While the UAE, as a member state of the AGCC, is committed to establishing bilateral, diplomatic and political relations with other states in the region for the sake of development and international cohesion, such developments and agreements cannot take place until the sovereignty of each of the nations is recognized and respected. In particular, Iran is one of the important states that the UAE and other member states of the AGCC recognize as a potential trade, political, and diplomatic partner (Henderson 6).
Nevertheless, it is the most controversial state when it comes to the violation of international laws and disrespect of international boundaries (Henderson 6). This argument results from the continued illegal occupation of Iran in the three islands that legally belong to the UAE, as proved by historical, social, geographical evidences as well as the international law (Mojtahedzadeh Boundary politics 48).
It is now 43 years since Iran forcefully invaded and occupied the three Islands of Abu Musa, the Greater and the Lesser Tunb. With the departure of the British colonialists in 1971, Iran used the opportunity that the leadership vacuum left to claim the three islands using its military force (Rubin 13).
Since then, Iran has been attempting to change the culture and demographics of the three Islands in order to influence the occupants to remain Iranians rather than the original Arabic speakers of the three islands (Mojtahedzadeh Boundary politics 52).
Nevertheless, historical facts show that the three islands belonging to the UAE. First, historical records indicate that the three have been under the ownership of Qawasim of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah for more than 300 years. When the British came to the region, they found the three islands under the ownership and control of the two emirates, with no ties with Iran whatsoever. To have solid control of the region, Britain was aware that the three Islands were crucial parts of the two emirates. Thus, they established a number of agreements with the rulers of the two emirates. Among these was the first agreement between the British and the Emirates concluded in 1820 (Rubin 16).
The incoming of the British was done in a diplomatic manner, which made it possible for the Europeans to control the region with no effect on the sovereignty of both the Ras al-Khaimah and the Qawasim of Sharjah over the three Islands. Noteworthy, the two Emirates were under the Qawasin Emirate, a single sovereign nation that had owned the islands for several centuries (Mojtahedzadeh Boundary politics 87).
In addition, when the British and the local leaders decided to diplomatically separate Ras al-Khaimah from the Sharjah in the early 1900s, the Qawasim of Ras al-Khaima took control of the Greater and the Lesser Tunb Islands while the Island of Abu Musa was returned to Sharjah (Henderson 8).
For the rest of the century, the situation remained peaceful, with the rulers of the two Qawasum peacefully controlling the Islands and the British providing naval protection. Between the early 1900s and 1971, the two emirates exercised their legitimate obligations of owning the islands, which were compatible with geographical features, size, and demographics (Schofield 53).
In history, there is no evidence that the three Islands have been abandoned and a power vacuum created, neither have the Islands been neglected at any point in history. In fact, the exit of the British troops in 1971 was done in the right manner and did not affect the ownership of the islands because the British did not own the Islands and only naval security to the Islands and other emirates as well (Schofield 59).
Therefore, there was no foreseen threat to external invasion. Nevertheless, the exit of the British troops in 1971 made Iran decide to invade the region and lay claim on the Islands, a phenomenon that violated international law on boundaries and sovereignty (Mojtahedzadeh Security and territoriality 141).
Apart from the historical facts, the social and demographic structures of the three islands provide adequate evidence that they are part of the UAE. The people of the Island have long been Arabs who speak Arabic as their mother tongue and not Iranian. The people have a history of tight and inseparable familial connections with other populations of the Gulf Coast, who are primarily Arabs.
Evidently, there have been little commercial and familial ties with the Iranian Persians, which provides evidence that Iran should have no claim on the Island (Mojtahedzadeh Security and territoriality 149). However, in the last four decades, Iran has seen the need to interfere with these facts by bringing its population in the Islands in order to prove that there are strong social, demographic, and familial ties with the people of Iran. In fact, it has also been attempting to control the inflow of people from other areas, especially the Arabs from UAE and other parts of the Gulf Coast.
The idea is to make sure that the population of Iranians increase significantly and that of the Arabs decrease while increasing the social and cultural integration between the two (Rubin 22). The ultimate objective, as it appears, is to force a referendum to let the occupiers of the three islands decide whether they belong, yet Iran has spent more than four decades bringing its people and barring Arabs from entering the islands. This is illegal and a violation of the sovereignty of the UAE.
Thirdly, a number of political, social, and economic factors provide evidence that the UAE has the right to own and control the islands, which Iran cannot refute. First, the three islands recognize that they are part of the UAE.
They hoist the flags of the Emirates of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah and strictly follow the laws of the two Emirates. In addition, the citizens of the Islands have citizenship of the two Emirates. Secondly, the two emirates are well represented on the three islands, even with the occupation of Iran. In fact, the representatives of the rulers of the two emirates collect taxes and oversee the use of these funds in social and economic developments for the people of the islands (Rubin 28).
Thirdly, Abu Musa and the Greater Tunb, which are relatively larger than the Lesser Tunb, have public utilities that have been developed by the two Emirates. The Lesser Tunb, due to its small size and lack of freshwater, has no public utilities, but it was under the control of the Ras al-Khaimah, whose representatives are based in the Greater Tunb.
While Iran claims the three islands, its rulers are well aware that the British and other foreigners have always sought licenses for oil and mineral exploration and drilling from the two Emirates (Mojtahedzadeh The Islands 28). The first permission was granted to the British companies in 1898, but others have been granted in 1933 and 1935 and are still valid. Thus, Iran has never been internationally recognized as the owner of the Islands.
Therefore, any claim made by Iran to claim the ownership of the Islands is not only baseless but also illegal and should be rejected. Any cooperation between Iran and the members of the AGCC should not be done until Iran leaves the three Islands, despite the importance of such cooperation on the regional and international levels.
Works Cited
Henderson, Simon. Unwanted Guest: The Gulf Summit and Iran. Washington, DC: The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, 2012. Print.
Mojtahedzadeh, Pirouz. Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran. Florida, USA: Universal Publishers Boca Raton, 2010. Print.
The Islands of Tunb and Abu Musa. London, UK: University of London, 2011. Print.
Security and territoriality in the Persian Gulf. London, UK: Routledge Curzon, 2009. Print.
Rubin, Barry. Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf. London, UK: Routledge, 2012. Print.
Schofield, Richard. Borders and territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian peninsula during the twentieth century. London: UCL Press, 2011. Print.