Introduction
In this paper, Bar-Joseph and McDermott1 present their arguments on strategies that can be taken to improve intelligence analysis. Their main argument on improving intelligence is that rather than undertaking radical changes in the intelligence process or bureaucracy, a novel approach should be adopted for the selection and promotion of intelligence analysts. Such a move would improve the accuracy of the intelligence analysis process. The changes proposed include an emphasis on candidates’ level of openness and tolerance for ambiguity so that they can overcome unconscious biases that obstruct optimal or atypical information processing.
Authors’ viewpoint
I agree with the authors’ viewpoint that to improve intelligence gathering and analysis, what we require is a change of the analyst rather than a change of the analysis method. My conviction with the argument arises from the fact that intelligence analysis basically goes through various steps that begin with gathering information about situations or events, characterizing them with respect to the situation or event, and, using probability theory, determining future actions based on similar information. None of these steps can be omitted from the process, neither can we alter their order. Consequently, to improve the process of intelligence analysis, analysts must possess certain skills that will enable them to handle each step precisely because the success of each step builds onto that of the previous one. Hence, a mistake occurring in any step ultimately affects the whole process and leads to erroneous or biased conclusions.
Qualities of Analysts
The skills that a good analyst should possess, according to Bar-Joseph and McDermott, include openness and tolerance for ambiguity as opposed to high intelligence, strong verbal and writing abilities, and good managerial skills. These skills are very important and perhaps if intelligence organizations such as the State Department, the Army, the Navy, and the FBI could have adopted them earlier, we could have avoided some mistakes that have occurred to poor intelligence analysis techniques. As an example, before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, a report on Iraq’s WMD program had been partly based on the country’s purchase of aluminum tubes that analysts believed were to be used for making uranium separation centrifuges.
These tubes could have also been used to make rocket casings. It arose later that they were used to make rocket casings, hence, the question that needs to be answered is, “did the original analysts contact a technical specialist in separation centrifuges, perhaps at Department of Energy intelligence?” Perhaps more information could have been availed to help in deducing whether the argument was feasible. Openness to a differing explanation for the aluminum tubes could have helped avoid the war, or improve the analysts’ evaluation of the whole situation and come up with accurate conclusions. In addition, tolerance for ambiguity could have also been helpful as this could have allowed the initial analyst to recognize that he could be wrong and thus allow for diverging opinions.
The qualities pushed by the authors of this article point to the need for analysts to coordinate with their peers in intelligence gathering and analysis. This should be followed by a consolidation of the various diverging opinions and an analysis of all opinions and views. However, both of these processes require that the analyst must possess both openness and tolerance for ambiguity. Consequently, I believe that good analysts should possess openness and tolerance for ambiguity as such skills would enable them to seek and interpret incoming information in creative and novel ways.
Bibliography
Bar-Joseph, Uri and Rose McDermott. “Change the Analyst and Not the System: A Different Approach to Intelligence Reform.” Foreign Policy Analysis 4(2008): 127–145.
Footnotes
- Uri Bar-Joseph and Rose McDermott, “Change the Analyst and Not the System: A Different Approach to Intelligence Reform,” Foreign Policy Analysis 4(2008), 128.