Piracy emerged at the same time as seafaring and trade. Maritime robbery existed near significant trade routes in both Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The aim was not just to profit at someone else’s expense but also to get rid of trade rivals. Piracy was an effective tool of foreign policy and generally an integral part of the medieval economic system (Arvanitakis & Fredriksson, 2017). Somali pirates are groups of maritime robbers operating in the Horn of Africa. It is perhaps the most famous part of Somalia’s modern history, dating back to the Cold War. For the most part, pirates operate in groups, making it easier to conduct organized attacks on ships. From 2005 to 2012, pirates seized dozens of ships and made millions of dollars in ransom payments while the UN and NATO tried in vain to stop the threat (Clarke, 2019).
The organizations were hampered by costs and bureaucratic formalities that, according to some reports, were not met by a squad of professional mercenaries. This analysis will provide a discussion of the very peak of pirate activity in 2008 and its current occurrences.
In early 2008, there was little or no coverage of Somali pirates in the media. One of the earliest mentions was the hijacking of the French cruise ship Le Ponant in April, which was freed with the help of French naval forces and special forces (Lindley, 2016). The event was perceived as something exceptional and had great resonance. Reports of hijackings later increased, and the UN even passed a resolution allowing foreign ships to pursue pirates in Somali territorial waters. However, the resolution was not enough. It created the illusion of action, while there appeared to be nothing to deter the pirates in practice. It appears that the international community has wavered too long and has underestimated the scale and dynamics of piracy off the coast of Somalia (Lindley, 2020). While there were 29 pirate attacks in mid-summer 2008, by the beginning of November, the number had risen to 81.
On November 12, pirates seized a Turkish tanker carrying 4.5 tons of chemicals off the coast of Yemen. The attack was repelled, and two of the pirates were killed. On November 11, the chemical tanker Stolt Strength, with 21 Filipinos on board, was hijacked (McCabe, 2017). An attempt was made to seize an Indian vessel. Attacks and hijackings were no less frequent in October. On October 30, a Turkish ship carrying iron ore was hijacked. On the 29th, pirates attempted to board a Panamanian oil tanker. However, they were deterred by a Spanish naval patrol plane that happened to be on the scene. Pirates attacked at least seven vessels on 29-30 October, and only six were repelled. On October 20, an Indian vessel and 20 crew members were seized (McCabe, 2017). On October 10, a Greek tanker was seized. According to available information, about 200 seamen from the hijacked ships were held hostage by the pirates.
It is worth remembering that the Gulf of Aden is one of the most crucial trade maritime routes linking Europe and Asia. Each year 16,000 ships pass through it (Oliveira, 2018). The Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal account for one-third of the world’s oil shipments. The pirates have not yet been able to seize any large oil tankers. However, they have shelled them several times, including with rocket-propelled grenades. Some experts fear that the pirates could one day seriously damage a tanker and spill oil, causing another environmental disaster. Nevertheless, if the threat of pollution is still hypothetical, piracy’s damage to commerce is straightforward. The fact is that piracy in this country has become an industry in which many people are involved. Ships are hijacked by small boarding teams of up to ten people.
However, after that, reinforcements of up to 50 people immediately arrive onboard the victim. The ship is then docked, most often at the port of Eyl on the east coast of Somalia, which has already become the capital of the new pirate republic. More men guard the docked ships, both onboard and ashore. The port inhabitants serve all this pirate free will, which has developed its own infrastructure, involving hundreds and thousands more people. Due to large ransoms, the economy based on the maritime robbery is booming. Expensive cars and posh mansions are not uncommon in the town of Eyl, with almost half of Somalia’s population dependent on humanitarian aid from outside.
Initially, attacks by Somali pirates were linked to famine—lawlessness during the Cold War. Without a centralized government, the country descended into chaos, with leaders of various factions seizing power in areas and declaring themselves unified rulers and their citizens losing all political power. Many fled to neighboring states, but a large part of the population had nowhere to go. Somalia is located near the Arabian Sea in northeast Africa. Most of the local money came from selling tuna, shrimp, and lobster to local shops. With the outbreak of war, the government had no money to set up a border service, which poachers took advantage of. They caught fish and seafood en masse and supplied it to the Italian mafia, earning up to $300 million a year.
At the same time, foreign ships poured chemicals into coastal waters, and overnight, the fish population declined. This has damaged not only the poachers but also the fishermen, who have lost their regular livelihoods. They needed a new source of income, and attention was drawn to the ships passing through Somalia. Some 9,000 ships from Asia, India, Europe, and the UAE transported expensive goods and oil every month (Oliveira, 2018). Often the ships were run by ordinary seafarers, and there were no guards on board. Thus, attacks on wealthy European ships became a means of survival for Somali pirates. Their goals have not changed much since then, and they continue to attack ships to enrich themselves through ransom payments or looting. The Somali authorities and the authorities of other states have become involved in the fight against piracy.
The Somali coastline is 3,000 kilometers long: patrolling such territory is too costly even for developed economies. Therefore, even when Western countries declared war on Somali pirates in 2008, it did little to stop them (Shay, 2017). A single attack could not destroy Somalia’s sprawling pirate empire. In theory, UN members could have supplied ships with weapons for protection, but legally this was forbidden. The only thing left to do was to protect humanitarian ships with military convoys and helicopters. Over the years, pirates had attacked humanitarian ships but almost immediately departed when marines in motorboats and helicopters with snipers appeared (Winn & Lewis, 2017). Vast sums of money were spent on military support, yet the guilty pirates were rarely brought to justice.
Legally, no country in the world has the right to arrest them in open waters if they are unarmed and non-aggressive. Moreover, the pirates were well aware of this loophole. In 2012, 80% of merchant ships were passing Somalia with armed guards on board (Shortland, 2018, 127). It is illegal to enter ports with weapons, so private military companies maintain floating bases in the region, where ships take fighters on board and say goodbye to them after visiting dangerous areas. This has proved effective, and the number of attacks has gradually declined. This was mainly because it was not profitable for the pirates to attack ships that were better equipped. Such attacks could definitely do much more harm than good.
As of now, there have been no incidents of pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea area, where famous Somali pirates have been operating a few years ago since 2019 (Forbes, 2018). Experts believe that the danger of pirate attacks in the region has been reduced by armed guards on ships and a series of special operations by British mercenaries in Somalia. To summarize, the phenomenon of Somali piracy has changed the international community’s perception of safety on the water. It has also made it clear that arming ships is essential to ensure the safety of both cargo and crew. The fight against piracy has forced countries to join forces against a common threat and finally eliminate it. This fight has shown that countries know how to co-operate and root out socially dangerous criminal groups.
References
Arvanitakis, J., & Fredriksson, M. (Eds.). (2017). Property, place, and piracy. Routledge. Web.
Clarke, W. S. (2019). Learning from Somalia: The lessons of armed humanitarian intervention. Routledge. Web.
Forbes G. (2018) Replicating success? A military response to maritime piracy, the Somalia experience. In: Reitano T., Jesperson S., Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, L. (Eds.)., Militarised Responses to Transnational Organised Crime, (pp. 127-154). Palgrave Macmillan. Web.
Lindley, J. (2016). Somali piracy: A criminological perspective. Routledge. Web.
Lindley, J. (2020). Responding to Somali piracy by providing sustainable alternatives: Addressing the motivation to offend. Crime Law Soc Change 73(1), 531–549. Web.
McCabe, R. C. (2017). Modern maritime piracy: Genesis, evolution, and responses. Routledge. Web.
Oliveira, G. (2018). The causal power of securitization: An inquiry into the explanatory status of securitization theory illustrated by the case of Somali piracy. Review of International Studies, 44(3), 504-525. Web.
Shay, S. (2017). Somaliain transition since 2006. Routledge. Web.
Shortland, A. (2018). Dangers of success: The economics of Somali piracy. In: Reitano, T., Jesperson, S., Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, L. (Eds)., Militarised responses to transnational organized crime. Palgrave Macmillan (pp. 135-162). Web.
Winn, N., & Lewis, A. (2017). European Union anti-piracy initiatives in the Horn of Africa: Linking land-based counter-piracy with maritime security and regional development. Third World Quarterly, 38(9), 2113-2128. Web.