This thesis tries to analyze the role of religion in the political, educational and social systems in the republic of Iran before and after the revolution. The paper elaborates the changes that took place in the three sectors during the reformation period. The paper also touches on the role of women in the Iranian politics and how they brought changes to the country’s leadership and how they also fought for their rights in the society.
Introduction
Iran was not officially occupied by colonialists including the British and the Russians; these colonial powers only applied pressure on the leadership of Iran just a few years before and after the twentieth century. The country was being ruled by a ruler from the family of Qajar. The Persian constitutional insurgency which happened in between 1905 and 1921 led to removal of the weaker Qajar powers. Reza Shah Pahlavi took control of the country from them. During the World War II, the Soviet Union together with the United Kingdom invaded Iran forcing the Shah to surrender the leadership to his son; Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The first prime minister was elected in 1951. When the United Kingdom came, the central intelligence agency organized takeover against Mosssadegh and this led to Mohammad Pahlavi being recalled as the president, in 1953 (Banuazizi, 302)
When Shah was the president of the republic of Iran, the United State was a great friend of Iran and the United States brought a lot of western policies to the countries which were aimed at improving the country’s economic and social state. The Shah’s power exercised great political authoritarianism arresting many who criticized his leadership like the Grand Ayatollah, a jurisprudent, was imprisoned and upon his release in 1964 he fled to a different country for security purposes. Political Islamists, Marxists and the Secularists formed a faction to overthrow the leadership of Shah. The group succeeded to remove Shah from power in 1979 and Ayatollah came back to Iran and led the movement. Ayatollah established a policy of Velayt-e-Fagih, which is the control of the regime by the clerics, which was in the constitution and was just passed in the same year. He came up with new policies of Islamic leadership as well as started repressing the resistance coming from the former reform supporters. He removed liberals, women and secularist from top state offices especially in institutions of higher learning and the judiciary. (Chehabi, 36)
The extensive protection given to the Shah by the United States of America irritated the associations between Tehran and Washington, the association was further worsened in the late 1979 and early 1981 by the captive catastrophe of the US embassy. The deadly war between the Iran and Iraq began and lasted until late 1988. In 1989, Ayatollah passed away and his position was taken by Ali Khomeini who was his subordinate ecclesiastic. From his leadership to the current leadership of Ahmedinejad, Iran has not replaced all that was destroyed during its war against Iraq. The change of family planning policies to reduce the population in 1988 led to a reduced population growth rate. However, because there were no other options to family planning those few years after the revolution, this resulted to a large number of young people in the population. The majority of the voters and the electorate are people with an age of less than 30 years and they account for over 50% percent of the population. From 1976 to 1991, the literacy rate has increased from 47% to 71% and presently sits at 79%. Despite an increase in the literacy rate, the highest population of the people is still unemployed; and many others employed receive low salaries. The nation is one which has the highest number of skilled citizens moving to other countries (Saeidi, 479).
The population of Iran is nearly sixty eight million, of which 59% are Persians, 8% are Gilakis and Mazandaranis, 24% are Azeris and 7% are Kurds. The majority of people belong to the Shia Muslim, followed by the Sunnis and the other religions like the Baha’i, Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrian account for the smallest group for about 2% of the total population. The youths do not have esteemed recollections of the revolution, and often challenge the wisdom of a political system that has failed to change the lives of its people especially in fulfilling the basic needs of its citizens. (Saeidi, 479)
Iran is rich in natural resources like oil and gas. These resources define its political boundary. Though the country is rich in these natural resources, still a majority of the people live in poverty. The per- capita income for the country has gone down so much that almost 40 percent of the population live below the poverty line. Corruption has penetrated the oil industry and this has led to the country getting energy from outside because it lacks the necessary machinery for refining its oil to generate its own energy. Most of the young men are faced with the challenge of marrying since money is so scarce. (Ali, 12)
Iran’s Political System
Iran has undergone a lot of changes in the last few years from a constitutional kingdom to an autonomous system. Just like the western countries, Iran also has systems of monitoring the efficiency of its governmental theocracy. The elected president runs for four years and has a unicameral parliament of two hundred and seventy members, who are chosen by the citizens directly, and some seats are reserved for the marginalized groups. The country does not have a prime minister therefore the speaker plays an important role in the running of the government. Voting is democratic and any citizen who has attained the age of sixteen is eligible to vote. The president appoints the cabinet ministers and budgetary council and often heads the board responsible for the national security. (Mir-Hosseini, 35)
A supreme jurisprudent is chosen by a board of religious jury who are considered an independent assembly of professionals. This board of experts is above the other governing bodies. Ayatollah was appointed to take the position of the chief jurisprudent during the time of reformation. The board was established in order to establish a contentious philosophy which was exclusive to Khomeini’s tradition a-guardianship’’ to be put in place until the time Shi’a imam, Mahammad Al-Mahdi, who has been hidden appears. Apart from the chief jurisprudent, there is also a council of guardians which has twelve members of which half are chosen by the chief jurisprudent while the rest are selected by the supreme judicial council approved by the majlis who are people who gather together for prayers. The board of guardians regulates on the Islamic appropriateness of both the chosen representatives and the rulings they pass. This board has the powers to nullify a candidate’s participation in an election prior or even after being elected. Another board reconciles the council of guardians and the parliament.
The political institutions like the presidency and the majlis, paramilitary and the armed forces institutions are as well controlled by Islamist principles, and often manipulate the political setting of Iranian people. Some of these organizations are the volunteer Basij militia and the Iranian Reformation Guard. The evaluation of Iranian political system by Chehabi (2001), proposes that provided the clearly dictatorial way of the ancient Islamic republicans, they had an ideological condition, and this ideology originated from the immutable and everlastingly legal God-given regulations, one would anticipate their leadership to be openly dictatorial. Chehabi instead argues that the modern Iran political system is not in line with the dictatorial mode of leadership. Chehabi still continues to argue that many leaders with high positions from the Shiite religious establishment have distanced themselves from politics, Iran is not run by the clergy but it’s led by a group of politicized religious leaders named the clerisy. (Chehabi, 39)
Kamrava and Hassan, similarly argue that the political structure of the Iranian republic has two sets of power relations: the official, legally-sanctioned organizational relationships, and the informal relations, present amid and inside a group of influential persons and organizations. They claim that the juxtaposition of the official and the informal organizational coalitions has led to an unstable steadiness of two authorities, having two outcomes. The coming out of several centers of authority has improved the extent and achievement of the nation in relation to different social levels, thus providing it with significant stability and staying power. The continuation of numerous formal and informal sites for rivalry has worsened the tone and essence of factional oppositions. (Kamrava, 495)
In their article, “Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty’’, Ali and Vali integrated the evaluation of Iranian Islam, history, civil society and political movements to clarify how Iran has reacted to the challenge of harmonizing nation-building with anti-dictatorship –construction. They argue that there has been improvement in the struggle towards social equality in Iran in comparison to other nations in the Middle East. This improvement is seen in the voting system, which manipulates lawmaking and the sharing of power at national and local levels. Though there are many obstacles to social justice in Iran, the nation has citizens who appreciate the basic essence of social justice and the regulations that administer its performance. The authors continue to argue that social justice in Iran was never a scheme enforced on the nation or the best type of politics adopted from western countries but instead it came from the country, so that thoughts about social justice and political prospects are widespread in the public sphere and currently serve as the major momentum for a sustained fight toward autonomy reformation. They propose that the apparent inconsistency of the Iranian case lies in the intricate nature of Iran’s entrenched struggle with social equality and discussion over the most excellent course to growth. (Ali, 7)
The Iranian judiciary is made up of the supreme judicial committee and a supreme judge. “The judicial members should be Shi’a Muslims jurisprudents” (Ali, 9). All the decisions made in the court are based on the Shari’a law. There is liberty of the media and gathering in the constitution provided they do not go against the Islamic law. The government structure consists of the provinces, and township. The ministry of the interior chooses the leader for each unit of the government. The defense and security in the country is taken care of by the army, air force and the navy together with the revolutionary guardian which was formed just after the reformation. There is also a national police force which administers the towns while the gendarmerie focuses to the countryside peacekeeping. (Ali, 9)
Iran has a number of charitable groups and the Muslims in the country often dedicate part of their excess income to such organizations. Though the contribution is by free will, often the government gathers the tithes and uses it to maintain health institutions, children homes and the religious learning institutions. The state is also devoted to developing the marginal areas. The group by the name “the sacred development struggle” (jihad-e sazandegi), “was formed to develop rural areas and it successfully brought in energy, infrastructure and water to these areas” (Ali, 12). There are also private charitable groups endowed with the role of assisting the less fortunate in the society like the Red Cross Crescent Society. The country also engages in disaster management globally incase it’s called upon to assist. (Ali, 12)
Islamic religion has greatly influenced the political system in Iran. Many policies established in Iran are based on the Islamic religion and this has led to the government ensuring that religious education is taught in schools
Educational System
The systematic nature of the republic of Iran shows that spiritual intellectuals and academicians play a vital role in the life of the citizens of the country. Theoretical arguments are used in almost all nationwide political speeches and often appear in common magazine and periodicals. Scholars like Abdulkarim have contributed to a large extent in the nature of the modern reformation group. Jahanbegloo has observed the young Iranian intellectuals and argues that the young intellectuals have a planned responsibility in developing a better civil society and help in bringing democracy in Iran. In the evaluation done by Jahanbegloo on the important roles in Iranian society and especially by the religious intellectuals to bring change, he found that these intellectuals play an important responsibility as leaders in the vibrant Iranian media, and the base of many famous reformists’ scholars as major Islamists in the reformation age. (Jahanbegloo, 153)
In his book the Critics from within: Islamic Scholars’ Protest against the Islamic State in Iran’’, Kurzman studies the Iran’s rebellious Islamic intellectuals. Kurzman tries to evaluate the practical and the theoretical implications of the protests against the Islamic state raised by a number of famous Islamic intellectuals like Ali Montazeri and Mohsen Kadivar. These rebellious intellectuals don’t belong to any group and only recognize themselves as political Islamist in different levels. These individuals however share the same thought of protecting the Shi’a customs of intellectuals contest and evaluation, which is seen as a danger by the ruling power. Kurzman continues to argue that the scholars have become a major threat to the Iranian republic given the fact that in Iran, scholarly debates have political impacts. He continues to look into the way intellectuals trained in seminaries apply their decisive techniques to basic matters of the state lawfully, especially the republic’s right to interpretive end which are limits placed by the government against rights of scholars to interpret Islamic jurisprudence. The constitution of the republic of Iran puts restrictions on seminarians’ privileges to challenge interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence by bestowing upon the supreme leader the freedom of interpretive end or the right to close a discussion on a subject. Kurzman gave details of the seminarians who questioned the government’s stand on matters such as the privileges of women and democracy, and the wider policy of interpretive ending. The scholars differed with the religious making on a considerable political matter; their position was not meant to challenge the political regulation but instead was intended to support it by bringing what they regard as true Islamic changes. (Kurzman, 341)
The republic of Iran educates both boys and girls and families strongly support the education of their children. The system of education used dependents mainly on rote memorization which France also uses. “Arts is also encouraged among the children” (Kurzman, 344). Children learn how to sing, paint, calligraphy and write poems and at times they learn on their own. Most of the Iranians are for the idea that their children should pursue higher education and the universities in the country are very competitive. Even a young Iranian co-worker who has been residing for many years now in Toronto explained to me that many of her family in Iran have pursued higher education such Masters and PhD degrees, and “those with only an equivalent of an undergraduate degree are looked at as nothing special.”
Most of the institutions of higher learning offer mainly medical and engineering courses and these fields do attract mostly the best students. Many parents force their children to take these courses since they have higher social reward. Islamic religion rules in all areas of education and all ideas, values and judgments are taught in schools. Teachers must qualify in religious education to be allowed to teach in school. The pupils are taught in school that if they don’t keep the law then they will end up in hell. This has limited children from enjoying their group and universal liberties such as secular learning, pleasure and involvement in social events meant for children and this is total child abuse. (Kurzman, 341-345)
Social Cleavage
During the revolution time, which is claimed to have started from early 1978 with many demonstrations up to the time when the referendum was endorsed in late 1979, Iran is said to have passed through a number of transformations and events. Just after Ayatollah left Iran in early 1979, the people of Iran remained in an anxious and confused state for some time. Others said that this was the time people were calm and open for only a shorter time. This is the time that joined the reformation with different anticipations and prospects. Pahlavi did not give equal legal rights, financial and social chances to both men and women and this led to some women rejecting him. Some women desired to have roles of men and women are defined and anticipated for a more conventional life. On the other hand, there were those women who wanted to battle with men on the same grounds and against comfort and looking forward to deliverance of women along with the deliverance of the other people. These women, together with others opposing Shah’s powers, fought until they overthrew him. There was then a drastic change in the perception of morality and modernity among women. Social life for the Iranian people used to revolve around weddings, religious feasts, birthdays and New Year’s holidays. The families also used to attend movie concert sand games which were arranged by the family. After the revolution precincts put on the some entertainment activities was overlooked by many people and people started living their own of lives secretly. Products and drinks like alcohol started emerging in social events and yet they were banned. There were also secret activities including smuggling and replication the goods that were banned by the authority. The other change that probed in was the extensive use of satellite TVs. (Ashraf, 110)
The world centers very much on women’s dress as a sign to show the advancement of women in Iran. Since the reformation period, women have made amazing steps forward in nearly all areas of life. The Pahlavi and the leaders of the Islamic state have displayed support to see women playing greater roles both in governance issue and public matters. Women have been appointed as government minister and legislatures since the late 1940s. The girls are now recommended for marriage at the age of 21 years. Education for a girl child is a must now and this led to a tremendous increase in the number of girls accessing education and the number of educated women now is almost equal to that of men, and for those women who aged below 25 years, it’s over 90%, even in remote areas (Ashraf, 111).
However, it’s in the employment sector that women have not thrived so well in the republic of Iran and a decline has been experienced since the time of reformation. Unfortunately up to now many professions are open to women though they have requirements that do not favor Iranian women. This is because of the way women dress, culture demands that women’s dress should cover the whole body which is not required in most industries. Islam demands that both men and women should dress in away that do not arouse the sexual desire of the other party. Therefore men were prohibited from wearing shorts, tight trousers open and short-sleeved shirts. “The hair for women was viewed as erotic in Iran; hence women were required to cover their hair. Any open event that demands that women should not dress modestly was not required at all in the country. Professions that require physical exertion outdoor are not allowed, as well as any public entertainment that requires it is forbidden for women” (Ashraf, 115). Despite the above restrictions to the Iranian woman, the women are allowed to watch television and film as long as they observe decent clothing values. Some of the civilized Iranian women perceived this forced dressing mode as repressive, and struggle to have the values lowered. These values have been very repressive to women especially when they are forced to dress in that mode always (Ashraf, 115). Many women have found themselves injured by the reformation guards when found with uncovered hair or having too much lipstick. Quite a number of women have agreed to respectable dressing willingly, and will do so in many years to come even if there will be changes in politics. “The emotional responsibility of both women and men in Iran differs from those of men and women in the western countries” (Mir-Hosseini, 37)
The success of the Islamic reformation and the restoration of the actual position and self-esteem of women’s recognition were viewed as the commencement of the Iranian women’s involvement in educational, societal, political and economical areas, principally reaffirmed in the words of the pioneer of this reformation. “Women Must Contribute to the Fundamental affairs of the country’’ (Khomeini, 153). The involvement of women in politics was seen during the regime of president Khatami, where around 76% of them voted for him. Khatami was the only contestant who presented the unique plan for development of women’s conditions. This election challenged the perception of women in elections as described by many theories. In June 1997, after Khatami had taken charge of the state’s leadership, all changes were put in place especially those addressing women’s matters. During this era, the women’s department in the presidential bureau was changed to be the centre for women’s involvement, which was mandated to ensure an effective task in incorporating gender views in state law-making. Together with the activities of the centre for women participation, other women committees have been established at the provincial level to handle issues affecting won met at the provincial level. Khatami appointed women to some of the top administration positions and to post relating to decision making and this raised the involvement of women in the political field. (Khomeini, 153)
According to Haleh Afshar (p.110), he argues that while the Iranian women played a fundamental role in bringing change during the reformation period, the post-reformation nation has not successfully met the prospects of improving the status of women in Iran. The establishment puts women in the forefront in the homes, but Afshar describes how the Iranian women have dared this title, in quest of the chance to shape the republic’s political life by working as voted political representatives, mostly in majlis. He continues to argue that Iranian women have been working as one in politics and have made so many steps in claiming some of the rights they have been denied for so long by gradually making their request through training. They have used the Islamic teachings to raise their demands; women serving in the parliament have established a durable, acceptable political opposition in a system that does not allow political parties and driven underground almost all other opponents. Afshar points out that this success has been because of the capability of women to apply family associations and information of Islamic regulations to ensure that they were seen as trustworthy protectors of Islam. (Ashraf, 110).
The scheme of the Islamic republic is to Islamize the state, the public and customs, the socioeconomic and educational areas as well as in regime, challenge and lower ‘Islamization’. The Islamic authorities are often forced to settle in their guidelines and conversation to realistic concerns. Secularization has not been reversed, but concealed behind forced signs and empty expressions. Non-cleric spiritual leaders have played a significant part in prompting the people of Iran to reorganize the spiritual and political laws upon which the Islamic republic is based. “Scholars like Soroush have used their sprawling intellectual project, aimed at reconciling reason and faith, spiritual authority and political liberty, ranges authoritatively over comparative religion, social science and theology” (Soroush, 30). Soroush sees democracy and human rights as a central part of the modern non religious knowledge, and argues that these principles must be incorporated into Iranian society. Soruosh’s revisionist strategy to Islam has had particularly tough footing within the Iranian women‘s movement, as it enabled scholars and activists to convey their demands within an Islamic structure. Mir-Hosseini and Razavi in their discussion of dynamic jurisprudence argue that thee rules of shari’a are time place sensitive. Therefore we can see that secularization has brought some changes in the Islamic religious world as perceived by many scholars. (Soroush, 30)
Conclusion
Iran can therefore be said to be a revolutionary country, which rose from monarchy to a theocratic republic. The constitution of Iran is moved by the Koran and a conventional Koranic teaching directs many social characteristics of social and political life. Currently, power in Iran is divided among different offices and institutions. Women are also playing an important role in the leadership of Iran now.
Works Cited
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