Introduction
New forms of governance are constantly emerging. In the UK, the notion of public participation has gained favour, owing to its ability to affect democracy and flexibility in the delivery of public services (Cunningham, 2008, p.1036). It represents a third alternative of public sector service provision because it differs from market systems or state-controlled initiatives.
Public participation allows service users to shape public polices during the design or implementation of the policies. Public participation facilitates access to knowledge because locals hold such detailed knowledge about their own needs and interests (Srinivas, 2009, p.623). It promotes social cohesion by allowing citizens to participate in policy debates and formation, which enhances democracy.
Moreover, this model of governance practice allows countries to prioritise the needs of the public without an overemphasis on bureaucracy. Public participation is a highly innovative paradigm because it has the latitude to experiment with different approaches.
While the above merits are impressive, it takes genuine power distribution to realise these benefits. The public’s role in consultation, decision making and communication must be legitimate in order to realise the gains of this governance practice (Arnstein, 1969, p. 220).
Failure to distribute power effectively will lead to tokenism, poor accountability, apathy and trading concessions. This dilutes public voice and undermines public participation as a governance strategy.
This report applies some of the literature on a case study concerning a national initiative known as Sure Start that Birmingham implemented. The aim is to apply theory to the case study and determine why the program did not realise its full potential. It also provides some insights on how Birmingham Sure Start can become more effective as a form of public participation.
In the Birmingham Sure Start initiative, unequal power was an underlying problem because community representatives were intimidated by professionals.
While initial processes were too formal, members of the system created procedures that eased citizens’ involvement within the initiative. As a result, the public participants became more confident, and contributed in budget processes. However, the Birmingham Sure Start program still has to empower citizens in decision-making.
Theory on public participation
Public participation is a term for which there is not a unified definition. Public participation is a synonym for volunteer organisations, community participation, or the third sector (Kelly, 2007, p. 1013). Literature indicates that public participation is the means with which a society interacts with its government during policy or program planning, evaluation or implementation (Chen et. al., 2007, p.40).
This can occasionally occur through the use of formal intermediate institutions, such as non-governmental organisations or not-for-profit bodies (Chen et. al., 2007, p.41). It is an approach to governance that encapsulates freedom of association with organised civil society. Civil society denotes third party establishments like religious groups and volunteer firms that articulate citizens’ concerns.
Volunteer organisations form a critical component of this method of governance practice. In other situations, public participation may be manifested through direct representation of community members (Bode, 2006, p.555).
In order to eradicate inequality and social exclusion within a society, governments should directly involve those who are affected by such issues. Engaging with citizens allows them to play a consultative, or a decision-making role in public service delivery.
Public participation therefore, becomes an attractive form of governance practice, particularly when the state requires ways of reaching those marginalised or disadvantaged communities (Cunningham, 2008, p.1036). This may take place through workshops, public meetings, meetings with institutions, partnerships, public consultation forums, seminars, working groups as well as interviews.
Alcock (2010, p.6) regards public participation as a third way. He asserts that public participation represents a different paradigm, which carries with it different values and/or principles. Three sectors are involved in the provision of public services. The first sector is the state, which has a high degree of formality. Management occurs through coercion and members must abide by strict regulation.
This sector was predominant in the Traditional Public Administration paradigm and the main aim of the state in governance is redistribution (Alcock, 2010, p.13). The second sector is the market, which was strongly associated with New Public Management. Here, the focus is on entrepreneurship and investment, with a primary goal of this system for accumulation through competition.
The orientation of the market to individual clients’ needs causes weak collective decision-making. The market is governed by a formulaic approach other than a deliberative one (Alcock, 2010, p.20). The third sector is civil society, which operates in the public participation paradigm.
The predominant values in this sector include association and altruism. Here, mutuality is critical, as is democracy. These three components may be regarded as interlinked, in which different sectors exist to provide public services.
Societies have a choice of the kind of orientation they adopt, which can either be a revolutionary approach or a non-profit one. In the case of a participant organisation that focuses on entrepreneurial activities (non-profit), it is likely that the organisation would give precedence to innovation and market concepts (Davies, 2007, p.778).
On the contrary, if the leaders of a participant organisation define their respective agenda as a developmental one, then chances are that they will have a revolutionary connotation (Srinivas, 2009, p.614).
Eight levels of public participation exist as outlined by Arnstein (1969, p. 219). The worst level of public participation is manipulation. This entails using the guise of public participation to achieve selfish gains for the powerful. The governance practice is reduced to a public relations exercise.
Secondly, participation could occur through therapy, where administrators use citizen participation as a pretext for curing or educating users. This approach is both deceitful and arrogant on the part of its initiators. Informing is the third level of participation.
Being the first level of legitimate citizen involvement, the approach undermines gains by making information flow one way from administrators to participants. The public is thus in no position to negotiate or offer feedback.
Consultation is the forth level of public participation, and is an improvement on the above three. However, tokenism undermines the approach; tokenism is conveniently including a marginalised representative into a mainstream body in order to create the impression that they are being involved. Officials use attitude surveys and enquiries to consult, but this often deteriorates to a ritual.
As a result, users will develop apathy to the consultations. Fifth, public participation can occur through placation, where citizens’ views are sought. However, officials still decide on the feasibility of this advice thus leading to distrust. Little power exists in planning or decision-making aspects. Tokenism also undermines the legitimacy of this approach to participation.
The sixth, seventh and eighth levels of participation are partnership, delegated power and citizen control. The former entails shared decision making and power distribution between those with power and the citizens.
Delegated power involves granting citizens power to make decisions by giving them majority positions in representative groups. Finally, citizen control is the most empowering approach to citizens. It allows users to plan, manage and change policies or programs without other intermediaries.
Power distribution in public participation
Running of representative groups
One of the key benefits of public participation in governance is the ability to access experience and knowledge. This allows representatives of the public to articulate their issues and concerns. Their involvement also places them in a unique position to evaluate service quality.
This means that whenever central governments and local governments are required to provide services to complex users, it will be better placed to meet their needs (Kelly, 2007, p.1013).
External experts have greater knowledge and experience than public participants; therefore they have a capacity to cause positive change in governance. However, these external experts lack the commitment to social change that the public possesses.
Community participants are committed to development, so their knowledge and intentions can merge together to bring forth effective governance. Users of public services have insights on how services amalgamate to meet their needs. This can be combined with the expertise of professionals (Srinivas, 2009, p.623).
Regardless of the experience and knowledge prevalent in the public, it is only when power balances within representative groups are considered and all members are treated equally that the approach can work. More often than not, officials may bring biases and attitudes of superiority that demean participation.
In most community arrangements, representatives must work with business stakeholders, trade unions, local governments and other professionals. A number of them may get intimidated by the poise, fluency, technical knowledge and the negotiating skills of professionals. In this regard, the interests of such experienced parties may attract more attention than those of the community.
In situations such as these, public participation may deteriorate to a level of tokenism, where no real community involvement takes place. Unless the concerned groups make an attempt to establish protocols that would ensure equal dialogue, those in power will always side-line the community (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004, p.60).
Marginalisation is a manifestation of power imbalances within community organisations. Communities consist of many subgroups; some of which may be more powerful than others. There is a danger of exclusion of marginalised groups, like ethnic minorities, by members of community associations (Dean, 1996, p. 60).
Most of the representatives tend to perpetuate historical practices of exclusion. Additionally, even membership in community representation may only focus on interests of a small group of individuals.
Management of third sector organisations
Perhaps one of the most significant contributions of public participation in governance is its capacity to prioritise the needs of the public. The traditional public sector is deeply rooted in organisational structure that can impede it from prompt service delivery.
Thus involvement of the public through voluntary organisations, NGOs or citizen representation allows the public service to be devoid of these procedures and structures. Representatives of the public sector pay little attention to structures as they are more interested in results (Kelly, 2007, p.1006).
Issues of power also affect how effectively the third sector prioritises the needs of the public. For the case of public participation, which occurs through volunteer organisations, it is likely that some of these entities may have to trade their autonomy for their role in governance (Dean, 1996, p.97).
This brings out the issue of power balance. It is not always true that a volunteer organisation, which offers public services and engages in advocacy roles, is a government agent.
Some volunteer organisations may be mistaken for government agencies and this could tarnish their reputation as autonomous organisations. Subsequently, this may lead to great anxiety among new participants because they may fear losing their autonomy.
The third sector is not immune from mimetic pressure. Mimetic pressure is defined as an external force that causes institutions to copy other organisations’ structures, systems o activities. As many volunteer organisations, as well as public participation, continue to increase, this leads to mimetic pressure. Here, players will create best practice guidelines that they will impose on all the participants (Harris, 2010, p.22).
Individuals may borrow ideas from the business sector and apply it across the third sector. For instance, they could select benchmarks as one of the options. The result of this approach is too much emphasis on compliance and minimal focus on the interests of communities.
Public participation, through volunteer organisations, may further threaten the principle of equity. Some charity organisations have certain agendas that may not be universal. For instance, religious organisations may only direct their focus towards individuals who ascribe to their faith.
When these charities are involved in the provision of public services, then chances are that they might contradict the principle of universalism that applies to such institutions (Peattie and Morley, 2008, p.47).
Lobbying is an important feature of this approach to governance. It causes new policies to be in accordance with public sentiment and protects citizens’ interests. When the public engages with the state concerning certain policies, chances are that the public will benefit from better design (Kothari, 2001, p.58). Moreover, civil society groups may adopt a confrontational approach to service provision.
In this regard, the state may respond by adopting a defensive approach (Mitlin, 2008, p.339). It may refrain from dealing with the practical issues in governance and instead dwell on dissipating attacks from civil society. This approach deflates attention away from the needs of users, and may be counterproductive.
Representation
Public participation enhances democracy when it engages genuinely with the public. If the arrangement is such that it focuses on practical collaboration, then the public will feel more in tune with the state. The Slum Dwellers International (SDI) is a classic illustration of how public participation leads to this benefit. SDI is a network of grassroots organisations designed to deal with inadequate shelter or insecure tenure.
It mostly relies on women-oriented savings schemes, and solutions often emanate from slum dwellers (Mitlin, 2008, p.358). Since the movement has such a vast array of members, politicians had to engage with the group because they wanted to get electoral support from women voters. Most forms of public participation have a certain community orientation that often attracts the attention of politicians.
The communities that participate in them may enjoy the political benefits associated with mass movements, while politicians will also gain from their support. This subsequently enhances democracy by involving the people in things that matter (Mitlin, 2008, p.358).
A number of practical benefits exist in marginalised communities. For instance, poverty reduction has occurred owing to public participation, and the practice empowers members of disadvantaged groups to grow their capacities as well as their opportunities (Bode, 2006, p.555).
Nonetheless, democracy and its gains can only be realised when control or power is distributed equally among the participants. This entails understanding who the public is, and its characteristics.
Failure to do so can lead to problems of representation, as Lowndes and Sullivan (2004, p.56) note, representatives in such systems may not always represent disparate groups. In the majority of cases, representatives tend to account for geographical communities rather than interest groups.
For instance, an area may have a considerable proportion of old people, but their community representatives may not account for their interests. Additionally, problems of how consultation occurs between the representatives and their communities may hamper the effectiveness of the approach. Many communities lack mechanisms with which to hold their representatives responsible (Kendall, 2003, p.121).
In the issue of representation, public sector players must understand the reason for the involvement of the public in the first place. However, this role is rarely comprehended by most players (Cunningham, 2008, p. 1041). They may not be certain about whether citizens are there to offer their views concerning members of a community.
Alternatively, they could be there simply as users of public services or as persons with needs. One may also understand the role of citizens in this form of governance as people who are held to account for their constituency. In some circumstances, all these aspects of representation may be a reality. Therefore, players need to strike a balance between such differing viewpoints.
Thus, effective engagement may be severely hampered when the groups concerned do not know whether they are there for local representation or local knowledge (Davies, 2007, p.778). Arnstein (1969, p. 221) points out that consultation and informing, as methods of participation, are only effective when information is two way, and officials work on the advice given by the public.
Innovation
Public participation, in the form of volunteer organisations, is highly innovative. This is because the organisations do not focus on formal procedures; instead their main concern is involvement of the public. They bring together a vast array of values and ideas to the public sector. In essence, they lead to greater creativity and innovation within governance structures.
Their ethos is unique and quite different from conventional public sector participants, who either dwell on bureaucracy or educational qualification. Srinivas (2009, p.623) states that the differential nature of civil society allows all players to experiment with different ways of meeting goals.
Even the lack of a formal definition of the third sector enhances their creativity because they are not limited by external standards, definitions and best practice procedures.
Non-state participants from the public have a unique advantage because they do not have to play by state-imposed rules. This in turn, gives them room to exercise their ingenuity (Leach & Wingfield, 1999, p.59). Moreover, non-governmental organisations should consider refraining from best practice procedure development as this would take away a critical component of their appeal.
Civil societies may exhibit flexibility by using different methods of involving the public in decision making. They can also demonstrate this quality by responding to their needs in different ways. Most times, they encourage citizens to intensify their involvement in the civil society organisation (Cunningham, 2008, p.1036).
Community sector and voluntary sector organisations do not have formal status. As a result, this could bring about mismanagement of governance arrangements in which communities are not certain about who is responsible for what (Kendall, 2003, p. 203). Lack of incorporation among volunteer organisations implies that roles are not clear and the people who are represented may suffer from this confusion.
Accountability
Accountability in governance refers to answerability and blameworthiness for one’s actions between two parties. These parties may be the public and third sector, where the third sector acts as a watchdog to hold the government to account.
Alternatively, it could be between civil servants and their superiors; hierarchy causes subordinates to be accountable to their superiors. In the case of public participants, accountability may involve citizen representatives and the public.
Public participation can lead to the improvement of policy procedures in governance by holding the government to account. The third sector is open to new ideas and as a result, it tends to keep central or local governments alert. Their approach to policy making is highly inclusive as it involves a wide array of networks and users (Kelly, 2007, p.1008).
This method can be contrasted to political processes, which are highly divisive and self-serving. The result is greater social cohesion in the state. This approach to governance often paves the way for informal interactions with citizens, politicians, managers and other public sector stakeholders.
Furthermore, it facilitates an open association between the state and the citizenry, which means that people will come together through policy-option debates.
However, accountability through public participation is only possible when the power relationship between the public and the government is clear cut and well understood. In situations where this relationship is poorly defined, then the reverse can occur. The government starts holding the third sector to account.
The problem of coercive pressure has to be addressed when implementing public participation (John, 2001, p. 80). In the context of the UK government, officials ensure all attempts at public service delivery are overseen. This implies that whenever volunteer organisations or any form of public organisation gets involved in governance, it must be answerable to the central government.
On occasion, this comes in the form of oversight or though contract enforcement. Although this tradition has been in place for years the practice counteracts the neutrality of the third sector.
That is, the parties involved will have to carry out their activities in accordance with the centrally-imposed regulations, and this ultimately undermines their core values (John, 2001, p.105). Once again, reversed power distribution perpetuates this challenge.
Accountability is a serious problem for several civil society organisations. Since most of them are unincorporated, this implies that the level of transparency in those institutions is low. In comparison to statutory bodies and local authorities, most of these organisations have minimal external standards to hold them to account.
The public may not be in a position to demand accountability because minimal structures exist to do so. In different governance paradigms, such as new public management, standards of conduct as well as checks and balances ensure that the rules are followed. However, in public participation, decisions largely depend on the integrity of civil society leadership, wherein transparency may not be witnessed in such an arrangement.
Decision-making power
As Arnstein (1969, p. 218) explains, public participation that gives participants minimal control in policies or programs can lead to unwanted manifestations. Therefore, the success of this governance practice largely relies on legitimate power sharing.
When the participation process has a minimal effect on decision making, this can frustrate public representatives and thus lead to scepticism. It is not enough to place citizens in the public sector as they must have some decision-making power. Problems often arise when the concerned local partnerships insist on doing things in the traditional way.
Local governments, business representatives and other traditional governance partners may become so set in their ways that this may hamper their willingness to involve the public in the decision-making process.
As a result, public participation in governance of the state may fail to yield substantial results if the participation process lacks clearly defined goals. Moreover, those who do not know the limits of the partnership may hesitate to contribute towards a meaningful change in the system (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004, p.72).
Trading of concessions is a problem that may arise out of this new governance approach. Some partnerships with the public may deteriorate into an arrangement, in which professionals merely want to contain local conflict. Bargaining, as practiced in the corporate sector, may become a part of this system.
Therefore, as opposed to dealing with the large scale community issues, members of the partnership may merely bargain and buy off representatives of the community (DavisSmith, 2001, p.18). This falls in line with therapy, manipulation and informing as levels of public participation as outlined by Arnstein.
Community representatives may turn into professionals who are out of touch with the public, and who focus only on advancing their interests. It should be noted that such problems generally arise when the public representatives do not have a system in which they can become accountable to the communities they represent (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004, p.64).
Sometimes apathy and cynicism can develop in public participation, which often stems from an overload of various forums for public participation (Lowndes, 1998, p.20). This unwanted scenario is likely to occur when the only mode of participation is community representation in partnership bodies.
Apathy may also stem from fatigue during an overlap of partnership initiatives. However, the real problem is when partnership initiatives do not allow for power sharing. Consultation as a form of public participation can only yield desirable outcomes when administrators actually work on advice given (Arnstein, 1969, p. 218). Too many forums for participation can appear within the same community.
Unless participation stakeholders coordinate their activities and implement ideas, communities may become wary of excessive consultation. Individuals may also become cynical about public participation when minimal avenues for feedback exist concerning the participation activities.
It becomes pointless to engage in a process when no one is certain as to whether the information will lead to reasonable outcomes or not (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2004, p.69). In the UK, New Labour has been particularly known for its zeal in making project initiatives; however, at times this has manifested in the form of overload and indifference from the concerned communities.
How Labour approached public participation
When Labour came in leadership in 1997, it experimented with different forms of power years. Labour realised that public service provision has evolved dramatically over the past few decades.
It was therefore not plausible for them to focus on the hierarchical approach of the 1950s or the market-focused models of the 1980s (Edwards, 2004, p.13). Modern public service is complex, so it required the involvement of people who have a thorough understanding of them.
A number of traits made public participation under Labour (1997-2010) unique. First, it focuses on issue-based approaches in various localities. This stems from the premise that policy problems are interconnected and people can respond to them in a shared manner.
However, it also incorporates and acknowledges the importance of consumer choice, which creates a diverse offering of governance processes (Office of the Third Sector, 2009, p.33).
During the implementation of public participation, Labour often embraced the contributions of service users, residents as well as different stakeholders within this process. Local partnerships were an effective way of merging efforts between various agencies (Lewis, 2005, p.126).
The Labour government specified policy objectives and outcomes. Thereafter, it expected local partnerships to respond to these objectives. Sometimes even performance management evaluation, as well as evidence-based practices may apply to those partnerships (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2002, p.82).
Multilevel governance is also another reality in this paradigm of governance. Regions or other geographical levels affect progress at local levels. Therefore, public participation is not a method that works independently; it is often affected by other models of governance, and this has implications on its effectiveness.
Case study
The case study involves a Sure Start Local Programme (SSLP) in Birmingham City. This was an initiative that the national government implemented in 1999, with the intent of dealing with poverty and social exclusion. Through the use of cross-agency strategies, the national government aimed at promoting family, community and child development.
SSLP was distinct from other forms of national government initiatives because it was separate from local authorities and was founded on individual partnerships. Some of the partners involved in the program include communities, families, children and parents. This initiative had parental involvement in some elements of governance as well as in elements of consumption.
In Birmingham, the Sure Start Programme began as part of a Children’s centre; this was the key partner in the arrangement. Thereafter, the SSLP formed an interim board in which health agencies, parents, community members, social service groups and the Children’s centre would belong.
Consequently, membership was divided into three categories; those who delivered the services, those who ensured accountability (like the health authority), and those who had local knowledge. The latter consisted of parents who had to come from the targeted community (Barnes et. al., 2008, p.15).
At the beginning of the project, certain issues started to become apparent. Three parents out of the eight resigned, citing pressure from other commitments. They also stated that they did not feel like they could contribute productively to the board. Another challenge that the team had to tackle was the insecurities prevalent among the members.
Some of the parents complained that the presence of “professionals in suits” intimidated them. This partnership did not feel equal to them and they objected strongly to the labelling of their community as poor. A number of the parents refrained from speaking during meetings and several of them even apologised when they had to make contributions.
Moreover, on occasion, councillors or the other professionals would say something technical that the parents could not understand; however due to the aforementioned constraints, few of them would not even ask for clarification when this occurred (Barnes et. al., 2008, p.15).
The chair of the committee noticed these problems and instated some changes. First, he realised that meetings were too formal. Therefore, the group selected some aspects of governance that were too formal, such as financial planning. They created a subcommittee that would specialise in handling these matters in order to encourage the parents to participate.
They were also encouraged to speak their mind and seek clarification when necessary. Once they gained confidence, they made vital contributions, such as determining how the area toy library could stay open (Barnes et. al., 2008, p.15).
Two years after setting up the SSLP in Birmingham, the membership decided to set up a limited company. Parents would account for 50% of the representation, while independent members and partner organisations would represent 20% and 30%, respectively.
During this process, parents and professionals learnt to work alongside one another. They established structures that were less formal than the ones in the interim board. For instance, they would discuss issues while sitting on the floor or in a circle (Barnes et. al., 2008, p.15).
However, at the time, the government minimised budgets allocated to the program. They had to come up with methods of minimising expenditure; yet this was difficult for parent representatives. They created short reports that would allow parents to follow through on critical issues. The SSLP also had pre-meetings in order to listen to resident members and parents before their board meetings.
This allowed them to make their contributions concerning financial issues. Currently, the members are working on supporting parents to gain sufficient training and expertise to become board members, for which they require convincing from members of the partnership that they are capable.
At the beginning of the initiative, three parents resigned from the advisory board. Literature notes that the public can become apathetic to efforts in public participation when there is an overload of local partnerships (Hambleton et. al., 2000, p.39). It appears that these three parents may have been victims to the same.
Additionally, they felt that they would not contribute substantially to the board, which may be as a result of role confusion. The parents probably did not understand their role in the Sure Start board as well as the necessity of professional qualifications.
Literature highlights that one of the advantages of this form of governance is its dependency upon informal and unprofessional members of the public (Lowndes et. al. 2006, p.552). This adds to the diversity and creativity of the governance approach. In hindsight, the parents should have been informed about this advantage before they left.
In relation to the parents that felt intimidated by their professional peers, public sector scholars identify this as a major obstacle to the successful implementation of this new governance practice (Sullivan et. al. 2001, p.49). They affirm that unequal power may develop when professionals dominate such efforts. Thus, tokenism may arise when poor engagement occurs.
However, it appears that members of this case study found a way of confronting the problem by creating processes that would ease the community representatives into their role. Their use of less formal discussions and consultation of parents during the budget cuts were indicative of this approach.
One challenge that individuals in the Sure Start Program have not tackled is getting parents to become board members. This is a reflection of a deeper problem of the group; the lack of decision-making power among the representatives. The public can become cynical about public participation when their representatives lack decision-making power (Taylor et. al., 2002, p.5), (Arnstein, 1969, p. 224).
Sadly, this is the case for the Sure Start programme. Most of the parents are there to give their views concerning their needs; however, it is the professionals who get to make the final decision. This initiative needs to encourage parents to train and gather expertise on board membership so as to give them decision-making power.
Conclusion
Public participation is a new governance paradigm that facilitates social inclusion and democracy. It can benefit a country by tapping into the experience and knowledge of local individuals. The governance practice also leads to social cohesion by engaging the public in issues that matter to them.
It is a highly innovative practice that challenges the bureaucratic method of public service provision. Communities can thus benefit from poverty reduction and reduced marginalisation.
In contrast, public participation may lead to challenges in representation, unequal power and tokenism, marginalisation of communities and overlap of local partnership initiatives. Issues of accountability may become a challenge as well as the principle of equity for partisan charities.
Furthermore, the problem of coercion from the national government and lack of decision making power among community representatives may impede its effectiveness.
In the case study, Birmingham Sure Start faced challenges in role clarification and unequal power. The local community were intimidated by the professionals and did not feel valuable enough for the role. In addition, they lacked decision making power. These issues were however, addressed by streamlining processes and empowering parents.
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