Introduction
Human beings are unique from other animals by their ability to solve problems. Most researches in psychology have focussed their attention on how human and other animal adopts certain behavior or react to some external things in a certain way. However, researchers have been closely interested in the cognitive development of humans together with how it affects their behavior and thinking. Problem-solving is a function that human beings have to deal with in their daily activities. However, there exist obstacles that affect the ability of human beings to solve problems. From early days, human beings had used tools in their day-to-day activities. In the use of tools, a mental block referred to as functional fixedness affects how they use tools.
Overview
The use of tools to solve problems is evidence of the cognitive capability of human beings. Although this ability is not purely unique to human beings, as with some primates, it is one of the greatest human achievements. As human beings encounter challenges in their daily lives, new tools had been innovated to solve the challenges and come up with easier ways of performing tasks. The wide variety, sophistication and complexity of human artifacts and tools are evidence that human beings are ultimate tool users. In fact, a random observation of the immediate neighborhood would show that human artifacts are far more than natural objects.
The use of tools is almost unique to human beings. While it has been so for thousands of years, there is still much that is common about our use of tools. The particular function that we assign a tool over other possible functions limits our potential actions with that tool. This is not necessarily in and of itself bad or faulty, as it has been suggested that our interpretations for the functions of various tools come from the results or difficulties that the tools were meant to solve.
However, to be inventive is a desired trait in a human being as well and this extends even to the use of tools. A person that can reinvent the use of tools is considered intelligent, crafty and creative. On the other hand, a person’s inability to reinvent the use of tools leads to functional fixedness. Such a person has a tendency to see only a sole function of a tool and uses a tool in a fixed conventional way (Maier, N. R, 1931, p89). This is a common and perhaps limiting feature of our cognitive development, and as such, there have already been ventures into the study of functional fixedness.
Functional fixedness studies have been an area of psychology and cognitive neuroscience that has been investigated relatively little. Most of the researches in this come before 1975. From then there has been a steady decline leading to a wide disparity of these areas with other areas of psychology.
The negative effects of functional fixedness were first studied by Gestalt psychologists. Studies by these psychologists identified functional fixedness as the main obstacle in creativity and the use of insight. Potential solution tools to particular problems were hampered by the habitual use of the tools.
Investigations on Functional fixedness
The effects of functional fixedness were clearly demonstrated in a classical experiment on problem-solving. Early experimental psychology investigated how human beings were affected by their knowledge of an object’s usual functions. In the experimental task, the subjects were required to fit a candle in a vertical way, so that it could burn effectively (Duncker, K, 1945, p56). The subjects were assigned with candles, a box of tacks and a book of matches (Adamson, R.E. & Taylor, D.W, 1954, p33). With these types of equipment, the subjects were asked to come up with as many solutions as they could to the challenge. From the experiments, Duncker observed that the subjects were hesitant to use the box as a base for the candles. However, when presented with the box and tacks separately, the probability of the subjects using the box as a base was raised. Inference from this experiment suggested that subjects were used to the usual use of a box as a container and could not think of how they could use it as a platform (Duncker, K, 1945, p35). Similar observations as in this experiment have been observed in other experiments on object use.
A similar investigation to Dunker’s experiment was repeated by Adamson in 1952. Adamson set a replication of Dunker’s experiment but split the participants into two groups. In one of the groups, there was preutilization while in the other group there was no preutilization. In the case where there was preutilization, participants presented with the objects in a conventional manner, participants were observed to have a low likelihood of considering another use for the box. On the other hand, when there was no preutilization, it was observed that participants had a higher likelihood of inventing a new way of using the box (Adamson, R.E. & Taylor, D.W, 1954, p37). Thus, from this instigation, Adamson showed that preutilization played a big role in functional fixedness. When in the usual atmosphere, human beings were less likely to use an object in another way apart from the familiar manner.
Another significant experiment showed that decision on the use of tools was influenced by experience with the tools. The experiment by Birch and Rabinowitz involved three groups in a problem that involved the use of heavy objects to fix a cord problem. Participants were given two cords hanging from a ceiling of a building, and two weighty objects from the room. The task involved connecting the two cords together; however, the cords were far that one could not be reached easily. To fix this, the participants were supposed to use the heavy objects presented to them. One end of the cords was to be tied with one of the heavy objects to form a pendulum and then swing the cord to hold the other cord. Two of the groups had a pre-task experience with heavy objects. One of the groups had used a relay in pre-task while the other group had used a switch in their pre-task. The third group did not have a pre-task experience. From the experiment, it was observed that the groups that had participated in a pre-task experience were more likely to use a different object as used in the pre-task experience in the experiment (Adamson, R.E, 1952, p5). The explanation given to this observation was that the two groups were not able to conceive other uses of the objects used in pre-task experience because of functional fixedness.
Although recent studies into functional fixedness are not much, however, there exist recent studies that shed more light on this area. In most of the studies, functional fixedness is observed to affect human creativity, insight and problem-solving. There has been interested in the effect of functional fixedness across different cultures and backgrounds. One of the recent studies showed preliminary evidence on the universality of functional fixedness. Despite the culture and background of a community, functional fixedness is likely to be observed. However, functional fixedness is influenced by experiences in a certain object or a tool in a community. A community with experience with the use of a certain tool or similar tools may be more likely to have functional fixedness towards such or similar tools. Provision with prior information on the function of a tool could help to reduce the likelihood of functional fixedness. However, even with prior information on the new function of an object or a tool, human beings are still more likely to continue with the usual uses of a particular tool. Functional fixedness also differs in different stages of development. Adults have more experience in a certain use of a particular object or tool (German, T. P. & Defeyter, M. A, 2000, p17). Due to this experience, Adults are less likely to adopt new ways of use of an object. In children, functional fixedness varies with age and past exposure. Older children are more likely to have a fixed way of the use of a particular tool than younger children are. Young children have less exposure to tools and other objects. When offered a new object, a young child is more likely to come up with creative ways of using an object.
Functional Fixedness and Concept on artifacts
Indeed human beings are tool-using species. However, cognitive capabilities that underlie the attainment of understanding about the tools are not well understood. In addition, the capacities that enable the human being to transfer the understanding in solving a day-to-day problem are perplexing. The lack of many types of research in these areas has made information on this area to be lacking. Development of other more technologically sophisticated tools calls for more understanding of tool development, use and effects. Most of the investigations on knowledge on artifacts that both adults and children have taken more focus on intuitions about objects and their functions. These investigations show a correlation between objects and functions with categorization task, judgment and extension. However, this information does not shed enough light on the importance of artifact knowledge that is important to problem-solving. Conceptual systems that organize information about artifacts are one of the factors that affect how humans choose and use tools.
In adults, reasoning about artifacts influences the adoption of a design stance. Design’s stance gives an abstract explanation of concepts on the relationship between tools and the purpose for which a tool was made. Adults make judgments of the way to use tools by reflecting what was in the designer’s mind while designing an artifact. From investigations, it is observed that adults make their conclusions on artifacts by using two basic factors: the intended function and design (Victor Lee, V. & Das Gupta, P, 1995, p55). To adults, the intention of a tool is more important than the outside appearance of an artifact while the designed functions are givens precedence to the current use of an artifact. Thus, design stance as used in making Inference on the way to use an artifact is mostly based on common sense rather than rational reasoning over the matter.
Research on the origin of designs stances is correlated with the idea of common sense. Recent findings in cognitive development suggest that understanding of the world by use of common sense is based on dedicated intelligence, quick learning guided by basic knowledge. This intelligence is responsible for perception, attention and reasoning about a certain issue in children (Eyseneck, M. W. & Keane, M. T, 2005, p123). Viewing the conception of artifacts from these perspectives, knowledge of artifacts by adults is developed in a similar way. Alternatively, knowledge about artifacts is developed by combining different concepts on core knowledge (Adamson, R. E., & Taylor D. W, 1954, p45)). Thus, artifact function requires the ability to present and rationalize the physical features of an object and constraints that the physical features of the artifact affect its motion and interaction with other objects. In addition, the similarity of artifacts may also lead to the decision-making on the use of an artifact.
The other concept on knowledge about artifacts relates an artifact with problem-solving. However, there exists a gap between children’s representation of concepts on artifacts and the use of the concepts in simple problem-solving. However, a very relevant link was established between Germany and Defeyster. These researches study the effect of artifact concepts in performance in an object use problem by children. Element of functional fixedness was observed on how children used the artifact with variation with age and past information.
Inference from traditional investigations shows that functional fixedness is influenced by the accumulated information on the use of artifacts. The regular design function of an object is usually activated by the demonstration of the function. This, somehow block the ability of a person to use the artifact in an alternative way leading to functional fixedness (Defeyter, M. A. & German, T. P, 2003, p78). The importance of past information has more relevance while investigation learning in children. From investigations, it is shown that young children tend to accumulate information in a way that is closely related to information that is already acquired or based on the habitual use of information. From this, it can be concluded that each person has an abstract concept on an artifact. This abstract concept is responsible for the ways in which we use an artifact. Thus, functional fixedness is a consequence of human beings having prior ideas on the function of an artifact such that they cannot conceive an alternative function of a tool.
Looking at the effects of age on functional fixedness it is seen that young children have less likelihood of functional fixedness. Exposures to an artifact or to another similar artifact lead to the development of concepts about the artifact. Young children are not exposed to many artifacts, thus their concept of the functions of an artifact is not developed in their minds. When presented with an artifact, young children are more likely to explore many other uses of the artifact (Dusink, L. & Latour, L, 1996, p77). On the other hand, older children may have prior knowledge of certain use of an artifact or they may have prior experience on the function of a similar artifact. This prior knowledge leads to a certain concept about an artifact and influences how they are likely to use an artifact.
Functional Fixedness across Culture
Functional fixedness varies with culture and technology exposure. Evidence various studies on cognitive development show attainment of knowledge on artifacts differs from the attainment of knowledge on other natural kinds (German, T. P. & Defeyter, M. A, 2000, p17). From recent findings, it is suggested that adults develop their concept on the function of an artifact from their understanding of the category and functions of an artifact from information about the design of the artifact. To children, the conceptions on the functions of artifacts become influenced by information on the functional design of an artifact. The concepts developed from this age become influential use of artifacts at adulthood. The prior information on the use of an artifact is not based on information on a single artifact. This is an integration of information from principle knowledge. Its function is for making judgments on mechanical properties and aims of the agents that use artifacts (German, T.P., & Barrett, H.C, 2005, p67). Investigation on the effect of functional fixedness in non-industrialized communities showed that such communities were more susceptible to functional fixedness than industrialized communities were.
Influence of Language on Cognitive Development
Among the marvels of nature is a child’s ability to acquire language. The ease with which children progress from the babbling stage through the one-word stage to the telegraphic speech of the two-word stage and beyond; has sparked a lively debate concerning how they do it. Behaviourist B. F. Skinner proposed that we learn language by the familiar principles of association, reinforcement, and imitation. Challenging this claim, linguist Noam Chomsky argued that children are biologically prepared to learn words and use grammar. Cognitive neuroscientists emphasize that for mastery of grammar, the learning that occurs during life’s first few years, when the brain is building a dense network of neuronal connections, is critical. Words convey ideas, and different languages embody different ways of thinking. Although the linguistic relativity hypothesis suggested that language determines thought, it is more accurate to say that language influences thought (Glucksberg, S., & Weisberg, R. W, 1966, p61). Studies of the effects of the generic pronoun he and the ability of vocabulary enrichment to enhance thinking reveal the influence of words. On functional fixedness, concepts acquired from the use of language influence the concept that we develop overuse of a specific artifact.
Functional Fixedness in Mathematical Reasoning
Mathematical reasoning entails the ability to come up with a solution that comes spontaneously to mind. Insight in mathematical reasoning leads to a spontaneous solution but this is not always the case since mental blocks, in form of mental set and functional fixedness, interfere with this reasoning (English, L., 2004, p172). In the development of mathematical concepts, a conceptual system of a child is important and influences how the concepts are developed and used in a child.
Conclusion
When faced with a novel situation for which no well-learned response will do, we may use such strategies as algorithms and heuristics. Sometimes the solution comes in a flash of insight. We, however, do face obstacles to successful problem-solving. The confirmation bias predisposes us to verify rather than challenge our hypotheses. Moreover, fixations, such as mental set and functional fixedness, may prevent our taking a needed fresh perspective on a problem. Viewing certain objects through the lens of a common definition leads one to accept objects in their mutually agreed upon the state. One may have to destroy the embedded roles of a concept allowing it to escape from a rigid understanding before creativity can occur. It is the avoidance of cognitive dissonance and a reliance on the convenience of functional fixedness. This leads most human beings to see a hammer as a tool for hammering nails, and not as a shoehorn.
Reference List
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