A guilty verdict can be based only on the admissible evidence. Therefore, all data obtained in violation of the due process of law should be excluded from the scope of the proceedings. The Due Process Clause is regulatory secured by the Fourth, the Fifth, the Sixth, and the Fourteenth Amendments of the Bill of Rights and is meant to equalize both state and federal obligations to operate legally and provide fair procedures (Due process, n.d.). According to the exclusionary rule, all information subsequently obtained from an inadmissible evidence – in case it has not been found consistent with the due process of law – should be excluded from consideration.
For example, the interrogation of a witness who was identified due to the forced confession of an accused person will be unacceptable. Similarly, if the search was conducted illegally, the seized items, their inspection, expert research, as well as other actions based on these data were deemed to have no legal value. As a general rule, hearsays about the evidence are regarded as a form of derivative evidence and should not be allowed in the court (Ionita, 2015). However, the rule implies some exceptions including the testimony of the police regarding the confession of a detained person made during or after the arrest.
When the evidence is obtained in violation of the constitutional rights, the exclusion of this evidence from the court consideration becomes a legal remedy. To do this, a defendant or a criminal defense lawyer files a “motion to suppress evidence,” thereby requiring the court to enforce the exclusionary rule (Jorgensen, 2006, p. 7). The exclusionary rule was first introduced by the US Supreme Court in 1914 in the case of Weeks v. the United States and was meant for the application in the federal courts only, but later it was extended to the state courts in 1961 in the case of Mapp v. Ohio (Burnham, 2006).
In the Mapp case, the Supreme Court decided for the application of the exclusion rule because it was recognized as a necessary premise for preventing the law enforcement agencies from engagement in misconduct and eliminating their incentive to violations of constitutional rights. Additionally, the decision was made with the consideration of “the imperative of the judicial integrity” (Mapp v. Ohio, 1961, par. 647). Thus, the extension of the legal power of the exclusion rule prevented the courts from becoming accomplices in the violation of the citizens’ constitutional rights by taking into consideration the illegally obtained evidence and making decisions based on it.
Nowadays, the exclusionary rule is subject to intense criticism due to the increasing demand for the establishment of a strict crime control regime in the criminal process (Burnham, 2006). The opponents to the implementation of the rule point to its large social costs which arise because of the release of offenders administered after the application of the exclusionary rule. Moreover, it is claimed that the process of the establishment of truth in the courts is quite slow, and the respect of public to justice institutions weakens when, due to some legal and technical errors, the notorious criminals are freed (Burnham, 2006).
However, the exclusionary rule may be regarded as an effective remedy for the citizens whose rights are violated during the illegal acquisition of evidence and the only way to ensure the respect of the Fourth Amendment and other constitutional guarantees. Supporters of the rule indicate that the courts’ toleration of the police misconduct induces large social costs as well. Moreover, the cancellation of the exclusionary rule will contribute to the development of an even more negative attitude of the public towards justice institutions, because it will eliminate individuals’ rights for self-defense from the violations performed by the government.
Nowadays, to mitigate the risks associated with the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court primarily employs it for the prevention of police misconduct. As a result of the shifts in the US Supreme Court’s position regarding the exclusionary rule, it can be applied merely if its use is directly related to the prevention of power abuse by the law enforcement agencies. On the contrary, if such an objective is not formulated in the case, the exclusionary rule is not implemented, and the evidence is admitted to consideration.
The exclusionary rule is rooted in the doctrine of the Fruits of the Poisonous Tree which eliminates the possibility of accepting illegally gathered evidence and information (Tarleton, 2016). However, if the link between the illegal actions of the police and the seizure of evidence is sufficiently weak, then the impugned evidence can be admitted for consideration (Burnham, 2006). In Miranda v. Arizona case, when a defendant was subjected to questioning without being informed of his rights, the public prosecution demonstrated to the court that the procedures administered to obtain the derivative evidence were not illegal, and Miranda’s rights were not violated (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).
The US Supreme Court also decided that the part of the exclusionary rule that related to derivative evidence does not necessarily apply to all evidence obtained through the claims that the police forced the suspect to tell in the context of violation of the legal regulations stated in the case. It can be explained by the fact that the rules laid down in the case of Miranda v. Arizona are not prescribed by the Constitution but are the measures set forth in order to prevent possible violations of the Fifth Amendment while the Amendment itself does not completely prohibit a certain level of pressure on a suspect but is meant to protect defendants from providing a compelled self-incriminating testimony.
References
Burnham, W. (2006). Introduction to the law and legal system of the United States. St. Paul, MN: West Group.
Due process. (n.d.). Legal Information Institute. Web.
Ionita, E. E. (2015). The exclusion of illegally administered evidence. Web.
Jorgensen, L. R. (2006). Motion practice and persuasion. Chicago, IL: ABA.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. (1961). Web.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. (1966). Web.
Tarleton, M. (2016). Fruit of the poisonous tree. NOLO. Web.