrate and other dangerous chemicals at the plant. The company failed to provide safety measures and report the presence of ammonium nitrate in its stores. At the same time, all federal, state and local authorities failed to inspect plants as required under the law. The explosion was a clear case of negligence, which could have been avoided.
Ammonium nitrate is regarded as safe and secure when stored well. Nevertheless, it can cause an explosion when it reacts with other chemicals or when subjected to high temperatures.
Recommendations
The federal, state and local authorities and plant owners should take certain safety controls to prevent another possible disaster witnessed at West Fertilizer Plant.
- There is a need for new regulations and effective implementation
- All agencies need to been active in enforcement of safety and security regulations
- All fertilizer plants must report the presence of ammonium nitrate in their stores and securely store hazardous chemicals
- Constant education and training for first responders are required to protect lives against potential huge explosions of hazardous chemicals
- Voluntary compliance will not work in the industry
Lessons learned show that effective regulatory systems are required to ensure that all plants operate within high standards of safety established by laws.
References
Henry, T. (2014). Investigation: Disaster at West Fertilizer Plant Was ‘Preventable’. Web.
Schneyer, J., McNeill, R., & Roberts, J. (2013). Texas fertilizer company didn’t heed disclosure rules before blast. Web.
Seba, E. (2014). West, Texas Fertilizer Warehouse Explosion Was Preventable, Investigators Find. Web.
State Fire Marshal’s Office. (n.d). Firefighter Fatality Investigation. Web.
StateImpact. (n.d). What We Know About the West Fertilizer Explosion. Web.