Case Summary
The University of Michigan Law School is one of the most prestigious and exclusive universities in the United States. Intending to promote student body diversity per the Supreme Court’s 1978 ruling on Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, the school introduced a new official admissions policy in 1992. This policy required officials to base their admissions decisions on a holistic assessment of a student’s suitability for the institution, as determined by academic grades, test scores, and “soft variables.” Those variables included the quality of “an essay describing how the applicant will contribute to Law School life and diversity” (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, p. 306) and personal statements and letters of recommendation. The school did not understand diversity in purely ethnic or racial terms and did not specify how much weight was granted to prospective individual diversity contributions. Nevertheless, it explicitly asserted that higher inclusion of ethnic minorities was part of the policy’s goal.
In 1997, Barbara Grutter sued the law school and university officials (including university president Lee Bollinger) for racial discrimination. Barbara, who is white, alleged that the school rejected her application on the grounds of her race, violating the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. She contended that the institution used race as a predominant factor that gave minority applicants a significant advantage over members of the majority without any compelling reason to do so. Grutter asked for compensatory and punitive damages, an injunction against the policy, and an order for the school to offer her admission. The respondents insisted that the practice was intended to deliver educational benefits to students by exposing them to diversity and encouraging interracial understanding, thus justifying the school’s use of race as a factor. The question put before the courts was whether or not the law school’s consideration of race in its admissions decisions constituted illegal discrimination.
Court Findings
The case was considered by the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in 2000-2001. Ultimately, it decided that racial diversity among students did not pose a compelling interest that justified discrimination, and that the school’s policy was not narrowly framed. Thus, the District Court found the law school’s use of race to be unlawful and issued an injunction against this aspect of its policy. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the ruling in a 5-4 decision in 2002. The majority cited Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke that classroom diversity was a compelling state interest. Furthermore, it asserted that the race factor only offered a minor potential advantage in the admissions process, in line with the Harvard program previously approved by Justice Powell. Three of the dissenting judges did not see the law school’s interest in diversity as compelling on its merits, while the fourth dissenter did not view its policy as narrowly tailored.
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for the case on April 1, 2003, and handed down its decision on June 23, 2003. The result of its deliberations was another 5-4 split in favor of upholding the school’s admissions policy. Justice O’Connor presented the majority ruling, holding that student body diversity was a compelling interest based on the testimonies of the school and its numerous amici in the case. Exposure to meaningful diversity helped prepare students for competing in an increasingly diverse business world and reduced the psychological pressure on minority students, who might otherwise feel isolated. Moreover, the admissions policy was precisely tailored to bring about educational benefits for the students, with race exercising a minimal influence alongside other factors. While Justice O’Connor suggested that the affirmative policy would no longer be necessary (and therefore justified) after 25 years due to racial progress, others in the majority believed it might take longer. Chief Justice Rehnquist led the dissent, alleging that the policy’s necessity to achieve the stated interest was not proven and that the school’s admissions outcomes suggested the operation of a disguised quota system.
Personal Reaction
Affirmative action remains a contentious issue in our society because of its contradictory nature. While it is aimed at ensuring a higher standard of racial equality, it also presents a form of state-sanctioned racial discrimination in a country where such practices are generally forbidden. As Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) shows, even its most consistent supporters among the Supreme Court justices wish to “sunset affirmative action” (p. 346) once its purpose has been served. In the meantime, the potential negative impact of such a policy is kept in check by the principle of narrow tailoring, which seeks to limit its effects on other rights. The respondents and their supporters raised additional legitimate arguments for the substantial benefits of diversity in learning. Thus, in addition to partly redressing racial injustice, affirmative action can help educational institutions fulfill their functions.
I believe that affirmative action remains necessary because it encourages social integration – one of the primary purposes of the educational system. It is also essential for achieving the proven educational benefits of classroom diversity. Nevertheless, such practices indeed skirt the boundaries of the constitution. While I regard the majority ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger as valid based on a good-faith reading of the school’s policy, it only serves to confirm the importance of scrutiny towards admissions policies. Educational institutions must not be allowed to abuse the special rights they have been granted to carry out their functions. Otherwise, they may end up doing more harm than good, undermining the laudable objectives of that policy.
References
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).